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ABSTRACT 
The Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community has difficulty retaining mid-
grade officers, as is evident by the considerable shortfall between Officer Programmed 
Authorization and the current officer inventory beginning at 9 years of commissioned 
service.  The objective of this study was to analyze the 13-year retention effect of adding 
a performance-based component to the SWO Critical Skills Bonus (CSB).  By analyzing 
pay and personnel records from officer cohorts entering the Navy between 1987 and 
2006, this study divided the sample of 1,331 SWOs into three performance tiers based on 
promotion timing to Lieutenant Commander (O-4).  Probit regressions showed that top 
performers exhibited higher retention rates than lower-performing peers, though pay had 
a stronger retention effect among low performers.  Additionally, the Commander (O-5) 
promotion rate for high performers was triple the promotion rate of lower performers.  
Expanding upon performance-tier differences, optimization models predicted a more 
efficient SWO CSB allocation while retaining the highest performers and remaining 
within budgetary constraints.  Thus, research recommends adding a performance-based 
component to the SWO CSB, which will maximize retention of high-performing officers.  
Furthermore, the Navy can realize additional savings by adopting cafeteria-style bonus 
options, capitalizing on differences between the federal standard discount rate and 
personal discount rates. 
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The [sic] ultimate goal of military compensation is to get the right Sailor, 
with the right skills and experience, to the right place, at the right time, for 
the best value. (Busch, 2006, p. 1) 
Since its inception, the United States Navy has always relied on its officers to lead 
Sailors and Marines in peacetime and during times of war.  Therefore, maintaining a 
corps of high caliber and fully qualified naval officers is essential to the Navy’s success.  
During a period of increasing military demands and direct competition from the civilian 
sector for high-quality Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs), retaining these officers requires 
new and innovative approaches.  As retention issues become increasingly more critical in 
the SWO community, this study examines the retention effect of adding a performance-
based component to Surface Warfare Officer bonuses. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The military can be classified as an internal labor market with a compensation 
system that significantly differs from standard compensation theory for a competitive 
labor market (Asch & Warner, 2001).  According to Rosen (1992), an internal labor 
market has few “ports of entry” and ports of exit, at which employees either enter or 
leave the organization (p. 227).  Employees are “home grown,” as they attain their 
positions through job transfer and internal promotions (Rosen, 1992, p. 227).  Due to 
virtually no lateral entry into the SWO community, the Navy must rely on retention and 
internal promotions to fill more senior positions (Asch & Warner, 2001).  For example, 
most Admirals (O-7 through O-10) entered the officer corps as Ensigns (O-1) and 
promoted through the ranks over a 25- to 35-year period.  The Navy only participates in a 
competitive labor market at “ports of entry” (during initial accession) and at ports of exit 
(after completing one’s active duty service obligation).  In order to attract and retain 
quality Surface Warfare Officers at these critical career points, the Navy must compete 
with civilian companies and other government agencies for the same talent pool of 
managers and leaders. 
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Operating in a restricted labor market, the Navy compensation system must 
remain competitive to retain naval officers.  Since 1973, the military has employed a 
tiered basic pay scale, in which pay grade (rank) and time-in-service are used to calculate 
a service member’s basic pay (DACMC, 2006).  This pay scale rewards tenure, where 
tenure acts as a proxy for human capital.  For example, a senior SWO, who is 
experienced and better trained, is more valuable to the military than a more junior officer.  
The current military pay scale lacks a specific performance metric, since overall job 
performance and mission contribution are not financially rewarded.  However, the 
Navy’s “up-or-out” promotion policy provides an incentive for at least average 
performance, since an officer will not promote to the next higher rank if performance is 
sub par (Asch & Warner, 2001, p. 525).   
To specifically address retention in the SWO community, the Navy implemented 
several pay incentives, or bonuses, including: 
• Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) 
• Junior SWO Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) 
• SWO Critical Skills Bonus 
• Senior SWO CSRB. 
These pay incentives are specific to the SWO community and do not address retention 
issues affecting other naval officers.  However, how much benefit do these pays 
contribute to the SWO community?  After several years of these retention bonuses, the 
Navy’s manpower shortages persist in the mid-grade and senior SWO ranks.  
Furthermore, these SWO retention bonuses are void of a performance metric, since all 
eligible officers receive identical bonus payouts and incur the same obligation. 
By comparison, according to Corporate Leadership Council (CLC) survey data, 
many civilian firms use tailored, performance-based compensation systems to attract and 
retain employees (CLC, 2002).  A performance-based compensation system (also called a 
pay-for-performance system) includes a variable pay structure that offers bonuses, 
rewards, or basic pay adjustments that correspond to individual employee performance 
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(CLC, 2006).  Thus, pay is not based solely on tenure, but rather on a combination of 
tenure and individual performance.  Moreover, employee bonuses are contingent upon 
on-the-job performance, as opposed to additional contractual employment obligations. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) developed a performance-based compensation 
system for federal employees when the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) was 
enacted in 2003 (GAO, 2005).  This system, which replaces the previous government 
civil service pay system, rewards employees by providing performance-based raises.  
With the civil service portion of the DoD switching to a new performance-based 
compensation system, the military is considering a modification to its compensation 
structure as well.  For example, the Defense Advisory Committee on Military 
Compensation (DACMC) has recently recommended changing the current military pay 
system.  The basis for this recommendation is captured in the April 2006 DACMC report 
to the Secretary of Defense, which states: 
The compensation offered to both active and reserve members—coupled 
with patriotism and the willingness to serve—is, arguably, the most 
important factor affecting the military services’ ability to staff the force 
with qualified people.  It is certainly the most important factor that can be 
affected by policy […and] the current compensation system can be 
improved in a way that will offer greater flexibility for force managers and 
results in an even more effective and efficient force. (DACMC, 2006, p. 1) 
Although alternative pay structures in the military are limited due to legislative 
and policy constraints, the addition of a performance-based component to the SWO 
Critical Skills Bonus may be a viable option with minimal policy reform.  Such a system 
could provide more flexibility in the distribution and allocation of retention incentives to 
better support force management goals and create greater system efficiencies (DACMC, 
2006).  As a pilot program, the SWO Critical Skills Bonus may be an appropriate vehicle 
through which to apply performance-based compensation theory to improve mid-career 
retention and officer quality in the SWO community. 
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B. OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this study are to analyze the Surface Warfare Officer retention 
problem and to evaluate performance-based compensation systems to determine if a 
change to existing retention bonuses can combat SWO retention issues.  This thesis: 
• Analyzes SWO retention issues and factors influencing retention. 
• Studies the current military compensation system, with emphasis on SWO 
incentive pays. 
• Discusses Congressional legislation and policy affecting military 
compensation. 
• Reviews the performance appraisal and promotion systems for naval 
officers. 
• Examines compensation theory in civilian labor markets. 
• Assesses compensation and incentive systems used in federal 
demonstration projects, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
National Security Personnel System, and civilian companies to identify 
best practices and potential pitfalls. 
• Models the 13-year retention effect of adding a performance-based 
component to the SWO Critical Skills Bonus. 
• Addresses legislative, policy, and cultural implications for implementing 
this revised program in the Department of the Navy. 
• Recommends a new performance-based component for the SWO Critical 
Skills program. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions examined in this thesis are: 
1. Will adding a performance-based component to the Surface Warfare 
Officer Critical Skills Bonus affect retention? 
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2. If a performance-based bonus is found to have a positive effect on SWO 
retention, how could the Navy adopt this compensation program? 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
This study hypothesizes that the addition of a performance-based component to 
the Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Bonus program will influence officers’ 
decisions to retain.  Moreover, it will positively affect retention of high-performing 
SWOs, but will negatively affect retention of low-performing SWOs.  This hypothesized 
relationship between a performance-based component and retention promotes functional 
turnover (i.e., loss of poor employees) while reducing dysfunctional turnover (i.e., loss of 
exceptional employees), which is an ideal situation for Navy manpower planners 
(Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau & Gerhart, 2003).  However, several legislative, policy, and 
cultural changes are necessary for implementing a performance-based component to 
SWO bonuses. 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis provides a qualitative analysis, focusing on policy implications of a 
performance-based compensation system for Surface Warfare Officers, coupled with a 
study of pay-for-performance systems in civilian companies and federal organizations.  
Statistical econometric and optimization modeling techniques are applied to Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) personnel and pay records to predict the 13-year 
retention effect of adding a performance-based component to the SWO Critical Skills 
Bonus program.  Specifically, the methodology includes: 
• An extensive literature and policy review. 
• Statistical regression models showing the effect of performance on 13-
year retention, characteristics among different levels of performance, and 
performance-level pay elasticities. 
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• Optimization models predicting the 13-year retention effect of varying 
bonus payments by performance level, creating a performance-based 
component for the SWO Critical Skills Bonus. 
• Suggested legislative and policy changes required for implementation of 
the revised bonus program. 
F. BENEFITS 
This thesis explores performance-based compensation and its effect on retention.  
Since few studies use statistical data analysis methods to study performance-based 
compensation systems, this study’s methodology furthers Navy research in this field.  
Furthermore, this thesis provides recommendations to improve SWO retention and the 
quality composition of the SWO community.  Also, the proposed performance-based 
component of the SWO Critical Skills Bonus supplies a framework for future pay system 
transformation.  This study’s analysis of current compensation and retention practices can 
significantly impact the Navy’s ability to execute future compensation reform. 
G. SCOPE LIMITATIONS 
This thesis specifically examines the potential effect of performance-based 
compensation on the retention of Surface Warfare Officers.  The ramifications are not 
addressed for the implementation of such a program in other officer communities, for 
enlisted Sailors, or in other branches of military service.  However, this narrow focus 
allows for direct comparison to civilian companies employing performance-based bonus 
systems to address management retention issues.  The Navy has a history of utilizing 
bonuses, special pays, and incentive pay programs to address retention issues for specific 
officer designators and skill sets.  Thus far, however, no bonus programs address 
performance differentials. 
Another limitation encountered in this study is the use of performance-based pay 
systems of civilian companies, federal demonstration projects, DHS, and NSPS as the 
framework for developing a military bonus structure.  These institutions have 
significantly different organizational cultures, traditions, and funding.  However, since 
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they compete for the same labor pool of managers and leaders, it is important to consider 
each of their compensation techniques for attracting and retaining talent. 
This thesis provides a snapshot of performance-based compensation systems in 
theory and practice, including their effect on retention.  The recommendations of this 
study focus on SWO applications and provide a foundation for further compensation 
reform. 
H. ORGANIZATION 
The structure of this thesis is organized in the following manner: 
CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER II:  SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER RETENTION 
This chapter focuses on factors affecting employee retention, human motivation, 
and intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.  The first section discusses the military as an internal 
labor market, specifically pertaining to the Navy.  The second section reviews the SWO 
career path, including critical retention points.  The third section analyzes current SWO 
retention issues.  The final section addresses factors that influence retention. 
CHAPTER III:  CURRENT POLICIES AND LEGISLATION AFFECTING 
SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS’ PAY, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, AND 
PROMOTION 
The current military pay system and compensation policy are detailed in this 
chapter.  The first section discusses the military compensation system for Surface 
Warfare Officers, including the four incentive pays (i.e., bonuses) used to address 
retention in the SWO community.  The second section analyzes the legislative process for 
military compensation.  The third section covers the SWO performance evaluation 





CHAPTER IV:  PERFORMANCE AND COMPENSATION THEORY 
This chapter discusses performance and compensation theory.  The first section 
addresses labor economic theory influencing performance, promotion, and compensation.  
The second section examines organizational behavior theory behind performance-based 
pay systems. 
CHAPTER V: PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION IN PRACTICE 
This chapter reviews pay for performance in the labor market.  The first section 
discusses implementing performance-based compensation and reviews commonly used 
pay systems.  The second section studies performance-based compensation demonstration 
projects at several federal agencies.  The third section examines a return-to-skills study of 
General Schedule (GS), Performance Management Recognition System (PMRS), and 
China Lake compensation systems.  The fourth section analyzes two recent conversions 
to performance-based compensation systems: the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).  The fifth section discusses 
civilian-sector performance-based compensation.  The final section analyzes problems 
with performance-based compensation implementation. 
CHAPTER VI:  MODELING THE RETENTION EFFECT OF ADDING A 
PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPONENT TO THE SWO CRITICAL SKILLS BONUS 
In modeling the 13-year retention effect of adding a performance-based 
component to the SWO Critical Skills Bonus, this chapter discusses the dataset and 
sample, variables, methodology, descriptive statistics, results of econometric and 
optimization models, and model limitations. 
CHAPTER VII:  SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter provides the summary, conclusions, and recommendations of this 
thesis.  The first section examines legislative, policy, and procedural changes required to 
facilitate program implementation, including a discussion of predicted cultural resistance 
to change.  The second section presents the conclusions of this study, while the final 
section provides recommendations for program implementation and future research. 
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II. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER RETENTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
Keeping a talented workforce is a challenging task for any organization.  This 
chapter focuses on factors affecting employee retention, human motivation, and intrinsic 
and extrinsic rewards.  The first section discusses the military as an internal labor market, 
focusing specifically on the Navy.  The second section discusses the career path of 
Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) to include critical retention points.  The third section 
reviews current retention issues among SWOs.  The final section analyzes factors that 
influence retention. 
B. MILITARY AS AN INTERNAL LABOR MARKET 
The US military is a large, hierarchical organization with a stringent chain-of-
command administrative and operational structure that meets the criteria of an internal 
labor market (Asch & Warner, 2001).  As such, the military faces challenges associated 
with the design of an internal labor market: limited lateral entry, an up-or-out promotion 
system, and lack of “skewness” in the pay structure (p. 524).  The military, naval officers 
in particular, must contend with these critical issues. 
1. Recruiting and Retention 
An internal labor market has few “ports of entry,” which are points in time when 
employees can either leave or join an organization (Rosen, 1992, p. 227).  At each port of 
entry, the Navy must compete with outside organizations in external labor markets.  In 
order to attract and retain talent, the Navy must offer competitive wages and benefits—
both tangible and intangible.  Wages consist of basic pay, allowances, special and 
incentive pays, annual pay adjustments, and tax advantages.  Tangible benefits include 
medical care, dental care, and reduced-cost life insurance policies.  Intangible benefits 
include military-specific and general training, education, and the opportunity to serve  
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one’s country.  Consciously and subconsciously, individuals must weigh disparity 
between military and civilian costs and benefits before deciding to join naval service or to 
remain in the civilian sector. 
For the Navy, the entry port occurs when a Sailor is recruited.  Naval officers 
receive commissions through a variety of sources, such as the US Naval Academy, Naval 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), or Officer Candidate School (OCS).  Since 
there is limited lateral entry due to the specificity of most military skills, recruiting 
quality naval officers at the entry level and lower rungs of the Navy’s hierarchy is 
essential (Asch & Warner, 2001).  The senior officers of tomorrow are the junior officers 
of today.  Since the Navy must compete with civilian and other government organizations 
for the same talent pool, the task of recruiting officers for particular specialties can be 
arduous.  With an increased operations tempo, a robust civilian economy, and a 
decreasing propensity for military service, the Navy is challenged to recruit the best talent 
for the Surface Warfare Officer community (Mullen, 2007). 
Subsequent ports or decision points beyond accession are herby referred to as 
ports of exit—since service members either choose to stay or quit, but new officers 
cannot enter (Rosen, 1992).  Most service members enter into an initial contract of 
service obligation before they are accessed and sent to initial training.  For naval officers, 
the initial obligation or minimum service requirement (MSR) depends on the 
commissioning source and the specific officer community to which they are designated.  
An Ensign (O-1), who earned a commission through the NROTC program and is 
designated as a SWO, has an initial obligation of four years.  However, if that same 
Ensign were to be commissioned through the US Naval Academy, then the MSR would 
be five years.  After the MSR has expired, officers reach a crossroad at which they must 
decide whether or not to continue service. 
At these ports of exit, the Navy must entice a certain number of officers to retain 
(in other words, to remain in service), in accordance with the Defense Officer Personnel 
Management Act (DOPMA) Officer Management System (Rostker, Thie, Lacy, Kawata 
& Purnell, 1993).  If a specific officer community is having trouble retaining the requisite 
number of officers, then retention bonuses and special pays are offered to increase the 
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officers’ willingness to stay.  Generally, the programs attach an obligation in order to 
retain the officer past a certain career milestone.  Specifically, Surface Warfare Officers 
are offered $50,000 through the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) 
retention program for committing to two department head tours, which add 
approximately five to six years of obligation past the first port of exit (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2005b).  Additionally, SWOs are offered $25,000 through the Junior SWO 
Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) for a similar commitment.  Both SWOCP and the 
Junior SWO CSRB can be taken concurrently, so SWOs are actually offered $75,000 to 
retain through two department head tours—totaling nine to eleven years of commissioned 
service (Chief of Naval Operations, 2006). 
Advanced educational opportunities are provided for SWOs approaching a port of 
exit decision.  If accepted for an educational program, a corresponding obligation is 
incurred based on program length.  For example, attending and graduating from the 
Naval Postgraduate School obligates naval officers to three-year commitments for 
Master’s Degree programs (Chief of Naval Operations, 2007).  Both monetary and 
educational incentives are used by the Navy as officer retention tools. 
However, if naval officers are not under an obligation associated with a bonus or 
educational benefit, then they are at a constant port of exit, with the choice to leave or 
stay constantly pending.  During these critical decision points, external factors (i.e., 
civilian job opportunities) influence officers’ retention decisions.  The structure of the 
military’s hierarchy is designed to account for a reasonable loss of officers at early ports 
of exit, since not all Ensigns can expect to achieve the rank of Admiral.  Fairris (2004) 
postulates that internal labor markets can positively influence retention behavior by 
developing “long job ladders,” substantial pay growth within these ladders, and a 
seniority system that reduces the politics involved in promotion (p. 592).  The Navy has 
inklings of these characteristics in its organizational structure. 
2. Promotion 
Another important characteristic of an internal labor market is that workers are 
“home grown,” or promoted from within the organization (Rosen, 1992, p. 227).  Due to 
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the lack of lateral entry, the Navy relies on its promotion system to fill its senior ranks.  
SWOs are promoted through Lieutenant (O-3) based on qualifications, minimum time-in-
rank, and minimum time-in-service (Asch & Warner, 2001).  For subsequent ranks, 
centralized promotion boards decide officers’ fates (Asch & Warner, 2001).  Rosen 
(1992) suggests that the importance of the selection process increases with the level of 
rank, since the levels of authority and responsibility also increase dramatically as an 
officer is promoted through the ranks.  The more senior the officer, the more valuable 
that officer becomes to the Navy, due to increased human capital.  Furthermore, superior 
work effort and ability has a spillover effect, where subordinates are motivated to 
increase productivity under the leadership of high performers (Asch & Warner, 2001).  
This increase in total productivity for the organization makes high-quality officers even 
more indispensable.  Figure 1 is a graphical depiction of the inverse relationship between 
the officer inventory size and the value of officers to the Navy at each rank. 
 
Figure 1.   Inverse Relationship between Officer Inventory and the Value of Officers to 
the Navy 
The Navy’s statutory officer promotion boards are held annually, and board 
members select qualified officers for promotion based on the quality of their service 
record.  Service records contain fitness reports (annual officer job evaluations), 















Officer Inventory Value of Officers 
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a history of past assignments, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), and personal 
awards.  According to Asch and Warner’s (2001) interpretation of promotion 
tournaments, individuals are evaluated on both ability and work effort.  The Navy’s 
promotion system considers both these characteristics, which are captured in service 
records, when selecting officers for promotion.  However, unobserved factors may also 
contribute to promotion decisions.  Promotion boards consider officers who are “fully 
qualified” and then select those who are “best qualified” (Secretary of the Navy, 2007b, 
p. B-1).  According to the Secretary of the Navy (2007b), “fully qualified” officers are 
able to perform the duties of the next higher pay grade, while “best qualified” status is 
assigned to officers after being evaluated in the following four areas: 
1.  Proven and sustained performance 
2.  Education, personal, and professional development 
3.  Ability to meet statutory promotion objectives 
4.  Achievement of competency and skill requirements (pp. B1-B3). 
Because of the hierarchical structure of the Navy, there are a limited number of 
openings for senior-ranking officers, as dictated by DOPMA grade tables (Rostker et al., 
1993).  Beginning with the rank of Lieutenant Commander (O-4), the Navy limits the 
number of officers, within each officer community, who can be promoted to the next 
rank.  Based on this restriction, the promotion system acts as a contest (i.e., tournament), 
in which officers compete with their peers for a limited number of promotion slots (Asch 
& Warner, 2001).  This competition creates an incentive for officers to increase their 
work effort, which reduces individual shirking.  The promotion rate also depends on the 
cohort retention rate (Asch & Warner, 2001).  As more officers retain, more officers who 
are “fully qualified” compete during the next promotion cycle.  This situation creates a 
higher-quality cohort at the next rank, since the promotion board screens and selects only 
the best candidates.  Therefore, as fewer officers retain, the officer pool (both “fully” and 
“best qualified”) considered by the promotion board is smaller.  This problematic 
circumstance forces the Navy to promote officers who may not have been “best 
qualified” in a larger cohort. 
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Additionally, the Navy’s promotion system contains an “up-or-out” clause (Asch 
& Warner, 2001, p. 525).  If naval officers (O-2 through O-4) fail to select for promotion 
to the next rank after two annual promotion cycles, then they can be processed for 
involuntary separation (Secretary of the Navy, 2005).  According to SECNAVINST 
1920.6C, even if they twice failed to select, most Lieutenant Commanders (O-4) are 
generally given leeway to retain on active duty until retirement at 20 years of service 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2005).  Commanders (O-5) and Captains (O-6) have similar “up-
or-out” requirements, with the same twice-fail-to-select criteria and mandatory retirement 
by 28 and 30 years, respectively (Secretary of the Navy, 2005).  Asch and Warner (2001) 
state that “by generating turnover, up-or-out rules and minimum performance standards 
increase the promotion opportunities for others when some are forced to leave, which 
increases retention of those who meet the standard” (p. 538). 
Arguably, officers not promoted after two opportunities have lower ability and 
lower productivity, as evidenced by their non-selection by two separate boards.  The 
performance standard increases with the level of rank, which, in turn, motivates “high-
taste” and “high-ability” officers to work harder (Asch & Warner, 2001, p. 538).  Harder 
work effort yields earlier promotions, which ensures that “high-taste” and “high-ability” 
workers promote on time.  This symbiotic relationship allows the Navy to get the “best 
bang for its buck” in an all-volunteer force.  All officers are persuaded to remain 
productive, and only the “high-taste” and “high-ability” officers promote to the most 
senior positions.  Therefore, in theory, Admirals should be the hardest working officers 
with the highest ability among their initial accession cohorts.  In reality, the politics of the 
Navy’s promotion process become more prominent in both the mid-grade and upper-
echelon levels.  Sometimes “who you know” or “visibility” can influence promotions as 
much as actual, documented performance (Schwind & Laurence, 2006, p. S85).  In 
reference to Admirals, Schwind and Laurence (2006) argue that: 
By the time an officer reaches the senior levels, the promotion process has 
normally prevented substandard performers from attaining higher rank, 
and thus, all performance evaluations at this level tend to be stellar.  The 
distinguishing factor among officers at this career point is visibility … 
[the] actual impact of performance lessens as an officer rises in seniority 
and the visibility factor increases dramatically.  (pp. S85–S86) 
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3. Pay Structure 
According to the Efficiency Wage Theory, employers in internal labor markets 
use “efficiency wage strategies, where employers raise wages above competitive market 
rates in order to promote productivity or deter shirking” (Doeringer, 1986, p. 48).  For the 
Navy, an officer’s pay is dictated by the military’s tiered basic pay table, in which pay 
grade (rank) and time-in-service (seniority) are used to calculate basic pay (DACMC, 
2006).  This compensation is fairly competitive for junior managers, but loses its edge for 
more senior talent.  Due to the lack of lateral-entry and “home grown” senior officers, the 
Navy must offer competitive wages to attract a talented entry pool that has the potential 
to perform the entry-level jobs of today and the higher-level jobs of tomorrow (Asch & 
Warner, 2001, p. 551).  If the Navy had perfect information about officers’ productivity, 
then labor economic theory would deduce that the Navy should pay wages (W) equal to 
an officer’s marginal product of labor (MPL) (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006).  However, to 
recruit high-ability officers, the military pay system was designed to set initial wages 
above their MPL, especially since most officers spend the majority of their first years in 
training.  This situation creates an economic deficit for the organization, resulting from 
salaries paid at the junior officer ranks.  Conversely, senior officers’ wages are well 
below their MPL, creating an economic surplus in the upper ranks (Asch & Warner, 
2001).  According to Asch and Warner (2001), the economic surplus at the higher ranks 
funds the overpayments (deficit) in the lower ranks. 
To achieve equilibrium so that LW MP∑ = ∑  across all pay grades, the Navy’s 
pay scale exhibits a lack of “skewness,” in which pay at lower levels is close to pay at 
higher levels, when compared to civilian compensation schemes (Asch & Warner, 2001, 
p. 524).  For example, “The typical O-6 [Captain] receives about three times the pay of 
an O-1 [Ensign] ... By contrast, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994b) report that level 6 
managers in the firm they studied earned about five times the amount earned by level 1 
managers” (as cited in Asch & Warner, 2001, p. 524). 
With such a disparity between the relative pay in civilian firms and the military, 
an officer’s decision to retain is significantly influenced by the military pay structure and 
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in-kind benefits (Asch & Warner, 2001).  Holding all other factors equal, and based 
solely on relative pay, an officer with perfect information about the labor market would 
choose to resign and seek employment in the civilian sector.  However, officers consider 
more than basic pay when making informed retention decisions.  Since the basic pay 
table recognizes seniority in addition to rank, it provides an incentive to remain on active 
duty longer.  Nonetheless, seniority only has a marginal impact, since high-performing 
and high-ability officers also expect to move up on the pay grade (rank) axis of the pay 
table. 
Under the military pay structure, naval officer pay is significantly influenced by 
individual performance as it affects promotion status.  According to Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom (1994a), workers are placed on the “fast track” when assigned jobs in which 
their productivity is highest, which in turn yields faster promotions (p. 901).  For the 
Navy, officers are considered on the fast track when they outperform their peers, 
resulting in earlier promotion to the next rank and more challenging job assignments.  
Baker et al. (1994a) argue that “those promoted quickly once should be promoted quickly 
again” (p. 901).  Likewise, naval officers on the fast track generally stay on the fast track 
since the Navy continues to recognize high performance and successful completion of 
challenging job assignments during the promotion process. 
However, the speed of promotion on the fast track is limited by Navy policy, 
which regulates the required time-in-grade before promotion to the next rank.1  
Furthermore, since the years-of-service component of the pay table recognizes seniority, 
the reward for early promotion for officers on the fast track has a reduced effect (Rosen, 
1992, p. 235).  As Rosen (1992) states: 
If a person works hard to get on the fast track, the gain is temporary and 
small because others are soon promoted anyway and receive the same pay.  
The person on the faster track gains only a temporary advantage often not 
worth the extra effort (p. 235). 
                                                 
1 The “fast track” is limited by promotion zones established for each statutory promotion board. 
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Additionally, the presence of a fast track creates increased competition among 
officers.  This competition can be healthy if kept under control, but can become a burden 
if there is proven discrimination against officers not on the “fast track.” 
Due to the lack of skewness in the military pay table, basic pay alone is 
insufficient to attract and retain talent in the surface warfare community.  At this point, 
the military retirement pension plan becomes an influencing factor.  After 20 years of 
service, a Sailor is vested in the pension plan that provides an immediate, inflation-
protected annuity (Asch & Warner, 2001).2  According to Rosen (1992), the retirement 
pension may be the prevailing force for retention after completing a second “tour,” or 
obligation period—possibly around nine to eleven years of commissioned service for the 
SWO community (p. 232).  Officers with higher probabilities of retention place larger 
weights on long-term rather than short-term compensation (Asch & Warner, 2001).  They 
value the long-term benefits of receiving a regular retirement paycheck each month 
throughout their retirement years, compared to a potentially higher immediate salary in 
the civilian sector.  Arguably, officers who place more emphasis on long-term payoffs 
will be more loyal, in terms of retention, to the Navy.  They are willing to forgo the 
immediate rewards of higher-paying civilian jobs for the opportunity to eventually 
recapture their economic rents (from the lower military pay collected while on active 
duty) in retirement. 
C. THE SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER CAREER PATH 
Historically, the typical SWO career path was standardized, and deviations from 
the norm were discouraged.  However, due to changing requirements in the SWO 
                                                 
2 There are three retirement plans available for military members based on the date they initially 
entered military service (DIEMS): FINAL PAY, HIGH-3, and REDUX.  Under the FINAL PAY plan, 
Sailors with a DIEMS date prior to September 8, 1980, receive retired pay computed as 2.5 percent times 
the number of years of service, multiplied by their final basic pay at date of retirement.  Under the HIGH-3 
plan, Sailors with a DIEMS date between September 8, 1980, and July 31, 1986, receive retired pay 
computed as 2.5 percent times the number of years of service, multiplied by the average of the highest 36 
months of basic pay.   Under the REDUX plan, Sailors with a DIEMS date of August 1, 1986, (or later) 
receive retired pay computed as “(2.5 [percent] times the number of years of service minus one percent for 
each year under 30 years of service) times the average of the highest 36 months of basic pay during that 
service.”  The REDUX plan was modified with the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, which 
allowed for a choice between HIGH-3 and a modified-REDUX plan (with a $30,000 Career Status Bonus 
at the 15-year point).  (Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 2007) 
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community, the career path currently has added flexibility and alternative opportunities.  
The following sections discuss the career opportunities for Surface Warfare Officers, 
including potential ports of exit. 
1. From Accession through the First Department Head Tour 
Figure 2 displays the current SWO career path from an officer’s commissioning 
through the first department head tour, with the top gray bar showing cumulative years of 
commissioned service. 
 
Figure 2.   SWO Career Path from Accession through the First Department Head Tour 
(Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b, p. 4) 
For officer cohorts accessing prior to 2005, Surface Warfare Officers attended 
division officer training at Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) in Newport, RI, for 
six months before reporting aboard their first ship.  However, more recent cohorts have 
reported directly to their first division officer (DIVO) tour.  Brick-and-mortar SWOS was 
replaced by the DIVO “SWOS at Sea” program, allowing junior Surface Warfare 
Officers to complete computer-based training modules at a self-paced speed, in lieu of 
classroom instruction.  In addition to completing “SWOS at Sea,” DIVOs are expected to 
earn their Officer of the Deck Underway (OOD U/W) qualification before proceeding to 
SWOS for a three-week validation course, taught in the classroom and with simulators.  
After completing the three-week course, junior SWOs report back onboard their ship to 
complete their Surface Warfare Officer qualification prior to finishing their first DIVO 
tour.  This qualification process is further illustrated in Figure 3. (Commander Naval 





Figure 3.   SWO Qualifications during the First Division Officer Tour 
(Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008a, p. 5) 
 
Upon completing the first DIVO tour, SWOs are assigned second DIVO billets on 
different Navy warships.  During this tour, they are expected to qualify as Engineering 
Officer of the Watch (EOOW), if not previously earned (Commander Naval Surface 
Forces, 2008a).  If junior SWOs previously qualified as EOOW during their first DIVO 
tour, they are eligible for assignment to an Individual Augmentation (IA) billet in a 
forward-deployed area, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, in lieu of a second DIVO tour at sea 
(Chief of Naval Operations, 2008b). 
At approximately four years of commissioned service (YCS), Surface Warfare 
Officers are eligible for their first shore duty.  A variety of shore billets are available, 
including graduate education institutions and various staff duties.  During this period 
ashore, SWOs also have the opportunity to complete Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME) Phase I.  Most officers finish their initial minimum service 
requirement during this shore tour and are faced with a critical retention decision at this 
port of exit. (Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b) 
If choosing to retain beyond the first shore duty assignment, Surface Warfare 
Officers report to SWOS for a six-month Department Head School.  Upon graduation, 
SWOs report for their first department head (DH) tour at sea.  In addition to normal 
duties, DHs are expected to qualify as Tactical Action Officers (TAOs).  If requested, 
high performing DHs also have the opportunity to screen for Lieutenant Commander 
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Command, generally as the commanding officer of a mine countermeasure (MCM) 
Avenger-class ship or a coastal patrol (PC) combatant craft (Commander Navy Personnel 
Command, 2007b). 
2. Second Department Head Tour through Executive Officer (XO) Tour 
As illustrated in Figure 4, the SWO career path continues from the second 
department head tour through the executive officer (XO) tour, with the top gray bar 
continuing the cumulative years of commissioned service. 
 
Figure 4.   SWO Career Path from the Second Department Head Tour through XO  
(Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b, p. 20) 
At approximately 9 YCS, Surface Warfare Officers report for their second 
department head assignment.  Similar to the alternative DIVO tour, some officers can 
participate in IA assignments instead of the traditional second DH assignment.  Upon 
completion of their first DH tour, Lieutenant Commander Command-selected officers 
attend commanding officer (CO) training at SWOS prior to assuming XO and subsequent 
CO duties onboard their assigned MCM or CO duties onboard a PC (Commander Navy 
Personnel Command, 2007b).  Upon completing the required DH tour obligation, mid-
grade SWOs transfer to various shore duty assignments, such as: graduate education, 
Junior War College, joint-duty assignments, subspecialty tours, and staff billets 
(Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b).  During this period, SWOs reach another 
critical port of exit as the commitment from the Junior SWO CSRB and SWOCP expire.  
In addition, according to the Chief of Naval Operations (2004b), Lieutenant Commanders 
(LCDR) can apply for one of six specialty career path programs, which include: 
• Anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) 
• Anti-submarine warfare 
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• Missile defense 
• Mine warfare specialist 
• Shore installation management 
• Strategic sealift (MSC/MPF) 
Acceptance into one of these six specialty career path programs creates the opportunity 
for Executive Officer Special Mission (XO-SM) assignment. 
3. Commanding Officer (CO) Tour through Major Command 
Figure 5 illustrates the senior portion of the SWO career path, with the top gray 
bar continuing the cumulative years of commissioned service. 
 
Figure 5.   SWO Career Path from CO through Major Command  
(Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b, p. 32) 
If Surface Warfare Officers continue on the traditional SWO career path, they 
then screen for Commander Command.  If selected, they transfer to SWOS to complete 
the CO school curriculum before assuming command at sea.  After training, these SWOs 
report onboard their respective warships as XO and eventually “fleet up” to CO aboard 
the same ship.  If not selected for Commander Command, SWOs fill various sea and 
shore billets.  After a successful Commander Command tour, SWOs transfer to a variety 
of assignments, including a Senior War College, joint-duty assignments, subspecialty 
tours, or staff billets.  At 20 YCS, naval officers face a major port of exit because they 
become eligible for retirement; thereby, they are entitled to lifetime military retirement 
pay and benefits.  However, if SWOs screen for major command, they can look forward 
to assuming another command opportunity at approximately 22.5 YCS and, therefore, 
may be persuaded to retain on active duty.  After this point, the SWO career path 
 22
becomes less predictable, as Surface Warfare Officers compete for flag rank while others 
choose to retire (Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b). 
4. Individual Augmentation (IA) and Global War on Terrorism Support 
Assignments (GSA) during Shore Duty 
At various points along the career path, SWOs can be assigned Individual 
Augmentation (IA) and Global War on Terrorism Support Assignments (GSA) during 
shore duty intervals.  While filling IA and GSA billets, individual naval officers augment 
or fill Army, Marine Corps, or joint units in forward-deployed areas of the world (GAO, 
2007b).  These billets involve work generally outside the officer’s specialty and require 
long periods of deployment.  Surface Warfare Officers assigned IA tasking often receive 
little notice and are removed from their shore duty billets for a specified amount of time 
(Chief of Naval Operations, 2008b).  Upon successful completion of IA tasking, officers 
are reassigned to their previous shore duty assignment, but they are not compensated with 
a shore duty assignment extension to make up for lost time at home.  These 
unaccompanied tours are generally not included in the SWO career path for shore duty 
periods.  Conversely, GSA billets are offered (or sometimes ordered) to officers as 
regular assignments at the beginning of the shore duty slating window, thereby increasing 
the “predictability” of such assignments for officers and their families (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2008a, p. 1).  Once the GSA requirements are fulfilled, officers are then 
transferred to other shore duty jobs, if career timing permits (Chief of Naval Operations, 
2008a).  
Figure 6 displays the current (as of February 2008) snapshot of the number of 
SWOs filling IA or GSA billets by rank, with the percentage of total Navy officers 
participating in these programs depicted on the right side y-axis.  The majority of surface 




Figure 6.   Snapshot of Surface Warfare Officers filling IA and GSA Billets  
(Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b, p. 13) 
 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that senior officer 
community managers are concerned that naval officers filling Individual Augmentation 
(IA) billets may have an impact on retention, but the GAO was unable to estimate the 
actual effect (2007b).  As a more recent initiative, the effect of Global War on Terrorism 
Support Assignments (GSA) on SWO retention is a study in its infancy.  In the near 
future, the Navy will need to capture the effect of IA and GSA assignments on retention 
to bring the full picture of SWO manpower requirements into focus. 
D. RETENTION ISSUES AMONG SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS 
1. SWO Retention 
The Navy manages to meet its overall end-strength targets set by the DOPMA grade 
tables.  In other words, it achieves aggregate retention goals in terms of the quantity of 
officers retained, but does not necessarily address the quality of officers who retain (Busch, 
2006).  Figure 7 depicts the overall retention rates in percentages for naval officers in fiscal 
years 2001, 2003, and 2005.  It is important to note that retention rates are conditional on 
officers retaining at previous points.  For example, the 85-percent retention rate for officers in 
fiscal year 2001 at ten years of service, means that 85-percent of the officers who are still in 
service at the ten-year point retain for an eleventh year of service. 
 24
  
Figure 7.   Overall Retention Rates for Navy Commissioned Officers by Commissioning 
Program for Selected Fiscal Years at Key Ports of Exit  
(GAO, 2007b, p. 33) 
Even with high overall retention rates, each officer community has difficulty 
retaining the right mix of officers in specific grades.  The Government Accountability 
Office (2007b) has identified retention problems in the medical, dental, surface warfare, 
and intelligence officer communities.  Specifically, the SWO community has trouble 
retaining the proper number of mid-grade officers to meet its billet requirements.  Figure 
8 shows the SWO inventory of officers plotted against the number authorized, Officer 
Programmed Authorization (OPA), for fiscal year 2008.  The yellow area represents 
fiscal year 2008 OPA, while the bars indicate the number of officers in inventory as of 
February 2008.  Additionally, the area highlighted by the red oval indicates the 
detrimental gap between SWO inventory and OPA. 
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Figure 8.   SWO Community Standardized FY08 Inventory  
(Adapted from Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b, p. 3) 
The Surface Warfare Officer community is currently meeting its overall end-
strength (total quantity of officers) goal, as Figure 8 shows a total inventory surplus of 
920 SWOs compared against OPA.  However, shortages exist in mid-grade and senior 
ranks in various year groups, defined by YCS.  Specifically, a shortage in the mid-grade 
officer ranks starts at Lieutenant (O-3) with nine YCS and continues through Commander 
(O-5) with 22 YCS.  Two years of exceptions occur at the rank of Lieutenant Commander 
(O-4) with 11 YCS and 12 YCS.  While inventory meets or exceeds OPA for the first 
four years at the Captain (O-6) level, a shortage of senior-grade officers emerges from 27 
YCS through 30 YCS.   Altogether, the inventory shortage is 552 SWOs, gapped from 
senior O-3 through O-6 officer ranks (Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b). 
Figure 9 shows the February 2001 SWO inventory plotted against fiscal year 2000 
OPA.  To examine the retention trend over time, a comparison of Figure 8 and Figure 9 
provides evidence that the current officer shortage has merely shifted to the right, to 













1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 30+
FY 08 OPA ENS LTJG LT LCDR CDR CAPT
O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6 
Inventory vs. FY08 OPA 
Rank          OPA      Inventory      Delta 
O1               918          1521            603 
O2              1030         1376            346 
O3              1750         2273            523 
O4              1356         1189           (167) 
O5              1031          760            (271) 
O6               500           386            (114)  
Total          6585         7505            920 
Years of Commissioned Service (YCS)  
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Figure 9.   SWO Community February 2001 Inventory Plotted against FY00 OPA  
(Crayton, Darling & Mackin, 2002, p. 4) 
A consistent shortage in the SWO community has continued over the years.  
However, the year group shortage has improved since 2001 for senior LT (O-3) and 
junior LCDR (O-4) year groups, but the gaps worsened at the CDR (O-5) level.  This 
may suggest that current SWO retention initiatives, such as SWOCP and Junior SWO 
CSRB, are helping combat the problem at the pre-department head level.  Crawford, 
Thomas, Mehay, and Bowman (2006) back this assertion, by claiming that introducing 
“SWOCP is related to an increase in retention of SWOs” (p. 27).  However, effects of the 
Global War on Terrorism may also have impacted the surge in retention (Crawford et al., 
2006). 
Furthermore, due to promotions over the past eight years and the lack of lateral 
entry into the SWO community, shortages at junior ranks in fiscal year 2000 (FY00) have 
progressed into shortages at more senior ranks in FY08.  However, the LCDR and CDR 
inventory shortfall remains quite prominent.  These inventory shortages require 
immediate attention from the SWO community.  Convincing more officers at 11 through 
13 YCS to retain will improve retention shortfalls in later years, so that later inventory 
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levels will approach OPA for more senior SWOs.  Though the trend among Navy leaders 
has been to focus attention on SWO retention through department head tours, attention is 
required in later years as well (Monroe & Cymrot, 2004). 
Manning shortfalls in specific pay grades at particular points in time is not 
conducive for effective fleet readiness.  Additionally, manning “gaps” create both hard 
and soft costs for the Navy (Thie, Harrell, Marquis, Brancato, Yardley, Graff, et al., 
2003, p. 91).  As defined by Thie et al. (2003), hard costs are quantifiable monetary 
outlays, such as compensation, accession costs, and training expenditures.  On the other 
hand, soft costs are tough to quantify; they include lower productivity due to deficiencies, 
readiness issues resulting from low retention, and weak team cohesion (Thie et al., 2003).  
With the excess of junior officers and a shortage of mid-grade officers, soft costs are 
incurred as junior officers have to fill billets slated for officers with more experience 
(Thie et al., 2003).  According to Thie et al. (2003), “job performance suffers, and the 
morale of the junior officers may also decline because of lower job satisfaction and 
resentment over carrying out responsibilities without being compensated fairly” (p. xix). 
2. Differences in SWO Retention by Gender 
The SWO retention problem is compounded by the significant difference in SWO 
retention rates between male and female Surface Warfare Officers.  Female SWOs are 
retaining at a much lower rate than their male counterparts (Commander Naval Surface 
Forces, 2008b).  Figure 10 displays the gender differences in SWO retention by year 
group (YG), from YG95 through YG04.3  The retention trend analysis beyond YG00 is 
premature.  YG01 through YG04 have not yet “closed out,” since not all officers in these 
year groups have committed to department head tours (Commander Naval Surface 
Forces, 2008b, p. 17). 
                                                 
3 Year group (YG) is defined as the year an officer was commissioned.  For officers commissioned 
after December 15 of a given year, their year group is the following year. 
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Figure 10.   Gender Differences in SWO Retention by Year Group  
(Adapted from Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b, p. 17) 
 
Figure 10 suggests that the male SWO retention rate has been almost double the 
female rate for YG95 through YG01.  This trend in retention reduces the diversity of the 
SWO population at more senior ranks, as fewer female SWOs are available for 
department head and more senior job assignments.  Crawford et al. (2006) argue that 
female SWOs are more likely to leave the Navy due to family needs, such as wanting to 
have children.  “They feel that they must choose between family and career,” thereby 
negatively influencing their intention to retain in the SWO community (Crawford et al., 
2006, p. 13).  Even the work load during SWO shore duty is not conducive to family life, 
as many SWOs work long hours (Crawford et al., 2006). 
To combat this gender difference in retention rates between men and women, the 
Navy has considered several unorthodox solutions to the problem, such as exploring the 
potential impact of sabbatical leaves for SWOs (Yardley, Thie, Brancato & Abbott, 
2004).  Three potential sabbatical leave programs were reviewed by Yardley et al. 
(2004): 
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1. A facilitated return to service (RTS) program4 
2. A one-year leave of absence (LOA) program5 
3. A personal leave (PL) program6 
Yardley et al. (2004) analyzed the three alternatives using return-on-investment 
(ROI) criteria to evaluate the Navy’s investment (cost) and the predicted program 
benefits.  The ROI rate was calculated by subtracting the total discounted costs from the 
total discounted benefits for each alternative, dividing the resulting difference by the total 
discounted cost, and then multiplying the result by 100 to obtain a percentage.  Program 
costs contained administrative expenditures for implementing each program.  Program 
benefits included increased SWO retention and decreased accession requirements to 
achieve the same force profile.  Table 1 provides a summary of the results from the ROI 
models. 
Table 1.   ROI Model Results for Each Proposed Sabbatical Leave Program  
(Yardley et al., 2004, p. 26) 
 
                                                 
4 The facilitated RTS program would allow selected officers, who have voluntarily separated within 
the previous two years, to return to service without going through the usual “red tape.”  This program 
would be very selective, since returning officers would count against new accessions.  Also, SWOs’ career 
clocks, for promotion and retirement purposes, would be adjusted to account for the break in service upon 
return.  (Yardley et al., 2004) 
5 The merit-based LOA program would allow SWOs to depart for up to one year to handle personal 
matters, such as pregnancy or advanced education.  Officers would be contractually obligated to serve out 
two department head tours upon return.  During the LOA, officers would not receive pay, but they would 
receive medical and dental benefits.  Similarly to the RTS program, SWOs’ career clocks would be 
adjusted accordingly.  (Yardley et al., 2004) 
6 The PL program increases the leave time between duty stations from 30 days to 90 days, of which the 
officer would contribute up to 45 days of accumulated leave, and the Navy would match the remainder.  
This program would be offered twice during a SWO’s initial 12 years of service.  During the PL period, 
officers would remain on active duty, receive all pays and benefits, and maintain their career clocks.  
(Yardley et al., 2004). 
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Based on the assumptions that Yardley et al. (2004) used for the ROI models, the 
RTS program increased SWO retention while reducing SWO accessions to yield 10 more 
SWOs to remain through 9 YCS.  Since the program cost was minimal, the RTS program 
produced a large positive ROI.  The LOA program produced similar results, but the 
program costs were slightly higher due to extra expenditures for medical and dental 
benefits during the LOA period.  The PL program was predicted to have little effect on 
SWO retention, and it would incur higher costs since the Navy would match up to 45 
days of leave while continuing to pay for officers’ pay and benefits.  Yardley et al. (2004) 
also conducted a sensitivity analysis for each alternative to test for changes in the ROI 
models’ assumptions.  These analyses yielded similar results within a relevant range of 
assumptions. 
3. Lateral Transfer to Other Officer Communities 
In addition to leaving the Navy during ports of exit, Surface Warfare Officers also 
have the opportunity to lateral transfer to other officer communities at various points in 
their career path.  According to the Director of Manpower, Personnel, Training, and 
Education Policy Division (2007c), the requirements for eligibility to lateral transfer from 
the SWO community include: 
• Must have respective year group authorized by the lateral transfer board 
precept. 
• Must have completed at least 24 months of active commissioned service. 
• Must have qualified as a Surface Warfare Officer (i.e., earned SWO pin). 
• May not be under orders to Department Head School at SWOS. 
• Must be within one year of satisfying the SWOCP obligation, the Junior 
SWO CSRB, or the SWO Critical Skills Bonus. 
Though officers who transfer to other communities still retain in the Navy, these 
officers are a loss to the SWO community since they no longer fill SWO-designated 
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billets at sea and on shore duty.  Figure 11 displays the number of annual lateral transfers 
by unrestricted line officer community from 1986 through 2002. 
 
Figure 11.   Lateral Transfers by Unrestricted Line Officer Community  
(Monroe & Cymrot, 2004, p. 7) 
Figure 11 suggests that approximately 125 to 250 Surface Warfare Officers 
laterally transfer to other officer communities each year (Monroe & Cymrot, 2004).  This 
loss to the SWO community is reflected in the SWO inventory.  Though the Navy wants 
to ensure a good officer-occupational fit for each naval officer and encourages lateral 
transfers as a vehicle for achieving this fit, approving a large annual allowance for lateral 
transfers drains the ability of the SWO community to meet OPA obligations.  
Additionally, due to the lack of lateral entry into the SWO officer ranks, Surface Warfare 
Officer accessions must be adjusted to meet the Navy’s requirement for at least 275 new 
SWO department heads each year (Monroe & Cymrot, 2004). 
4. Retention of “High-Quality” Surface Warfare Officers 
Confounding this personnel retention dilemma is a concern that the Navy is not 
retaining high-quality officers, as it is unclear if the officers who retain at each port of 
exit are of the requisite caliber.  Retention bonuses and special pays are non-
discriminatory systems, in which officers meeting the minimum qualification 
requirements and applying for incentive pays are selected with few reservations.  Without 
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a performance mechanism during the screening process, these retention bonuses and 
incentive pay programs do not ensure that the best-qualified officers are retained.  Also, 
these programs are not flexible to changing labor market conditions.  If more officers 
retain than were anticipated due to a worsening civilian job market, the Navy may be 
slow to react in changing the bonus program.  Once mandated, these monetary programs 
are viewed as entitlements rather than as incentives.  Additionally, retention bonuses only 
affect those officers at the margin of a stay-or-leave decision (Asch & Warner, 2001).  
Officers who are strongly opposed to staying in the Navy will want to charge the Navy 
exorbitant economic rents in order to retain.  It is not cost effective for the Navy to retain 
officers with such preferences.  However, it is possible that these officers are the high-
ability and highly productive leaders the Navy needs to retain. 
a. Defining Quality Performance 
How does the SWO community define the quality of an officer?  
Throughout Surface Warfare Officers’ careers, quality is an amorphous concept that 
changes as officers advance in rank.  Generally, the promotion board determines the 
quality of an officer.  However, several indicators of a quality rating exist among SWOs: 
qualifications, subspecialty (SSP) codes, graduate education, Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME), and documented performance in an officer’s fitness report (FITREP). 
(1) SWO Qualifications.  When SWOs complete warfare 
qualifications, an additional qualification designation (AQD) entry is annotated in their 
officer service records.  AQD entries represent an officer’s personal qualifications history 
and (to some degree) performance and quality.  Certain AQDs are required to fulfill 
specific job positions.  For example, the SWO qualification AQD is required for SWO 
DH billets.  Officers are expected to attain the requisite AQD, but those who achieve 
AQDs beyond the actual job requirements and exceed expectations for their peer group 
exhibit high-quality characteristics. 
The performance requirement for the first DIVO assignment 
includes: attaining Officer of the Deck Underway (OOD U/W) and SWO qualifications. 
These requisite qualifications begin a career filled with peer competition in which 
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“sustained superior performance at sea and proven leadership positions in shore or joint 
assignments” are evaluated and rewarded through promotion and eventual selection to 
command (Commander Navy Personnel Command, 2007a, p. 6).  Attaining additional 
SWO qualifications, such as Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) during the first 
DIVO tour, enables officers to stand out among their peers.  During the second DIVO 
tour assignment, SWOs are expected to obtain EOOW qualifications and, if permitted by 
their commanding officer, Tactical Action Officer (TAO) qualifications.  If the EOOW 
and TAO qualifications are not achieved during DIVO tours, officers are required to 
complete them during their first DH tour at sea.  Additional warfare AQDs are awarded 
for qualification at additional watch stations, such as anti-submarine warfare evaluator or 
AEGIS missile system operator.  Finally, mid-grade and senior SWOs screen for XO and 
CO command, which includes respective AQDs that define quality among their peers. 
(2) Subspecialty (SSP) codes.  During shore duty, Surface Warfare 
Officers have the opportunity to enhance their personal qualifications by attaining 
subspecialty (SSP) codes.  SSP codes identify an officer’s achievements in enrolling and 
completing “advanced education, functional training, and significant experience in 
various fields and disciplines” (Commander Navy Personnel Command, 2008b, p. 1).  As 
such, SSP codes can be awarded for both education and experience within a specific 
specialty field.  For example, 3130X is the SSP code for manpower systems analysis 
management, where the suffix (placeholder is X) represents the level of qualification 
based on experience and education.  Certain SSP codes provide further detailing 
opportunities that are not provided to non-designated officers, thereby providing 
additional means to separate quality from non-quality SWOs. (Director of Manpower, 
Personnel, Training, and Education Policy Division, 2007b) 
 (3) Graduate Education.  Assignments to duty locations such as 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), United States Naval Academy (USNA), and Naval 
Reserve Officer Training Commands (NROTC) provide the opportunity to attain a 
Master’s Degree and higher education at a Navy-sponsored residence program.  Officers 
can also choose to enroll in Navy distance-learning education programs.  Finally, SWOs 
can enroll in residence or distance-learning programs through civilian institutions of their 
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choice, funded by Tuition Assistance, the Montgomery GI Bill, or personal funds.  These 
programs are also documented in officers’ personnel records by SSP codes by which the 
Navy “track[s] specific skill sets beyond those described by an officer’s designator” 
(Commander Navy Personnel Command, 2008b, p. 1).  Obtaining advanced education 
represents a higher-quality officer.  
(4) Joint Professional Military Education (JPME).  Through 
residence courses and distance-learning programs, SWOs have the opportunity to 
complete joint-military education in two consecutive phases: JPME Phase I and JPME 
Phase II.  In addition to significant joint experience, completion of both phases is 
required to earn a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) designation.  JPME Phase I, JPME Phase 
II, and the JQO designation are all quality indicators for Surface Warfare Officers, as 
they indicate a level of joint-military expertise that is highly valued by the Navy. (Office 
of the Secretary of Defense, 2007). 
(5) Documented Performance in a SWO’s FITREP.  Since the 
nature of the FITREP process includes relative performance scores based on comparison 
to an officer’s peer group, FITREP scores and promotion recommendations are 
instrumental in gauging the quality of an officer.  Appendix B contains a sample of an 
officer FITREP, including the criteria against which SWOs are evaluated. 
b. Definition of Quality Changes with Rank  
During department head, XO, CO, and major command tours, 
qualification requirements and expectations continue to develop as more stringent 
standards apply to future job positions.  As compiled from the FY08 SWO community 
brief, Figure 12 shows the descriptive statistics for SWOs at each rank from Lieutenant 
(O-3) through Captain (O-6). 
 35
 
Figure 12.   Surface Warfare Officer Qualifications and Education Statistics  
(Adapted from Commander Navy Personnel Command, 2007a, pp. 3-5) 
 
As shown in Figure 12, the quality metrics increase as rank increases.  The 
percentage of the SWO population with Master’s Degrees, JPME Phase I and Phase II 
qualifications, joint-duty assignments, JSO (now called Joint Qualified Officer) 
designation, financial management SSP code, and operations analysis SSP code increases 
as SWOs progress through the ranks.  Increasing attainment rates in graduate education, 
AQDs, and SSP codes detail the value that the SWO community and selection boards 
place in these areas.  For example, in differentiating the quality of officers, the percent of 
O-4 SWOs who completed JPME Phase I are recognized over those officers who did not 
complete this milestone, 32 percent compared to 68 percent.  At the Captain (O-6) level, 
a senior SWO among the 13.3 percent who did not complete JPME Phase I is 
differentiated negatively from the others.  The same analysis can be made for other 
quality indicators. 
5. Dissatisfaction with Compensation as a Reason for Leaving 
Regardless of the quality of officers who leave, it is hypothesized that SWOs are 
leaving for very specific reasons.  One reason consistently repeated in the literature is 
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dissatisfaction with the current compensation system.  Several recent surveys and other 
studies have captured these reasons and are the grounds for further analysis and policy 
implications. 
a. 2000 Military Exit Survey 
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC, 2001) conducted the 2000 
Military Exit Survey in accordance with the Fiscal Year 2000 National Defense 
Authorization Act.  DMDC (2001) distributed over 113,000 questionnaires, leading to 
15,952 responses from service members in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, 
and Coast Guard, who were leaving active duty between April 1, 2000, and September 
30, 2000 (though the Coast Guard’s period began July 1, 2000).  Among all respondents, 
officer and enlisted, the top reason cited for leaving active-duty service was pay and 
allowances—41 percent of the responses (DMDC, 2001).  However, officers selected 
overall job satisfaction as their top choice, with 44 percent of the responses (DMDC, 
2001).  According to DMDC (2001), the top two factors of military life that would have 
to be improved to encourage officers to stay were the quality of leadership (30 percent of 
the responses) and basic pay (21 percent of the responses).  Finally, 48 percent of the 
entire sample was dissatisfied with basic pay.  However, officers were more likely than 
enlisted members to be satisfied with basic pay.  One weakness of this survey was that 
the results were not reported by different services and different ranks.  Therefore, naval 
officer-specific survey results can not be extracted from DMDC’s (2001) report. 
b. 2004 SWO Continuation Intentions Quick Poll 
Since the SWO community has difficulty retaining mid-grade officers, the 
2004 SWO Continuation Intentions Quick Poll was administered by the Navy Personnel 
Research, Studies, and Training Department (NPRST).  The poll was sent to 4,448 junior 
and mid-grade Surface Warfare Officers (O-1 through O-4), producing 2,128 responses 
(NPRST, 2004).  According to NPRST (2004), mid-grade (O-4) and prior-enlisted SWOs 
were more likely to remain in the Navy than junior SWOs (O-1 through O-3).  
Additionally, “loyalty, patriotism, benefits, job security, and educational benefits” were 
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the top reasons for remaining in the Navy (p. 1).  Finally, the poll found that an increase 
in the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) retention bonus payout would 
increase the participants’ intention to retain, likely increasing the overall retention rate as 
well (NPRST, 2004). 
c. 2005 SWO Junior Officer Survey 
To further examine the pulse of the surface warfare community, the 2005 
SWO Junior Officer (JO) Survey was administered to 6,411 SWOs (O-1 through O-5) 
and completed by 1,803 respondents (Department of the Navy, n.d.).  Participants chose 
the following options as satisfiers, with the percentage of responses in parenthesis: 
leading and training subordinates (88 percent), relationship with peers in the wardroom 
(83 percent), leadership challenge using skills and abilities (79 percent), mental challenge 
using skills and abilities (75 percent), and relationship with senior enlisted (72 percent) 
(Department of the Navy, n.d.).  Respondents also selected the following choices as 
dissatisfiers: ability to plan and schedule family and personal activities (58 percent), 
hours of work required (48 percent), ability to plan and schedule work (42 percent), 
inspections (40 percent), and the zero-defect mentality (27 percent) (Department of the 
Navy, n.d.).  It is unclear whether participants were provided questions pertaining to 
basic pay or the military pay system; nevertheless, participants were asked to rate the 
level of motivation to retain provided by two retention bonuses—SWOCP and Junior 
SWO CSRB (Department of the Navy, n.d.).  These recent responses are displayed in 





















2001 39% 47% 12%
2003 41% 43% 12%
2005 47% 42% 9%
Positive motivator
A monetary bonus does 
not motivate me to stay 
on active duty
It does not provide 
enough money
 
Figure 13.   Level of Motivation that SWOCP Provides to the Retention Decision among 
SWOs  








2003 40% 48% 11%
2005 49% 41% 10%
Positive motivator A monetary bonus does not motivate me to stay on 
It does not provide enough 
money
 
Figure 14.   Level of Motivation that Junior SWO CSRB Provides to the Retention 
Decision among SWOs  
(US Department of the Navy, n.d., p.15) 
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These results may be skewed due to the seniority of the officers polled.  
Commanders are not junior officers, and they have a much different outlook on the 
surface warfare community than do more junior officers.  Additionally, they were not 
offered either of the bonuses, since SWOCP and the Junior SWO CSRB are recent 
programs.  This may have forced the majority of the respondents to gravitate toward the 
“monetary bonus does not motivate me to stay on” option. 
d. August 2005 Status of Forces Survey of Active-Duty Members 
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) conducted the 2005 Status 
of Forces Survey of Active-Duty Members between August 22, 2005, and September 27, 
2005 (DMDC, 2006).  The survey was administered in a web-based format to 35,000 
active-duty personnel, in order to determine their status and intentions.  The survey 
included everything from retention and factors influencing a service member’s retention 
decision to health care and length of medical clinic wait times.  Most striking were the 
responses regarding military compensation, military-to-civilian job comparisons, and the 
balance of work life and home life. 
Although 60 percent of the Navy sample surveyed reported overall 
satisfaction with the “military way of life,” the poll indicated an overall decreasing trend 
since July 2002 (DMDC, 2006, p. 35).  As Figure 15 depicts, the average satisfaction 
level of all services members with their level of compensation was even lower (47 
percent), while the Navy maintained a 50-percent satisfaction level (not shown in Figure 





Figure 15.   Satisfaction Aspects of Military Service for all Service Members  
(DMDC, 2006, p. 39) 
Comparing military-to-civilian employment (see Figure 16), while over 60 
percent of the respondents were satisfied with retirement benefits and vacation time, only 
35 percent of the service members were satisfied with spouse programs that included 




Figure 16.   Comparison of Military to Civilian Opportunities  
(DMDC, 2006, p. 337) 
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Even more disconcerting is that nearly 70 percent of respondents reported 
dissatisfaction with hours worked per week and the amount of, or lack of, family time 
(DMDC, 2006).  Lastly, an astounding 85 percent of service members responded that 
increased pay would improve their work-life balance (DMDC, 2006).  Figure 17 clearly 
displays the impact of certain employment-related aspects and support mechanisms on 
service members’ quality of life. 
 
Figure 17.   Importance of Factors in Improving Work-life Balance  
(DMDC, 2006, p. 358) 
 
e. Other SWO Retention Surveys 
Using a survey sample size of 334 junior SWOs, Wahl and Singh (2006) 
asked respondents to rate several statements on their influence in the decision to retain at 
two critical career points: after the minimum service requirement (MSR) and at the 
current port of exit.  Some of the 14 choices influencing retention at the first critical 
career point were the Global War on Terrorism, the current state of world instability, the 
economy and job market, SWOCP, marital status, the influence of SWOCP on spouse, 
amount of take-home pay, increases in pay and housing allowances, medical benefits, 
education, retirement benefits, the lifestyle, job satisfaction, and an “other” category 
(Wahl & Singh, 2006, p. 29).  The 10 items at the current port of exit include: take-home  
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pay, bonus pay, medical benefits, education, retirement benefits, patriotism, prior SWO 
job satisfaction, promotion, operation tempo (OPTEMPO), and an “other” category 
(Wahl & Singh, 2006, p. 29). 
Wahl and Singh (2006) found that retirement benefits and job satisfaction 
had the greatest influence on officers’ decisions to retain after their MSR, while 
retirement benefits and patriotism had the largest impact on current retention.  At the first 
port of exit, the “influence of SWOCP ranked fifth out of 14” for the overall SWO 
sample, and when separated for females only, SWOCP ranked eighth out of 14 (Wahl & 
Singh, 2006, p. 30).   Similarly, at the current port of exit, the “influence of SWOCP 
ranked sixth out of 10” for the overall sample, and for females SWOCP ranked ninth out 
of 10 (Wahl & Singh, 2006, p. 32).  Based on these survey results, SWOCP only had a 
marginal impact on the decision to retain at the first and most current ports of exit for the 
junior SWOs questioned. 
Similarly, after conducting several focus groups and interviews with both 
junior and senior Surface Warfare Officers, Crawford et al. (2006) concluded that “[n]one 
of the women or men in the study were influenced to stay by the SWOCP” (p. 16).  
Additionally, money appears to influence the retention decision of male SWOs more than 
female SWOs (Crawford et al., 2006).  However, Crawford et al. (2006) also recognize 
that SWOCP is correlated with an increase in overall SWO retention over the past few 
years, as is indicated in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18.   Effect of SWOCP on SWO Retention for YG94 through YG97  
(Crawford et al., 2006, p. 28) 
 
According to Figure 18, the eight-year retention rate for both male and 
female SWOs in YG94 through YG97 has increased since the introduction of SWOCP.  
Though this depiction does not prove causality, it suggests correlation. 
f. Weaknesses of Survey Data 
Although surveys are good tools for gathering information, they have 
several flaws which need to be addressed.  First, surveys collect self-reported data, which 
can be inaccurate if the participant feels pressure or is afraid to be truthful.  This type of 
inaccuracy is unlikely in the 2000 Military Exit Survey as officers leaving active duty 
have less fear about reprisal.  However, the officers polled in the 2005 SWO JO Survey 
and the August 2005 Status of Forces Survey were on active duty and may have been 
concerned about the confidentiality of their responses.  Second, surveys only capture 
intentions, not actual behavior, and intentions are subject to change.  For example, the 
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2000 Military Exit Survey asked “what would have to be improved so they would stay” 
(DMDC, 2001, p. 11).  Answers merely provided a proxy to represent intentions if such 
changes were enacted.  Third, surveys are generally restricted to broad categories of 
respondents, in which little personal information is collected.  This makes it nearly 
impossible to merge personnel files with survey responses for a comprehensive data set 
to conduct analysis.  In addition, exit surveys are obtained from a very select group—
those who leave.  Their responses, therefore, cannot be representative of the entire 
population. 
g. Analysis of Factors Affecting the Retention Plans of Junior Navy 
Officers 
Clemens (2002) analyzed survey data using a multivariate logistic 
regression model.  Data from the 1999 Department of Defense Survey of Active Duty 
Personnel was used to model the effect of demographic characteristics, rank, experience, 
economic factors, military occupation, and satisfaction characteristics on the probability 
of intent to stay in the Navy (Clemens, 2002). An independent variable that captured 
satisfaction with military pay and promotion was used.  Unfortunately, the partial effect 
of this variable was not statistically significant at even the 10-percent level.  This 
discrepancy may be due to combining promotion, advancement, pay, retirement, and 
security factors into a single categorical variable.  The different factors should have been 
separated to yield the partial effect of each characteristic.  However, other motivational 
factors, such as satisfaction with military work values and satisfaction with military time 
allocation, were found to have positive effects on naval officer retention (Clemens, 
2002). 
6. Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) Model 
a. Methodology of the ACOL Model 
In 1984, Warner and Goldberg developed a theoretical model quantifying 
a service member’s retention decision.  Using FY74 and FY78 data from the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) containing personnel history on over 220,000 enlisted 
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personnel in 80 ratings, Warner and Goldberg (1984) estimated a value for the decision 
process.  When approaching career crossroads, service members must weigh their options 
by determining the utility of remaining in the service to n years.  The following equation 
describes the annualized cost of leaving (ACOL) model, where An is annualized cost of 
leaving; Cn is the cost of leaving, representing the difference between the present value of 
military life and civilian life; jd denotes the present value of a dollar received j years in 
the future; and ( )mcγ γ γ− =  is the net taste of civilian life over military life (Warner & 
Goldberg, 1984).  The following is the equation for the ACOL model: 
1
( )/ mn jn n
j
cdA C γ γ γ
=
>= − =∑  
When the annualized cost of leaving exceeds the net taste of civilian life, it is more costly 
to leave military service, and the service member should elect to remain in the service.  If 
the net taste of civilian life exceeds the individual’s ACOL, then the reverse is true.   
Hansen and Wenger (2005) revised the ACOL model developed by 
Warner and Goldberg.  They used two data sources to complete their study—CNA 
Corporation’s Navy data from the Enlisted Master Record and the March Current 
Population Survey covering FY87 through FY99. They included two assumptions in their 
model.  First, Hansen and Wenger (2005) assumed military members aggregate all of the 
elements of pay into a single number and are able to compare that value to civilian 
compensation.  Second, by using pay over time, the revised ACOL model reveals a time 
“horizon” over which relative earnings can be compared (Hansen & Wenger, 2005, p. 




























This model indicates that members at year t of their career have two 
choices: to stay for y additional years or get out.  Service members will stay as long as the 
 46
difference between their military compensation, Mi, and civilian compensation, Ci,, 
adjusted by the real discount rate, r, exceeds their relative taste for civilian life (Hansen 
& Wenger, 2005).  An individual will stay as long as “there is at least one time horizon 
over which [the above equation] is satisfied” (Hansen & Wenger, 2005, p. 32). 
b. ACOL Model for Surface Warfare Officers 
Crayton, Darling, and Mackin (2002) employed a panel probit model 
using the ACOL framework to study the effects of pay elasticity on retention decisions of 
Surface Warfare Officers at seven critical decision points.  The sample included over 
14,000 non-nuclear SWOs, who made retention decisions between 1979 and 2000.  For 
each decision point, the mean years of commissioned service (YCS), mean age, and pay 
elasticities derived from the probit model are depicted in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Pay Elasticity of SWO Retention Decisions at Critical Ports of Exit  






The pay elasticities at each decision point were derived from the ACOL 
independent variable in the probit regression model, which was statistically significant at 
the 1-percent level.  The first decision point captures the minimum service requirement 
for SWOs, which has a pay elasticity of 0.748 (Crayton et al., 2002).  As tenure increases, 
the pay effects rapidly decrease.  Additionally, though not depicted in Table 1, SWOCP 
Decision Point Mean YCS Mean Age Pay Elasticity 
1 4.8 28.8 0.748 
2 5.1 29.0 0.525 
3 6.4 30.2 0.401 
4 7.6 31.4 0.246 
5 8.8 32.7 0.138 
6 9.8 33.8 0.133 
7 10.7 34.7 0.098 
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was found to increase the retention probability at MSR by over 15 percent (Crayton et al., 
2002).  However, the results of the model may be limited due to the range of years over 
which retention decisions were made.  Other factors associated with time-specific trends 
should have been analyzed.  For example, naval officer retention may have been 
significantly affected after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, when compared to 
earlier periods.  These unobserved effects were probably buried in the error term in the 
regression model. 
E. FACTORS INFLUENCING RETENTION 
1. Human Capital 
“Education and training are the most important investments in human capital” 
(Becker, 1992, p. 85).  As an organization, the Navy operates within the same human 
capital constraint as any other institution.  Both are dependent on sufficiently trained and 
experienced labor.  For the active-duty Navy, this labor force consists mainly of the 
officer and enlisted corps, of which the Surface Warfare Officer community is a key 
component.7  Their human capital is the sum of the knowledge obtained through training 
and experience (before and during active-duty service), inherent ability, and creativity 
(McShane & Von Glinow, 2007).  
According to Ehrenberg and Smith (2006), business organizations and individuals 
engage in three types of human capital investment: education and training, migration 
(relocating for better job opportunities), and job search.  With the exception of firm-
specific training costs, civilian institutions generally pass this investment expense onto 
employees, whereas the Navy bears practically 100 percent of the expense for newly 
commissioned SWOs (not counting Bachelor’s Degrees for OCS accessions) and nearly 
100 percent later in an officer’s career.  To train and retain an effective fighting force, the 
military services must also pay sufficient wages to “compete for the skilled labor that 
they themselves have created” (Rosen, 1992, p. 232).  When civilian employers engage in 
                                                 
7 Government Schedule (GS), Senior Executive Service (SES), and government employees under the 
National Security Personnel System (NSPS) comprise additional labor for the Department of Defense, 
including those assigned to Navy positions. 
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human capital investment, they seek a return on their investment through increased 
worker productivity, lower wages compared to what the post-trained worker may be able 
to receive elsewhere, and a commitment from the employee until the employer recoups 
its investment (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006).  While naval officers may incur additional 
service obligations, some officers are able to serve such obligations concurrently with 
existing service commitments.  This provides economic rents to these service members 
and a relatively minimal return on investment for the Navy.  Furthermore, human capital 
training investment does not have an immediate impact on individual promotion 
opportunities, annual pay, or even retention.  The first two officer promotion steps occur 
systematically with time in service and depend little on performance measures.  Not until 
advancements reach beyond the rank of Lieutenant (O-3) are promotions based on 
individual performance and human capital growth, in addition to previously mentioned 
time metrics.  Thus, in many ways, the Navy cannot determine the long-range effects of 
human capital investments. 
Ehrenberg and Smith (2006) describe three costs associated with investment in 
human capital, each falling under the categories of either specific or general training.  
These costs are direct expenses, lost earnings, and psychic losses.8  Education and 
training raise the employee’s ability to increase earnings and also improve productivity 
through knowledge, skills, and analytical ability (Becker, 2002).  While psychic costs are 
commonly associated with training and education in both the civilian and military 
sectors, SWOs benefit from specific and general training conducted during the standard 
workday, which decreases these costs. 
During a Surface Warfare Officer’s career, it is common to accumulate several 
years in training commands.  The more technical the billet, the longer a SWO spends in 
training programs.  For example, SWOs spend at least six months in training at 
Department Head School before reporting for their first DH tour.  Additionally, combat 
                                                 
8 Direct costs include the cost of education and training.  Lost earnings occur as a result of time spent 
not working while enrolled in a program.  Psychic costs are intangible costs associated with mentally 
challenging or tedious programs.  General training encompasses work skills that apply to many employers, 
while specific training is focused on enhancing skills that will benefit the employer providing the specific 
training. (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006) 
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systems jobs aboard AEGIS destroyers require several months of AEGIS missile system 
training before reporting aboard.  Furthermore, as SWOs progress through rank, an 
assignment to advanced education at one of several War Colleges or the Naval 
Postgraduate School may again remove them from standard Surface Warfare Officer 
duties—lasting from ten months to over two years.  Meanwhile, these officers receive full 
salary and benefits and pay nothing in tuition and direct expenses.  Other Navy-sponsored 
education programs such as the Executive Master of Business Administration Program or 
enrollment in local or online universities may require weekday, evening, and weekend 
coursework while officers remain in an operational billet.  Though naval officers pay for 
some of these programs, tuition assistance and the Montgomery GI Bill (depending on the 
commissioning source) are available to alleviate the burden of direct expenses for the 
officer.9  These programs allow SWOs to build human capital while on active duty and 
minimize the financial burden which typically coincides with psychic costs associated 
with returning to an academic environment. 
In addition to education and training, migration and job search are built-in 
components of military service.  Though some job moves may be only lateral transitions 
with little increase in human capital, many more aim at advancing officers’ careers, 
enabling them to become more experienced while filling critical billets.  These job 
changes are coordinated through the assistance of placement officers and detailers, who 
serve as career planners helping to fill jobs with qualified officers while ensuring officers 
remain upwardly mobile.  They balance the needs of the Navy with officers’ career 
development.  As with education and training, the Navy pays for job changes requiring a 
permanent change of station, while some members may actually earn money for the job 
relocation.  Instead of job mobility coming at the expense of an individual, in some cases  
 
 
                                                 
9 Tuition Assistance (TA) is the Navy's educational financial assistance program providing active-duty 
personnel funding for tuition costs for courses taken in an off-duty status at a college, university or 
vocational or technical institution (Navy College Program, 2007).  Navy TA pays for a fiscal year credit 
limit of 16 semester hours, 24 quarter hours, or 240 clock hours per individual up to a $4500 per fiscal year 
(Navy College Program, 2007).  MGIB provides up to 36 months of education benefits and more than 
$37,000 to eligible active-duty service personnel and veterans (Department of Veteran Affairs, 2004). 
 50
the Navy even provides individuals a financial incentive for their job relocation.  It is 
evident the military invests significantly in all three aspects of human capital: education 
and training, migration, and job search. 
As the Navy’s total force structure maintains approximately 51,000 officers, 
human capital expectations have become more extensive in order to achieve upper-level 
promotions.  Command selection board precepts—which set priorities for screening 
commanding officers to lead squadrons, ships, and other units—brief the growing 
importance of expanding human capital investments in education.  Training in JPME and 
a Master’s Degree are becoming standard qualifications.  Although advanced degrees are 
not necessary to promote to the rank of Commander (O-5), promotion beyond this level is 
becoming increasingly difficult without them.  Separating “best qualified” personnel 
from “fully qualified” personnel, selection boards give favorable consideration to 
investments in human capital through military education, graduate degrees, and 
subspecialty codes (Secretary of the Navy, 2007a, p. B-1).  Those officers who have 
achieved additional development, above and beyond their contemporaries, tend to 
compete more successfully than the rest of the candidates (Secretary of the Navy, 2007a).   
Throughout a SWO’s 20-year career, he or she receives specific training and 
general training, may change jobs six or seven times (often in as many locations, both 
ashore and at sea), and coordinates job moves through detailers and placement officers.  
With exception to individually selected education programs, each investment in human 
capital occurs during government time and at the government’s expense.  Minimal 
financial expense is passed to the officer.  Though civilian companies may offer larger 
salaries for upper-level management, Navy compensation and human capital investments 
coupled with motivation, extrinsic, and intrinsic factors influence officers’ decisions to 
serve past their MSR and remain in the service (Baker, Gibbs, & Holmstrom, 1994a). 
2. Human Motivation   
Research in the area of human motivation is incomplete without reference to 
“Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy Theory” (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007, p. 92).  Individual 
motivation stems from basic needs.  As the necessities of food, water, and shelter are 
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fulfilled, the next higher order of needs are sought after and achieved (Steininger, 1994; 
McShane & Von Glinow, 2007).  However, employment and retention with employers 
extend far beyond a paycheck and satisfying basic needs.  Today’s work force desires to 
make a positive impact with the work it performs.  While military members do not work 
for free, the compensation and financial incentives provide merely a portion of the 
motivation for a naval career (Strickler, 2006).  The complicated concept of motivation 
and retention is further explained by Rabin (2006) as a “mix of both self-interested 
motives and social preferences” (p. 450). 
Military service in the 21st century is much different from other periods in US 
history.  The Defense Advisory Committee on Military Compensation (DACMC) 
summarizes today’s service members succinctly: 
The men and women who serve in the US military are there through 
voluntary decisions to enter and remain in the military service, not through 
the coercion of conscription.  It is the innate ability, training, experience, 
and motivation of the men and women who staff this force that are the 
primary reasons for its superb capabilities. (DACMC, 2006, p. XV) 
In a Washington Post article, General Sheehan, USMC (Ret.), stated that “service 
to the nation is both a responsibility and an honor for every citizen presented with an 
opportunity” (2007, p. A17).  As previously discussed, naval officer compensation 
involves basic pay, allowances, incentives (that are designed to retain officers at critical 
points during their careers), and a generous retirement pension plan.  Norman (1971) 
describes the decision process of a making the military a career as a function of:  
geographical background, family consideration, family economic 
background, promotion opportunities, retirement benefits, travel, job 
satisfaction, source of commission, educational opportunities, social 
opportunities, effectiveness of supervisor, use of abilities, freedom of 
expression, housing situation, family separation, changing fringe benefits, 
job security, prestige, like military life, stability of tours, and feeling of 
nationalism. (p. 14) 
Norman (1971) reported that service members “cite[d] increased pay, faster 
promotions, and higher prestige in order of importance toward making military service 
more attractive” (p. 15).  Analyzing the most important aspects of military service, 
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younger officers reported such intrinsic qualities as military way of life, family 
considerations, and opportunity to use abilities; while more senior officers cited military 
retirement and military lifestyle as the two most important components of military service 
(Norman, 1971).  Though Norman’s study is dated, these finding are supported through 
current officer surveys. 
Success of the military depends on individuals, enlisted and officers, being able to 
make good decisions and lead others in making similar decisions. Surface warship 
commanding officers (COs) must have the utmost trust and confidence in their personnel 
to accomplish the mission autonomously.  COs cannot remain on the bridge 24 hours a 
day, though they are reachable at a moment’s notice.  Many situations require officers 
entrusted to standing watch to make decisions first and inform the CO as soon as 
possible.  Leadership and morale in the workplace flourishes when everyone participates 
(Wilsey, 1995).  Although in many ways the military operates within the confines of a 
strict hierarchical system, there is freedom of action and decision-making that forms the 
bedrock of leadership and motivation (Wilsey, 1995).   
Leadership, as described by Jago (1982), is a “process and a property” (p. 315).  It 
may not have a set definition, but common themes consistently emerge.  Jago (1982) 
describes leadership as the ability to influence others toward meeting group objectives.  
As a personal quality, leadership is a characteristic of those who successfully employ the 
process of guiding others.  Leadership forms the cornerstone in officer motivation and is 
central to influencing an officer’s decision to retain at ports of exit. 
3. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Rewards: What Motivates Surface Warfare 
Officers? 
Individual motivation and the reasons for serving and retaining past the minimum 
service requirement are interwoven with intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.  What matters 
most to one individual may be of secondary or tertiary importance to another.  How one 
views these matters greatly determines individual motivation and chosen interactions.  
Patriotism or the call to service may be the intrinsic motivator that not only drives an 
individual to serve in the Navy but also determines his or her dedication to that calling.  
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At the 20-year mark, individuals become vested.  At that point, they will receive a life-
long, inflation-protected pension.  The job security attained after promotion to Lieutenant 
Commander (O-4) and the financial rewards that accompany a naval career are extrinsic 
qualities associated with military service, while patriotism is a major intrinsic factor. 
Two Surface Warfare Officers may have completely different attachments to 
Norman’s (1971) list of 21 military career influences.  While one officer’s decision to 
serve and retain may be related to travel and job satisfaction, another is gratified by 
military life and stability of tours.  Each decision has intrinsic and extrinsic value to the 
individual.  However, the most important motivators are not necessarily the same.  At 
three different firm internal labor markets (FILM) levels, Figure 11 depicts the 
relationship between the organizational commitment of individuals’ value of job security 
plotted against the level of FILM.10  Figure 12 shows organizational commitment in 
relation to promotion opportunity at a given level of FILM.11  How individuals perceive 
their opportunities greatly influences their organizational work behavior and their 
decisions to serve. 
 
 
Figure 19.   FILM and Organization Commitment by Levels of Job Security  
(Yang, Worden & Wilson, 2004, p. 680) 
                                                 
10 FILM is an index level of hiring practices and promotion opportunities.  A low FILM indicates 
external hiring practices and restricted promotion opportunity, while a high FILM denotes promotion from 
within and favorable promotion opportunities, as employees are home grown.  Job security is a measure of 
one’s value of job stability with the firm. (Yang et al., 2004) 
11 Promotion opportunity is a measure of individual perception of the likelihood of advancement 
opportunities within the firm (Yang et al., 2004). 
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Figure 20.   FILM and Organization Commitment by Levels of Promotion Opportunities 
(Yang et al., 2004, p. 681) 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Data support the challenges facing manpower planners regarding the costs and 
benefits associated with retaining a qualified and talented workforce.  This difficulty is 
exacerbated in the Navy as a result of internal labor market uniqueness and its impact on 
recruiting, promotion, and retention of Surface Warfare Officers.  The military pay 
structure inadvertently deters higher-level performance by promoting lower-performing 
SWOs at similar rates and by providing the same pay based on the criteria of time in 
service, without taking quality into consideration.  High-quality SWOs who have external 
market pay information may be more susceptible to civilian market incentives, thereby 
increasing their probability of exiting naval service before retirement eligibility.  With its 
inverse relationship between economic rents (as obtained through experience and 
investments in human capital), the military pay structure falls far short of the civilian 
standard.  Further damage is caused by manning shortfalls at specific points along the 
SWO career path. These shortfalls have severe spillover effects at major career decision 




Additionally, the quality of SWOs leaving at ports of exit is unclear.  If a greater 
proportion of high-quality SWOs are leaving than are staying, the Navy may have a 
larger dilemma than just inventory shortfalls. 
Various surveys highlight the sentiment in the fleet.  While these surveys are 
somewhat flawed, the pulse of the respondents echo a reason for concern among policy 
analysts.  Studies indicate problems arise with compensation, but they do not address the 
potential impact of a performance-based compensation system.  Through regression 
analyses and applications of the ACOL model, evidence shows that an increase in 
compensation has a positive effect on retention among Surface Warfare Officers. 
Additionally, investments in human capital significantly influence officers’ decisions at 
the ports of exit.  The more time an officer has invested in the Navy, the more human 
capital the officer may possess, which can potentially attract a higher-paying civilian 
company to bid for that human capital.  However, as SWOs invest more time in military 
service, the attractiveness of an inflation-protected, life-long annuity is a significantly 
large carrot at the end of the stick.  Yet extrinsic rewards, such as present and future 
income streams, are insufficient stand-alone motivators used to retain a qualified and 
talented workforce.  Nonetheless, bonus programs, such as SWOCP and the Junior SWO 
CSRB, have been implemented to provide stronger financial motivation to combat the 
SWO retention problem. 
Individual motivation and intrinsic rewards also factor into naval officers’ 
retention decisions.  As reported in the aforementioned surveys, significant intrinsic 
factors include overall job satisfaction, quality of leadership, loyalty, patriotism, 
relationships with coworkers, mental challenges, and the balance of work life and home 
life.12  To combat the Navy’s retention issues and ensure that quality SWOs are retained, 
decision-makers must consider both extrinsic and intrinsic motivators. 
                                                 
12 As compiled from the 2000 Military Exit Survey, 2004 SWO Continuation Intentions Quick Poll, 
2005 Junior Officer Survey, and the August 2005 Status of Forces Survey of Active-Duty Members. 
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III. CURRENT POLICIES AND LEGISLATION AFFECTING 
SURFACE WARFARE OFFICERS’ PAY, PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION, AND PROMOTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
As a branch of the military bureaucracy, the Navy follows very specific 
governance for maintaining its officer corps.  This chapter addresses the legislation and 
policies affecting the pay and advancement of Surface Warfare Officers.  The first section 
reviews the structure of the current military pay system, based on policy and legislative 
mandates—including the four incentive pays used to address retention in the Surface 
Warfare Officer community.  The second section discusses the legislative process for 
approving and changing military compensation.  The third section examines the naval 
officer performance review system, focusing on the SWO community.  This chapter also 
revisits SWO promotion timing, promotion opportunity, and promotion as a measure of 
performance. 
B. MILITARY PAY SYSTEM 
The US military pay system is described by the Defense Advisory Committee on 
Military Compensation as an “inefficient mix of cash, in-kind, and deferred 
compensation” (DACMC, 2006, p. 2).  Surface Warfare Officer pay is derived from the 
military’s tiered basic pay table, in which rank and seniority are used to calculate the 
common base salary used by all services (DACMC, 2006).  Due to the aforementioned 
lack of “skewness” in the military pay table, basic pay alone may be insufficient to attract 
and retain an effective military force (Asch & Warner, 2001, p. 524).  Therefore, 
allowances, special and incentive pays (e.g., SWO retention bonuses), annual pay 
adjustments, and tax advantages are added to base salary to close the gap between 




deferred benefits (such as a life-long protected annuity upon reaching the vesting point of 
20 years of service) complete the military pay system, which DACMC has recently 
criticized (DACMC, 2006). 
1. Cash Payments 
United States Code, Title 37—Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services 
(2004b) details the administration of all active-duty military compensation to include 
basic pay, special and incentive pays, and allowances.  United States Code, Title 10—
Armed Forces (2004a) provides pay information for retired service members. 
a. Basic Pay and Allowances 
The FY 2008 monthly basic pay table, shown in Appendix A, depicts the 
“main component of an individual’s salary” (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel 
and Readiness, 2008a, p. 1).  For example, commissioned officers with six years of 
service, who have no prior enlisted service, and who are in the pay grade of Lieutenant 
(O-3), earn $4,763.10 per month (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, 2008a).  Added to basic pay, the two most common allowances naval officers 
receive are Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) and Basic Allowance for Subsistence 
(BAS), both of which are non-taxable allowances intended to offset the cost of housing 
and meals (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2008b).  BAH and 
BAS are “based in the historic origins of the military in which the military provided room 
and board (or rations) as part of a member’s pay" (Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, 2008b, BAS).  Thus, all current service members receive either 
government-provided housing or a housing allowance and an allowance for subsistence.  
The current housing allowance depends on duty location, pay grade, and dependent status 
(i.e., if the service member has a spouse, children, etc.). 
The intent of BAH is to provide uniformed service members with 
permanent duty within the 50 United States accurate and equitable housing 
compensation based on housing costs in local civilian housing markets, 
and is payable when government quarters are not provided. (Department 
of Defense Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee, 
2007c, p. 1) 
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BAS is a fixed amount, regardless of duty station, which is recalculated annually based 
on the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) food cost index.  Currently, 
SWOs receive a monthly BAS payment of $202.76. (Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness, 2008b) 
Additional allowances are paid to naval officers: Cost of Living 
Allowance (COLA), Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA), and Family Separation 
Allowance (FSA).  These allowances depend on service location or, during shipboard 
assignments, length of time at sea.  COLA is received only in designated geographic 
locations to compensate for excessive costs specific to non-housing expenditures in 
communities where costs are at least 8 percent higher than the compensation received for 
BAH (Department of Defense Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance 
Committee, 2007a).  According to the Department of Defense Per Diem, Travel and 
Transportation Allowance Committee (2007b), OHA is paid to members who are 
stationed overseas when government housing is either not provided or not available, 
compensating for the majority of added expenses incurred by living in non-government 
housing.  OHA includes monthly rent, utilities allowances, and a one-time move-in 
expense allowance (Department of Defense Per Diem, Travel and Transportation 
Allowance Committee, 2007b).  FSA compensates SWOs for service either aboard ship 
or in a duty location where they are separated from their dependants for over 30 
consecutive days (Koopman & Hattiangadi, 2001).  For most naval officers, basic pay 
and allowances “constitute the largest portion of cash compensation—well over 90 
percent on average” (DACMC, 2006, p. xxv).  However, special and incentive pays are 
becoming a larger portion of total compensation for the surface warfare community. 
b. Special and Incentive Pays: Surface Warfare Officer Bonuses 
Special and incentive (S&I) pays create flexibility in the military 
compensation system by providing each service the ability to respond to market supply 
and demand forces, to compensate for particular duty stations or assignments, and to 
create incentives to acquire or remain in specific skill sets (DACMC, 2006).  S&I pays 
allow the services to “meet specific staffing challenges […] for improving staffing and 
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personnel readiness” (DACMC, 2006, p. xxv).  However, with over 60 different special 
and incentive pays, managing the program has become cumbersome and, in some 
instances, creates less overall flexibility.  As stated by DACMC (2006), “the proliferation 
of pays makes the system difficult to monitor and manage […] some of these pays have 
impeded flexibility, not increased it” (pp. xxv-xxvi).  Particularly, the SWO community 
employs several S&I pays to target retention issues.  According to DACMC (2006), the 
following S&I pays represent the special and incentive pays designed specifically for 
Surface Warfare Officers: 
• Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay 
• Junior SWO Critical Skills Retention Bonus  
• SWO Critical Skills Bonus 
• Senior SWO Critical Skills Retention Bonus 
• Nuclear Accessions Bonus13 
• (Nuclear) Career Accessions Bonus 
• Nuclear Officer Continuation Pay 
• (Nuclear) Annual Incentive Bonus  
• Career Sea Pay 
• Career Sea Pay Premium 
• Imminent Danger/Hostile Fire Pay 
• Hardship Duty Pay Location/Mission. 
While the monetary value of S&I pays and bonuses vary, the purpose remains the same:  
to compensate service members for dangerous and arduous duty, recruit or retain proper 
manning levels, and improve personnel readiness in targeted communities (DACMC, 
2006).  In the SWO community, the first four incentive pays listed above are specifically 
designed to target retention at various ports of exit.  Table 3 describes the intricacies of 
each bonus program: total payout, obligation, eligibility requirements, eligibility YCS, 
and the associated bonus payout plan. 
 
                                                 
13 Nuclear bonuses only apply to nuclear-qualified officers, which is only a small portion of the SWO 
community. 
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Table 3.   Description of the Four SWO Retention Bonuses  
(Adapted from Chief of Naval Operations, 2002; Chief of Naval Operations, 
2004a; Chief of Naval Operations, 2005b; Commander Naval Surface Forces, 





Payout Obligation Eligibility 
Eligibility 










*Selected for DH tour 
*Application submitted 
prior to graduating DH 
School (~7.5 YCS) 
*Sea Duty Assignable 
3 - 7.5 
YCS 
*First Payout upon 
acceptance of SWOCP 
agreement 
         ~4 - 7.5 YCS = $10,000
*First of four annual 
installments on the 
anniversary date of DH 
School or DH tour report date
         ~7.5 YCS  = $10,000 
         ~8.5 YCS  = $10,000 
         ~9.5 YCS  = $10,000 













*Completed DIVO tour 
obligation 
*Completed less than 25 
years of active duty 
service before end of 
Junior SWO CSRB 
contract 
*Completed 5 YCS 
*Approved for SWOCP
*Application submitted 
before 6 YCS 
*Sea Duty Assignable 
3 - 6 YCS
*Payout on anniversary of 
DH tour report date 
         ~6 YCS = $15,000 
         ~7 YCS = $5,000 














*Completed DH tour 
obligation 
*Completed less than 25 
years of active duty 
service before end of 
SWO Critical Skills 
Bonus contract 
*Sea Duty Assignable 








*Payouts eligible on the 
second anniversary of 
promotion to O-4 
*Subsequent payouts on third 
and fourth anniversary of 
promotion to O-4 
*One-year obligations:  
        O-4 + two years   = 
$12,000 
        O-4 + three years = 
$12,000 
        O-4 + four years   = 
$12,000 
*Three-year obligation: 
        O-4 + two years   = 
$22,000 
        O-4 + three years = 
$12,000 
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or frocked to O-5 or O-6
*Completed XO or XO 
Special Mission tour 
*Currently serving in 
qualifying billet 
*Not completed more 
than 24 years of active 
duty service 
~ 16 - 24 
YCS 
*Lump sum divided into 12 
monthly payments upon 
reporting to designated billets
         $15,000 for O-5 billets
         $20,000 for O-6 billets
*Monthly payments for 
remainder of contract 
(1) Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP).  On 
October 1, 1999, SWOCP was authorized as a retention incentive to encourage junior 
SWOs to commit to completing a full department head (DH) tour obligation.  This 
commitment corresponds to two DH tours or a “single longer tour identified as a two-tour 
equivalent by COMNAVPERSCOM (PERS-41)” (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005b, p. 
2).  Eligible officers must meet standard requirements: qualified SWO, selected for a DH 
tour, completed original service obligation, and completed the SWOCP application prior 
to graduation from DH school. Upon approval, they are authorized $50,000 for 
completing the new service obligation. The SWOCP remains “available each year in 
numbers sufficient to meet the need for Surface Department Heads” (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2005b, p. 2).  As long as SWOs meet the minimum eligibility requirements 
and the shortage of necessary SWOs to fill DH billets exists, junior SWOs will be 
approved for the SWOCP retention bonus.  Quantity, not quality, is targeted. 
(2) Junior SWO Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB).  In 
addition to SWOCP, “the FY06 Defense Appropriations Act [authorized] the $25,000 
Junior SWO Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB)” that provided further financial 
incentive to junior SWOs to remain in the surface warfare community and retain through 
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their full department head obligation (Navy Personnel Command, 2008a, p. 1).  
Beginning April 1, 2006, Junior SWOs have the opportunity to receive a total of $75,000 
to retain in the Navy and serve through their DH tour obligation (Navy Personnel 
Command, 2008a).  Eligibility for the junior SWO CSRB is restricted to applicants 
beyond 6 YCS; however, exceptions were authorized for the first three months of the 
program’s implementation for year groups (YG) 98, 99, 00, corresponding to accession 
years 1998, 1999, and 2000 (Navy Personnel Command, 2008a).  This retention bonus 
targets junior SWOs even earlier in their career, as applications are required by an 
officer’s sixth year of commissioned service.  Eligibility requirements include: qualified 
SWO, appointed to Lieutenant (O-3), completed the DIVO tour obligation, and approved 
for the SWOCP contract.  Whereas the SWOCP bonus targeted officers between 3 and 
7.5 YCS, the Junior SWO CSRB targets SWOs between 3 to 6 YCS.  Since the Junior 
SWO CSRB depends on approval of the SWOCP, this bonus is similarly contingent upon 
the shortage of SWO department heads. 
(3) SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  The Surface Warfare Officer 
Critical Skills Bonus became effective October 1, 2002, and targeted Lieutenant 
Commanders (O-4) midway through their careers as an incentive to retain in the SWO 
community through 15 YCS (Navy Personnel Command, 2008b).  Eligible Lieutenant 
Commanders would receive up to $46,000 provided they stay SWO through 15 YCS.  
Eligibility requirements include: qualified SWO, permanently appointed to O-4, and 
completed the DH obligation (Chief of Naval Operations, 2002).  The SWO Critical 
Skills Bonus essentially covers mid-grade officers beginning at approximately 10.5 YCS 
as an incentive to remain in the Navy through their second shore tour and will include 
selection for further sea duty assignments.  The SWO Critical Skills Bonus coincides 
with the expiration of the two previous bonuses: the Junior SWO CSRB and SWOCP.  It 
also corresponds with another critical port of exit just beyond the half-way career 
milestone toward a 20-year military career.  The contract also contains a smaller bonus 
amount of $12,000 associated with a one-year service obligation in lieu of the three-year 
obligation.  However, officers who apply in advance and are approved prior to their 
second anniversary of promotion to O-4 are eligible for the full $46,000 bonus associated 
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with the three-year commitment.   The objective of the SWO Critical Skills Bonus is to 
bridge the manning shortfalls depicted in Figure 8, specifically at the mid to senior O-4 
level at 13, 14, and 15 YCS. (Chief of Naval Operations, 2002; Navy Personnel 
Command, 2008b) 
(4) Senior SWO Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB).  The 
Senior SWO CSRB is the final SWO incentive pay targeting specific shortfalls in the 
senior SWO community.  This bonus is designed to attract eligible SWOs to fill specific 
executive officer (XO), commanding officer (CO), and senior-level staff officer billets, 
beginning at approximately 16 YCS and continuing through 24 YCS.  The Senior SWO 
CSRB provides $15,000 per year for Commander (O-5) billets and $20,000 per year for 
Captain (O-6) billets.  Eligibility requirements include: qualified SWO, promoted to 
Commander or Captain, completed an XO or XO Special Mission tour, assigned to a 
qualified O-5 or O-6 billet, and the ability to complete the qualified assignment before 25 
YCS.  Qualified billets include such positions as Commanding Officer Afloat, Executive 
Officer Afloat, Chief Staff Officer, Commanding Officer Shore Activity, and 
Commanding Officer Operational Forces.  The Senior SWO CSRB targets the critical 
manning shortfall at the senior SWO level and attempts to close the inventory gap of 271 
Surface Warfare Officers at the O-5 rank when compared to the Officer Programmed 
Authorization, as depicted in Figure 8. (Chief of Naval Operations, 2004a; Commander 
Naval Surface Forces, 2008b) 
c. Effect of SWO Incentive Pays on Retention 
Are incentive pays working, or are they merely transforming the surface 
fleet?  With the introduction of SWOCP in 1999, three more incentive pays were added 
to address SWO manning shortfalls in the mid-grade to senior officer ranks.  Surface 
Warfare Officers now have the ability to collect nearly $200,000 in incentive pays over 
the course of a 25-year career, depending on billet assignment and promotion timing.  
Despite the increasing incentive value, Figure 8 shows a current shortage of 552 SWOs 
between O-3 with 9 YCS and O-5 with 22 YCS.  Perhaps the bonuses are not efficiently 
targeting the SWO community.  Even with the surplus of junior officers (i.e., Lieutenants 
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with eight years of commissioned service and junior), retaining more senior officers 
remains an issue.  Perhaps there is a more optimal method for allocating the incentive pay 
budget that not only increases the quality of Surface Warfare Officers but also meets 
current and future manning requirements. (Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b) 
d. Annual Adjustments and Tax Advantages  
The annual military pay raise is another tool used to adjust basic pay to 
meet manpower requirements.  From January 1, 2000, through the end of 2006, 
legislation approved an annual pay raise of 0.5-percent above the private-sector average 
increase, as calculated by the Employment Cost Index (ECI) (Under Secretary of Defense 
for Personnel and Readiness, 2008b).  Public Law 110-181 (i.e., the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008), signed on January 28, 2008, approved a 3.5-
percent proposed pay increase for calendar year 2008 (US House of Representatives, 
2008).  Additionally, House Resolution 1585 contains verbiage supporting future pay 
increases of 0.5-percent above the ECI for fiscal years 2009 through 2012.  The FY 2008 
National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Policy Issues provides 
further explanation that defends the pay increase, citing the ongoing operations in the 
Middle East and other military pay concerns as factors (CRS, 2007). 
Tax exemptions are another pay adjustment the federal government 
employs to level the difference between military and civilian compensation.  While basic 
pay is taxed at the appropriate federal level, allowances such as BAH and BAS are not 
taxed.  These allowances total nearly 1/3 of a service member’s total cash payment and 
provide a sizeable annual savings (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, 2008b).  Duty assignments in combat zones also provide federal tax benefits 
in the form of a Combat Zone Tax Exclusion (CZTE).  In 2008, spending just one day of 
the month in a designated combat zone provides federal tax relief for basic pay, bonuses, 
and special and incentive pays for the entire cash payments for enlisted personnel, and up 
to $7,100.10 for officers (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
2008b).  Additionally, some individual state laws provide tax exemptions for active-duty 
military service members.  For example, officers who are legal residents of Illinois do not 
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pay state or local income taxes on their military “pay for duty” (Illinois Department of 
Revenue, 2007, p. 3).  Furthermore, nine states (i.e., Alaska, Florida, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) do not require 
state income tax on wages earned for legal residents (Federation of Tax Administrators, 
2007).14  Upon attaining legal residency in one of these states, SWOs can retain their 
residency even after being reassigned to another location, thereby continuing to benefit 
from no state income tax on military wages (Navy Personnel Command, 2007). 
2. In-kind Benefits (Health Care) 
In the midst of rising health care costs, employer-sponsored health care has 
become a critical recruiting and retention tool in the US workplace.  Total health care 
spending in 2005 reached $2 trillion, and it is expected to double by 2015 (NCHC, 2007).  
As a result of rising annual premiums, nearly 47 million Americans are uninsured at the 
time of this writing. Many insurance recipients report changing their lifestyles to cover 
rising medical-related debt, housing problems resulting from medical debt, and 
reductions in food and heating expenditures to pay for medical debt (NCHC, 2007).  
Employer-sponsored programs that defray or significantly reduce these growing costs 
provide a significant quality of life improvement for employees receiving adequate 
insurance and medical services.   
TRICARE, which serves as the DoD health care provider, “compares favorably 
with civilian health care plans on many measures, and military members consider it an 
important and valuable part of their compensation package” (DACMC, 2006, p. 72).  
TRICARE contains three insurance options: TRICARE Prime, TRICARE Extra, and 
TRICARE Standard.  As outlined in Table 4, insurance costs to service members vary, 
depending on enrollment in a specific program, military status (i.e., active duty, reservist, 
or retired), and the status of the treatment facility administering the health care (i.e., 
military-sponsored or civilian). 
 
                                                 
14 Though no state income tax is paid on wages earned, New Hampshire and Tennessee residents pay 
state tax on dividends and interest (Federation of Tax Administrators, 2007). 
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Table 4.   TRICARE Benefit Summary for Beneficiaries under Age 65  





There is no annual premium for active-duty service members and their dependents 
for TRICARE Prime, TRICARE Extra, and TRICARE Standard.  However, retirees pay 
$460 per year for TRICARE Prime family care and reservists pay 28-percent of the 
medical costs for their personal and their dependents’ medical care (DACMC, 2006).  In 
comparison to civilian sector insurance options, active duty and retired military members 
save thousands of dollars in annual premiums alone, as “the average premium 
contribution for family coverage in employer-provided plans in the civilian sector was 
$2,713 in 2005” (DACMC, 2006, p. 75).  Additional savings occur by factoring in per-
visit fees and prescription medication costs. 
3. Deferred Benefits (Retirement) 
The final critical component of the military pay system is the deferred payment 
provided by military retirement.  A Surface Warfare Officer is vested after 20 years of 
service.  According to DACMC (2006), the original system, established by Congress in 
1947, was designed to serve two purposes: 
• Provide income for military members in their old age  
• Create a retirement incentive for those active-duty military members with 
20 to 30 years of service who did not have future promotion opportunities. 
In its current state, three retirement plan options remain: FINAL PAY, HIGH-3, 
and REDUX.  The most senior personnel with active-duty service starting prior to 
September 8, 1980, are eligible for the FINAL PAY retirement plan.  Under FINAL 
PAY, after 20 years of service, retired officers earn a lifetime inflation-protected annuity 
equal to 2.5-percent of the basic pay at the date of retirement, multiplied by each year 
served (up to 30 years of service).  Beyond 30 years, the retirement annuity remains 
capped at 75-percent of the final basic pay.  SWOs entering after September 8, 1980, 
have the option of selecting either the HIGH-3 or REDUX retirement plans.  HIGH-3 is 
similar to FINAL PAY, except HIGH-3 uses the average of the three highest years of 
basic pay in retirement pay calculations rather than basic pay at the date of retirement.  
By electing REDUX, officers receive a $30,000 Career Status Bonus at the 15-year mark 
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and earn retirement pay as calculated by the HIGH-3 methodology, reduced by 1-percent 
for each year under 30 years of service. (Defense Finance and Accounting Service, 2007) 
Though a protected retirement annuity provides a significant retention incentive, 
data from the Defense Manpower Data Center provides evidence that less than 40 percent 
of all officers will complete 20 years of service (DACMC, 2006).  Figure 21 indicates 
that the highest proportion of officers leave military service after completing their initial 
service obligation near the five-year mark.  There is a steady decrease in the proportion of 
officers leaving from five years through 12 years of service, except for an increased spike 
occurring between eight to nine years.  This is consistent with the end of service 
obligation for naval aviators.  However, retention past the initial service obligation seems 
to be influenced by retirement benefits. Figure 21 shows a gradual decline in losses as 
“the pull of the retirement system tends to dominate retention beyond 10-12 years of 
service” for most naval officer communities (DACMC, 2006, p.18).  However, this 
phenomenon may not be the case for the SWO community, since other retention bonuses 
also have an impact on retention.  The nearly flat rate of loss associated with the period 
between 12 to 20 years of service and the abrupt spike occurring at 20 years of service 
suggests the strength of the 20-year vesting program. 
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Figure 21.   Officer Loss Distribution  
(DACMC, 2006, p.19) 
C. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FOR MILITARY COMPENSATION 
The legislative process for approving annual military compensation is complex.  
First, “the President is required by law, to submit the budget to Congress by the first 
Monday in February,” which includes proposed expenditures for military compensation 
(McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p. 30).  However, this budget submittal is not necessarily 
signed into law for the next fiscal year.  For several months, Congress debates the 
President’s budget, writing separate authorization and appropriation bills, which are 
returned to the President to be either signed into law or vetoed (McCaffery & Jones, 
2004).  For defense personnel and manpower spending, the Congressional budget process 
for the National Defense Authorization Act includes four main steps en route to the 
President’s desk for final approval: 
1. Concurrent Budget Resolution 
2. Reconciliation Bill (if needed) 
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3. Defense Authorization Bill 
4. Defense Appropriation Bill. 
During the Concurrent Budget Resolution process, the House of Representatives 
and Senate Budget Committees debate and adjust the President’s budget.  These 
committees set spending and tax (revenue) totals and also set spending levels by 
functional area, such as defense.  As necessary, a Reconciliation Bill affecting taxes and 
mandatory spending may also be added to the budget resolution.  The Concurrent Budget 
Resolution is then forwarded to the House and Senate Authorization and Appropriation 
Committees by April 15.15  While the Defense Authorization Bill, which creates 
authorization to spend specific levels of money on defense-related activities (including 
military compensation) is supposed to be completed and signed before the Defense 
Appropriation Bill, which makes money available for defense spending, this does not 
always occur.16  In the event that the Appropriations Bill is not signed by the start of the 
new fiscal year (October 1), a Continuing Resolution Appropriation (CRA) allows 
spending at previous levels to maintain the status quo while preventing spending on new 
programs.  Additionally, Supplemental Appropriations are issued to handle national or 
international emergencies and military requirements not normally included in the Defense 
Appropriation Bill. (McCaffery & Jones, 2004) 
After the Appropriations Bill is signed into law, approving and providing funds 
for federal spending, “the Department of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
and the DOD Comptroller receive and allocate the budget for national defense 
appropriated by Congress” (McCaffery & Jones, 2004, p. 37).  Military pay for active 
duty and retired personnel are then paid in compliance with United States Code, Title 37 
and Title 10 respectively (United States Code, 2004b; United States Code, 2004a).  This 
process for approving military pay expenditures follows Article 1, Section 9 of the United 
States Constitution in that “no Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
                                                 
15 The President does not approve the Concurrent Budget Resolution, as it is an internal document 
(though public record) directing the action of Congress (McCaffery & Jones, 2004). 
16 The actual order of submission of the Defense Authorization Bill and the Defense Appropriation 
Bill depends on many factors, such as time spent in each respective Subcommittee or time debated on the 
floor of the House of Representatives (McCaffery & Jones, 2004). 
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Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of 
the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.” 
Unlike civilian compensation policy, changing the military compensation system 
or the pay table “requires legislative action,” as the change must be approved by 
Congress and subsequently signed into public law by the President of the United States 
(CBO, 1995, p. 47).  Attempts to bypass the normal avenues for change are limited by 
legislation and the separation of powers among the branches of government.  Regarding 
alternative measures for approving compensation changes, the Congressional Budget 
Office (1995) states: 
The President has only limited authority, under title 37, section 1009 of 
the US Code, to reallocate a portion of the annual pay raise among grade 
and year-of-service categories; no category may receive less than 75 
percent of the raise it would get under an across-the-board raise […] 
Congress would either have to grant specific authority for the Department 
of Defense to change the pay table or […] establish a specific new table 
through legislation. (p. 47) 
D. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
SYSTEM 
Like most organizations, the US Navy employs a formal assessment system to 
evaluate the performance of its workers.  In accordance with Bureau of Naval Personnel 
Instruction (BUPERSINST) 1610.10A, senior officers (reporting seniors) are responsible 
for assessing their subordinates’ performance (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2005).  A 
Surface Warfare Officer’s performance is evaluated annually using a fitness report 
(FITREP), which according to Cozzetto (1990) is used as the “primary yardstick for 
evaluation and eventual judgment” for promotion (p. 235).  Appendix B contains a blank 
copy of an officer FITREP, form NAVPERS 1610/2. 
1. Contents of a FITREP 
The performance-based components of an officer’s FITREP are the performance 
trait grades, comments on performance, and promotion recommendation (Schwind & 
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Laurence, 2006).  According to the Bureau of Naval Personnel (2005), reporting seniors 
evaluate subordinate officers across seven performance traits, which include: 
1.  Professional expertise 
2.  Command or organizational climate and equal opportunity 
3.  Military bearing and character 
4.  Teamwork 
5.  Mission accomplishment and initiative 
6.  Leadership 
7.  Tactical performance (including SWO qualifications). 
For each performance trait, SWOs are graded on a numerical scale of 1.0 through 5.0, in 
which 1.0 represents “disappointing performance” as the lowest score, and 5.0 signifies 
“superstar performance” as the highest score (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2005, pp. 5-6).  
The average of the seven performance trait scores is calculated and recorded as the 
member trait average (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2005).  The summary group average is 
calculated as the mean of all member trait averages in the group of SWOs (at the same 
rank) being evaluated during that specific promotion cycle (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 
2005).  By displaying both the member trait average and the summary group average, 
FITREP readers can assess relative performance. 
FITREPs also include a comments section, in which the reporting senior can 
articulate the officer’s performance.  Though the comments generally correspond to 
performance trait scores, specific comments are only required for “all 1.0 grades, three 
2.0 grades, and any grade below 3.0 in Command or Organizational Climate/Equal 
Opportunity” trait category (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2005, p. 6).  Finally, a 
promotion recommendation is endorsed by the reporting senior.  According to the Bureau 
of Naval Personnel (2005), this recommendation is categorical and includes (in 
descending order): early promote, must promote, promotable, progressing, significant 
problems, and NOB (for non-observed reports).  The number of “early promote” and 
“must promote” recommendations are limited based on the summary group size, as 
depicted in Table 5. 
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Table 5.   Maximum Limits on “Early Promote” and “Must Promote” Recommendations 
(Adapted from Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2005, p. 1-19) 
 
For example, in a summary group of ten Lieutenant Commander (O-4) SWOs, a 
maximum of two officers could be recommended to “early promote”; three officers could 
be recommended to “must promote.”  There is no restriction on the number 
recommended as “promotable” or lower (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2005).  The 
maximum limits for each promotion recommendation category allow for greater variation 
or spread in the promotion recommendations. 
2. Grade Inflation 
Though the limits on promotion recommendation categories partially control for 
rater bias, critics of the Navy’s FITREP system contend that individual trait averages 
exhibit “grade inflation” or leniency error (Bjerke, Cleveland, Morrison & Wilson, 1987, 
p. 1).  According to Mathis and Jackson (2006), leniency error occurs when overall 
officer ratings fall at the high end of the 5.0-rating scale.  After analyzing FITREPs for 
582 naval officers, a study conducted by Thomas, Edwards, Perry, and David (1998) 
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found empirical evidence that trait scores in fitness reports displayed patterns of “extreme 
inflation” (p. 140).  Thomas et al. (1998) concluded: 
Because the military is a closed system that promotes from within, 
inflation of performance marks and rankings is probably inevitable.  For 
this reason, selection boards are left to search for nuances in the narrative 
portion of the fitness report and to evaluate other career data.  The 
quantitative information does little to distinguish between truly 
outstanding and merely good Navy officers. (p. 140) 
There are no documented restrictions on the quantity of a particular score awarded 
for each performance trait category across all FITREPs submitted by a reporting senior.  
For instance, the reporting senior can grade all SWOs as 5.0 performers in each 
performance trait category, providing the necessary justification of the high marks in the 
comments sections of the FITREPs.  To combat this grade inflation, each senior officer 
maintains a reporting senior’s cumulative average, which considers the average of all 
FITREPs at a given rank (i.e., average of all O-4’s evaluated over time).  Promotion 
boards can view the reporting senior’s cumulative average along with the member’s trait 
average and the summary group average (PERS-80, n.d).  In relation to other officers 
who the reporting senior evaluated over time, promotion board members can assess 
whether or not the officer’s performance was above average (i.e., higher than the 
reporting senior’s cumulative average).  This provides a moderate measure of 
performance, though the significance of the distribution of scores around the reporting 
senior’s cumulative average is unclear.  The board has a biased or somewhat limited 
evaluation of the officer’s true performance since the standard deviation is not reported, 
nor is a t-test conducted to assess the statistical significance between the member’s trait 
average and the reporting senior’s cumulative average. 
E. SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER PROMOTIONS 
Promotions through Lieutenant (O-3) are solely based on meeting minimum 
requirements and qualifications, while promotion to Lieutenant Commander (O-4) and 
more senior pay grades relies on the judgment of formalized promotion boards (Asch & 
Warner, 2001; Secretary of the Navy, 2002).  These promotion boards are governed by 
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Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 1420.1B and tailored board precepts 
for each promotion board (Secretary of the Navy, 2006). 
1. Promotion Zones and Promotion Timing 
A Surface Warfare Officer’s eligibility for promotion is determined by the 
Secretary of the Navy’s annual promotion plan, which establishes promotion zones 
(Secretary of the Navy, 2006).  Promotion zones, which are “the size of the population 
considered to fill projected [manpower] requirements,” are established for each grade and 
competitive category (Yardley, Schirmer, Thie, & Merck, 2005, p. 11).  Promotion zones 
classify which officers are eligible for consideration for promotion to a specific grade, 
based on lineal seniority (Secretary of the Navy, 2006).  According to the Secretary of the 
Navy (2006), officers are categorized as “in zone” if they fall within the promotion zone, 
“below zone” if they are more junior than the officers “in zone” yet are still eligible for 
promotion, and “above zone” if they are more senior than “in zone” officers (pp. 8-9).  
Officers who are “below zone” and “above zone” may be considered for promotion as 
prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy (Secretary of the Navy, 2006).  However, Navy 
policy restricts the “below zone” selection rate from exceeding 10-percent (Yardley et al., 
2005). 
Though promotion zones specify which officers are eligible for promotion in a 
given fiscal year, a more generalized promotion timing plan was published in Department 
of Defense Instruction 1320.13 (Yardley et al., 2005). The promotion timing and 
promotion opportunities for promotion to Lieutenant Junior Grade (O-2) through Captain 







Table 6.   Promotion Timing and Promotion Opportunities  
(Adapted from Yardley et al., 2005, pp. 12-13) 
 
Promotion timing, also called the promotion flow point, is the average years of 
commissioned service before eligibility for promotion to the next rank (Yardley et al., 
2005).  For instance, Lieutenant (O-3) SWOs will be “in zone” for promotion to 
Lieutenant Commander (O-4) at approximately 10 years, plus or minus one year, of 
commissioned service.  As stated by Yardley et al. (2005), the promotion opportunity is 
“the percentage of all officers selected for promotion, and includes officers selected from 
above, in, and below the zone” (p. 13).  For example, the O-4 promotion board selects 
approximately 80-percent of the qualified officers, with a variance of plus or minus 10-
percent depending on the officer community.  Though promotion timing and promotion 
opportunity is standard across all branches of service, the Secretary of the Navy has 
authority to temporarily circumvent the policy if required to meet manpower 
requirements or maintain authorized grade strength (Secretary of the Navy, 2006). 
Due to the SWO inventory gap at mid-grade and senior levels, the SWO 
community has historically selected above-the-mean promotion opportunity rates (and 
closer to the upper-range limits) established by the Department of Defense (DoD).  Table 
7 depicts the SWO promotion rates (for both conventional and nuclear-qualified SWOs) 
to Lieutenant Commander (O-4) for FY03 through FY08.  Table 8 displays similar SWO 
promotion rates to Commander (O-5), and Table 9 shows comparable SWO promotion 
rates to Captain (O-6).  In Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9, for each promotion category 
(i.e., “above zone,” “in zone,” and “below zone”), the data are displayed as the number of 
To Grade Promotion Timing Promotion Opportunity 
O-2: Lieutenant Junior Grade 2 yrs All Qualified 
O-3: Lieutenant 4 yrs All Qualified 
O-4: Lieutenant Commander 10 yrs ± 1 yr 80% ± 10% 
O-5: Commander 16 yrs ± 1 yr 70% ± 10% 
O-6: Captain 22 yrs ± 1 yr 50% ± 10% 
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SWOs eligible for promotion, the number of SWOs selected for promotion, and the 
overall percentage of SWOs selected for promotion.   
 
Table 7.   SWO Promotion Rates to Lieutenant Commander (O-4) for FY03 through FY08 
(Adapted from Commander Navy Personnel Command, 2008a) 
Lieutenant Commander (O-4): 111X/116X 
Above Zone In Zone Below Zone 
Fiscal Year 
 Elg      Sel        %      Elg      Sel       %           Elg      Sel         %     
FY03  16        0        0.00% 217     203   93.55 % 615       7        1.14 %
FY04 21        0        0.00% 241     202   83.82 % 525      17       3.24 %
FY05 40        3        7.50% 249     221   88.76 % 501       4        0.80 %
FY06 33        1        3.03% 239     208   87.03 % 686       5        0.73 %
FY07 31       10     32.26% 260     229   88.08 % 564      13       2.30 %
FY08 22        3      13.64% 277     234   84.48 % 530       0        0.00 %
 
 
Table 8.   SWO Promotion Rates to Commander (O-5) for FY03 through FY08  
(Adapted from Commander Navy Personnel Command, 2008a) 
Commander (O-5): 111X 
Above Zone In Zone Below Zone Fiscal Year 
   Elg      Sel       %      Elg     Sel       %         Elg      Sel       %       
FY03  182      15    8.24%  175     123    70.29% 312       1       0.32 %
FY04 169       3     1.78%  153     113    73.86 % 294       3       1.02 %
FY05 160      10    6.25%  128      98     76.56 % 349       0       0.00 %
FY06 150       5     3.33%  118      82     69.49 % 313       6       1.92 %
FY07 135       2     1.48%  146     108    73.97 % 311       0       0.00 %










Table 9.   SWO Promotion Rates to Captain (O-6) for FY03 through FY08  
(Adapted from Commander Navy Personnel Command, 2008a) 
 
Captain (O-6): 111X 
Above Zone In Zone Below Zone Fiscal Year 
  Elg      Sel       %       Elg      Sel       %        Elg      Sel       %       
FY03  147        0        0.0% 102      55    53.92 % 267       8       3.00 %
FY04 157        3      1.91% 112      52    46.43 % 280       6       2.14 %
FY05 149        2      1.34% 122      64    52.46 % 271       2       0.74 %
FY06 165        0      0.00%   92      42    45.65 % 243       2       0.82 %
FY07 164        3      1.83% 112      64    57.14 % 249       0       0.00 %
FY08 141        0      0.00% 134      80    59.70 % 253       0       0.00 %
 
As illustrated in Table 7, the past six Lieutenant Commander (O-4) board 
selection rates for SWOs were above the DoD-standard of 80-percent promotion 
opportunity (found in Table 6).  Similarly, as depicted in Table 8, five of the past six 
fiscal year Commander (O-5) SWO board selection rates were above the DoD-standard 
70-percent O-5 promotion opportunity.  The exception was FY06, with a 69.49-percent 
“in zone” promotion rate.  As shown in Table 9, the results were mixed for the Captain 
(O-6) promotion board statistics as some fiscal year boards selected above the DoD-
standard 50-percent O-6 promotion opportunity, while other years’ boards fell below the 
standard promotion rate.  The predominantly higher promotion rates suggest that the 
SWO community is attempting to combat lower retention at critical ports of exit 
(Commander Navy Personnel Command, 2008a). 
2. Promotion as a Measure of Performance 
According to Fairburn and Malcomson (2001), promotions serve two roles: to 
ensure a good person-job fit based on ability and to provide incentives for performance.  
Since promotion to a higher rank assumes increased responsibility and qualification for 
higher-level job assignments, the SWO promotion system strives to ensure a good 
person-job fit, where job is synonymous with pay grade and rank.  In theory, officers who 
do not meet the standards of the next higher rank nor possess the prerequisite ability will 
not be selected for promotion (Asch & Warner, 2001).  However, since promotion 
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opportunities at mid-grade promotion boards (particularly the O-4 board) are significantly 
lenient with a promotion opportunity up to 90 percent, it is quite possible that some 
officers may be selected to the next higher rank based on the relative quality of the 
eligible officer pool and not on whether that officer is ready to accept the responsibility 
of higher rank (Yardley et al., 2005).  This situation is more probable for the surface 
warfare community, due to the SWO inventory gap at mid-grade and senior ranks.  For 
example, suppose an annual O-4 board considered 100 SWOs for promotion, of which 
only 75 possess the ability and experience to successfully perform the duties of 
Lieutenant Commanders (O-4).  Due to manning shortages in the SWO community at the 
O-4 level, the board precept suggested selecting 90-percent of eligible officers (the 
maximum promotion opportunity for O-4 boards from Table 6).  Most likely, the 
promotion board would follow the precept guidance and select 90 SWOs for promotion, 
even though the readiness of 15 officers to assume the increased responsibility associated 
with the promotion is questionable. 
Generally, this problem exists for any tournament-type promotion scheme, where 
the number of promotion slots is determined in advance, and there are no minimum 
performance standards.  This dilemma is amplified in the SWO community as more high-
quality SWOs leave the Navy at earlier ports of exit.  In order to meet manning goals, 
lower-quality officers may receive promotions.  The probability of this phenomenon 
occurring in the Navy decreases as the promotion board evaluates more senior-ranking 
officers, since the promotion opportunity significantly decreases as the rank becomes 
more senior (i.e., the average promotion opportunity to O-5 is 70 percent, in contrast to 
80-percent promotion opportunity during O-4 boards) (Yardley et al., 2005). 
From an incentive perspective, SWOs are not directly rewarded monetarily for 
their annual performance as recorded on their FITREPs.  However, their performance is 
ultimately evaluated and rewarded during promotion boards.  Promotion to a higher rank 
results in higher pay as the officer moves up the basic pay table and receives increased 
allowances.  Though promotion boards consider FITREPs in their deliberations, other 
contents of Surface Warfare Officers’ service records are judged as well.  Advanced 
education, training, professional surface warfare qualifications, the challenge and 
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“visibility” of past job assignments, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), joint 
experience, and personal awards are all assessed during promotion decisions (Schwind & 
Laurence, 2006; Secretary of the Navy, 2007a; Secretary of the Navy, 2007b).  
Promotion boards consider both past performance and potential ability to perform future 
assignments at a higher pay grade.  Therefore, promotions may be a good proxy for 
performance among naval officers. 
3. Potential Bias in Promotion Boards 
Just as bias may be found in the Navy’s FITREP system, the SWO promotion 
board process may succumb to a similar fate.  According to the Active Officer 
Promotions Branch (PERS-80), promotion boards rely on the assessment of officers’ 
service records by two board members, who individually grade their assigned records 
(PERS-80, n.d.).  One of these board members is responsible for briefing each of the 
assigned officers’ records to the promotion board.  After viewing the initial assessment 
grades, board members vote on each record.  Following sometimes-lengthy deliberations, 
enough SWOs are selected for promotion without violating the selection rate defined in 
the board precept.  Thus, within the promotion board process, there is ample opportunity 
for individual board members, including the briefer, to introduce bias during promotion 
boards. 
Adverse personal knowledge of the officer is prohibited from being discussed by 
the briefer and other board members, unless this information is included in the member’s 
service record (PERS-80, n.d.).  However, if the briefer or any other board member has 
personal knowledge of positive aspects relating to the officer’s performance or ability, 
the board may consider such input in its deliberations.  Regarding personal knowledge 
affecting selection decisions, one anonymous Navy Admiral stated, “Knowledge—that’s 
human nature.  To discredit that means you’re stupid.  ‘Hey, I know him.  He’s proven.  
This guy I don’t know, he looks good, but if I have to make a choice, I’m picking my 
guy’” (Schwind & Laurence, 2006, p. S90). 
Additionally, much of the promotion decision relies on the quality of the brief 
presented to the board.  For example, if the briefer breezes through the positive 
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characteristics of a SWO’s service record but chooses to highlight the negative aspects, 
the board may be swayed to score the officer lower than if the brief had been presented in 
the opposite manner.  The briefer could also influence the board’s decision by non-verbal 
cues or expressions, such as frowning when discussing a particular FITREP or smiling 
when presenting a fellow alumnus.  The bottom line is that all members of a promotion 
board play vital roles.  Without proper training or supervision by a competent Board 
President, promotion board members may inadvertently bias the promotion board 
process. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The governance maintaining the Navy’s officer corps is steeped in both tradition 
and bureaucracy.  Although the military pay system is skewed such that there is a much 
smaller pay differential between lower-level and upper-level management compared to 
the civilian sector, approximately 40 percent of the officers retain on active duty to reach 
the 20-year retirement annuity vesting point (DACMC, 2006).  A Surface Warfare 
Officer’s total compensation package contains more elements than just basic pay, as there 
is a large quantity of additional pays and benefits (both in-kind and deferred) that 
accumulate over a naval career.  However, since basic pay is a significant amount of the 
total compensation package, its proper management is essential (CBO, 1995; DACMC, 
2006; Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2008b).  Additionally, 
changes to the basic pay table must be thoroughly supported with empirical evidence and 
Congressional support in order to pass through the legislative process in a timely fashion.  
Furthermore, the only performance element of the basic pay table is the pay grade axis, 
which is dependent on the naval officer promotion process. 
The military’s reliance on promotion as the sole source of monetary 
rewards for good performance causes certain problems for anyone seeking 
to increase performance incentives […] As with any performance rewards, 
military promotions only provide incentives if the links between 
performance and promotions are clear.  In the officer ranks, in particular, 
that may not always be the case. (CBO, 1995, p. 2-3) 
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Based on the legislative complexity of changing the basic pay table, a more 
accessible vehicle for implementing a performance-based compensation tool for the SWO 
community is to revise and optimize one or more of the SWO retention bonuses, 
specifically: the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP), Junior SWO 
Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), SWO Critical Skills Bonus, or the Senior SWO 
CSRB programs. 
While the fitness report (FITREP) evaluation system and the promotion board 
process have inherent flaws and biases, the promotion system is probably a more 
appropriate indication of overall performance.  Promotions are good proxies to define 
high-quality characteristics to be used for developing a SWO retention bonus program 
that is tied to performance.  In theory, promotion boards ensure that SWOs are paid their 
true value to the Navy, promoting the right officers and only the right officers, based on 
the quality of performance, as documented in their service records.  Holding all else 
constant, the promotion board process ensures that SWOs are paid for their performance. 
Nevertheless, more efficient and optimal incentive pay (or bonus) programs may be 
necessary to provide incentives for higher performance and to combat current retention 
issues plaguing the surface warfare community. 
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IV. PERFORMANCE AND COMPENSATION THEORY 
A. OVERVIEW 
To develop a stronger monetary incentive program, policymakers and decision-
makers must first understand the theories behind performance and compensation.  This 
chapter discusses performance and compensation theory.  The first section addresses 
Labor Economic Theory affecting employees’ performance, promotion, and 
compensation.  The second section reviews the organizational behavior constructs behind 
pay for performance systems. 
B. LABOR ECONOMIC THEORY 
Attracting and retaining a talented workforce is essential for organizations to 
achieve a competitive advantage (Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau, & Gerhart, 2003).  To 
maintain this advantage, the Navy must strive to decrease dysfunctional turnover, while 
taking advantage of functional turnover.  Dysfunctional turnover occurs when the Navy 
fails to retain exceptional performers, especially in the surface warfare community 
(Sturman et al., 2003).  Applying the theoretical discussion of Trevor, Gerhart, and 
Boudreau (1997), dysfunctional turnover can be quite harmful to the Navy, since the 
service loses valuable human capital.  On the other hand, functional turnover is when 
poor performing employees leave the organization through quitting or being fired 
(Sturman et al., 2003).  If managed properly, functional turnover can be a strategic option 
for organizations, since eliminating poorly performing employees makes room for new 
employees with higher potential for success (Trevor et al., 1997). 
According to Sturman et al. (2003), an organization’s compensation system 
influences the probability of voluntary quits affecting both types of turnover.  Generally, 
employees who feel they are equitably compensated as a function of their performance 
and productivity are more willing to stay with their employers.  Conversely, employees 
who are not satisfied with wages relative to their performance and ability are more likely 
to quit.  However, in organizations in which work is team-based and team performance is 
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the ultimate goal, the relationship between individual performance and pay are not clearly 
defined (Sikula, 2001).  Surface Warfare Officers are faced with the same dilemma, and 
retention decisions rely on several economic factors: perceived value to outside 
employers based on accumulated human capital, the efficiency of military wages, the 
desire to continue participating in the military promotion tournament system, the 
relationship between performance and turnover, and the correlation between performance 
and pay.  These labor economic theories are further discussed in the following 
subsections. 
1. Human Capital Theory 
At ports of exit, SWOs are faced with the decision to stay with the Navy or to 
seek outside employment.  The value these officers present to outside employers at the 
ports of exit (i.e., the salary that civilian employers are willing to pay) is directly 
proportional to the level of general human capital the officer possesses.  However, the 
Navy values both general human capital and firm-specific (or military-specific) human 
capital that has accumulated during the SWO’s career.  According to Gibbons and 
Waldman (1999b), “general human capital refers to training that is valued equally by 
many firms, while specific human capital refers to training that has value at the firm 
providing the training but no value elsewhere” (p. 2,378).  For example, graduate 
education for SWOs provides general human capital—the decision-making skills and 
advanced knowledge being equally valuable for both the military and civilian employers.  
On the other hand, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is firm-specific training 
that is only valuable to the military. 
Human capital theory predicts that the Navy should keep wages high enough to 
sufficiently pay for both general and firm-specific human capital, thereby attempting to 
retain high-quality SWOs (Rosen, 1992).  However, based on the limitations of the 
military’s pay system and the complexity of accurately measuring human capital (since it 
is an intangible asset), compensating increased human capital is not always possible 
(Whitaker & Wilson, 2007).  For instance, SWOs do not receive additional direct 
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compensation for completing a graduate degree.  Theoretically, this should increase their 
general human capital and result in increased wages. 
The level of overall human capital varies among Surface Warfare Officers, 
depending on training, operational experience, qualifications, education, and tenure in the 
Navy.  Specifically, the Navy places a high value on individual surface warfare 
qualifications.  Warfare qualifications signify the culmination of intense naval training 
and experience, thereby signaling acquired firm-specific human capital.  Due to the 
shortage of mid-grade and senior-ranking SWOs, retention bonuses were implemented to 
compensate for military-specific human capital.  Therefore, the Navy invests in both 
general and firm-specific human capital in the SWO community to attract and retain 
talent, though the level of investment may not capture the highest performers. 
Most civilian firms value and invest in human capital (Whitaker & Wilson, 2007).  
The choice to invest in human capital involves a critical cost-benefit analysis (Ehrenberg 
& Smith, 2006).  Costs are incurred in the near-term and include direct expenses, forgone 
earnings, and psychic losses; while benefits “accrue in the future” and commonly must be 
discounted for comparison with costs (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006, p. 277).17  The return to 
training for general human capital is gained solely by the worker, since the employee is 
equally valuable to all firms due to the general nature of the training (Becker, 1993; 
Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b).  According to Becker (1993) and Gibbons and Waldman 
(1999b), the employee commonly bears the entire cost of the general training, since it is a 
poor investment for the firm.  However, both the worker and the firm share the cost and 
reap the benefits of firm-specific human capital (Becker, 1993; Gibbons & Waldman, 
1999b).  Other companies do not value firm-specific training, so the firm is not 
handcuffed to provide higher post-training wages that cover the increased productivity 
due to such training (Becker, 1993; Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b).  However, workers 
will be motivated to quit if the firm captures all of the benefits of the firm-specific 
training (i.e., not increasing wages of employees who receive training and become more 
                                                 
17 Direct expenses, also called out-of-pocket expenses, include expenditures for tuition, fees, and 
learning materials.  Forgone earnings refer to the compensation that is lost while workers are away from 
work.  Finally, psychic losses are the psychological stress associated with learning difficult concepts, skills, 
or tasks. (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006) 
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productive), so most firms will “pay a post-training wage that includes at least part of the 
increased productivity from training” (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b, p. 2,378).  In 
summary, based on the cost-benefit analysis of human capital, most firms only invest in 
firm-specific training. 
Though firm-specific human capital is a good investment for most firms, 
empirical evidence supports variance in the level of investment among different 
organizations.  Baker, Gibbs, and Holstrom (1994a) analyzed personnel data from a 
medium-sized US firm in the service industry from 1969 through 1988, which included 
68,437 employee-years of data.  The researchers found that the firm did not place much 
weight on firm-specific human capital, since both external hires and internal workers had 
similar value to the company and similar career performance (Baker et al., 1994a).  The 
firm used a stable hierarchy, in which all jobs could be condensed into eight levels—with 
the first level being the primary “port of entry” and the eighth level being the Chief 
Executive Officer (Baker et al., 1994a, p. 898).  Utilizing transition matrices and Chi-
square statistical tests, Baker et al. (1994a) examined the mobility of workers within the 
firm and the entrance of external hires.   
In general, external hires had slightly more general human capital, as evidenced 
by more education and longer experience in the job market (Baker et al., 1994a).  
Because of their higher level of general human capital, new hires were initially promoted 
more rapidly than incumbent internal workers (Baker et al., 1994a).  According to Spence 
(1973), this promotion trend may be due to the signaling effect of higher education rather 
than actual general human capital accumulation.  Since most firms have asymmetric 
information about workers’ actual productivity and performance, education level acts as a 
signal of ability and potential productivity (Spence, 1973; Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006).  
Higher education is generally associated with higher ability and potential for higher 
productivity, while lower education acts as a negative signal for both ability and 
productivity. 
Additionally, the placement of more highly educated external hires into lower-
level jobs may indicate that the firm is using the first few months as a trial period based 
on the asymmetric information about the workers’ productivity (Gibbons & Waldman, 
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1999a).  Since the firm does not know the true level of human capital or productivity 
potential, it may not be willing to place external workers into higher-level jobs 
commensurate with their education and experience until they have proven themselves.  
Once the firm has gathered direct information about the productivity of the worker 
through tenure with the firm, education “play[s] a smaller role in determining earnings” 
and promotions (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006, p. 307).  Nonetheless, Baker et al. (1994a) 
found that subsequent career performance, measured as the highest hierarchical level 
attained, is fairly similar between external hires and internal workers.  As reasoned by 
Baker et al. (1994a), this conclusion suggests that employees’ general human capital and 
job performance at lower hierarchical levels determined the probability of promotion 
through the ranks. 
Also, Baker et al. (1994a) found that workers accumulate human capital at 
different rates, which in turn yields promotion at different rates.  This conclusion 
suggests that some workers are on the “fast track […since] those promoted quickly at one 
level are promoted more often and more quickly at the next level” (p. 916).  Employees 
entered the fast track when assigned positions which maximized their productivity, 
thereby leading to faster promotions (Baker et al., 1994a, p. 901).  However, this 
evidence contradicts the theoretical discussion of Gibbons and Waldman (1999b), who 
claimed that “an individual’s capital stock depreciates at a constant rate […and] the 
human-capital production function exhibits diminishing marginal returns” (p. 2,378).  
According to Gibbons and Waldman (1999b), even fast-track workers experience some 
depreciation of human capital over time, so tolerating or continuing accelerated 
promotions of those on the fast track may not be the most efficient or best practice for 
firms to follow. 
Finally, Baker et al. (1994a) examined the effects of human capital and 
hierarchical levels on employee salary.  Using education level and tenure with the firm as 
measures of human capital, the authors conducted pooled regressions to estimate the 
returns to human capital, hierarchical levels, and a combination of the independent 
variables (Baker et al., 1994a).  Additionally, a regression was run for the 1985 cross-
section of the dataset for comparison purposes.  The dependent variable was the 
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logarithm of the employee’s real salary in 1988 constant dollars (Baker et al., 1994a). 
The regression results are depicted in Table 10. 
Table 10.   Effects of Human Capital and Hierarchical Level on Current Salary  
(Baker et al., 1994a, p. 907) 
 
Evaluated separately, both measures of human capital in this study (tenure and 
education) and hierarchical levels had statistically significant positive effects on 
employees’ salary.  However, in the combined regression, the results were mixed, as 
“tenure” and “13-16 years [of] education” variables had negative marginal effects on 
salary (Baker et al., 1994a, p. 907).  As discussed by the authors, there is likely high 
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multi-collinearity in the combined regression model, since tenure and hierarchical levels 
are probably correlated (Baker et al., 1994a).  The negative tenure effect can be explained 
by those on the fast track.  Between two employees in the same hierarchical level, the 
worker with shorter tenure is on the fast track and potentially possesses higher ability.  
Based on the results from Baker et al. (1994a), the sample firm valued human capital and 
rewarded employees based on education and tenure, though tenure was recompensed at a 
diminishing rate because the marginal effect of tenure-squared is negative.  Additionally, 
employees’ pay increased as they progressed through the ranks, which is consistent with 
tournament theory.  However, pay overlapped between different levels—indicating that 
both human capital and position were considered when determining pay. 
In recent years, more organizations have placed a heavier emphasis on human 
capital, also known as intellectual capital.  Since human capital cannot be copied by 
competitors, it provides a “sustainable competitive advantage” for organizations that 
value human capital investment (SHRM, 2007a, p. 1-84).  According to Whitaker and 
Wilson (2007), accurate human capital measurement can be an even better predictor of 
future organizational performance than “lag indicators, such as employee attrition or 
accounting measures” (p. P60).  Yet, human capital is difficult to measure (Whitaker & 
Wilson, 2007).  Because of the complexity of evaluating human capital, the Navy is 
forced to use bonuses and special pays to combat SWO retention or recruiting shortfalls, 
in lieu of compensating for individual human capital. 
2. Wage Theories 
a. Efficiency Wage Theory 
Organizations employing a “lead the market” strategy offer higher 
compensation than other companies in the industry to “recruit and retain the most 
desirable talent from the labor pool” (SHRM, 2007c, p. 4-38).  As such, these firms pay 
efficiency wages, which are above market-clearing wages (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b).  
Since civilian companies strive to maximize profits, a firm will choose to set pay at a 
level in “which the marginal revenues to the employer from a further pay increase equal 
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the marginal costs” (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006, p. 370).  This high-level pay will provide 
an incentive for workers to keep productivity high to avoid being fired from their 
generous company.  Initially, employees may not see the incentive for working hard, 
since they are being paid high wages from day one (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b).  
However, over time, if the employer enforces high-performance requirements by firing 
low-performance employees, the remaining employees will exert high effort and reduce 
shirking to keep their jobs (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b). 
Generally, “larger firms, more-profitable firms, and capital intensive firms 
all offer better compensation packages and better working conditions” (Zábojník & 
Bernhardt, 2001, p. 694).  Larger firms and capital intensive firms employ more skilled 
workers due to the higher technological skills required in the job specifications (Zábojník 
& Bernhardt, 2001).  Additionally, these firms have better opportunities to increase 
overall and individual productivity, such as exploiting economies of scale in training 
(Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006).  More-profitable firms have the ability to pay higher wages, 
since their higher-than-average profits can be shared among employees.  All three 
categories of firms value human capital as a competitive advantage, and are willing to 
pay efficiency wages to acquire it (Sturman et al., 2003). 
In a companion study to Baker et al. (1994a), Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom (1994b) used the same dataset from a single US firm (but a reduced sample 
of 50,595 observations) to discuss the firm’s wage policy and salary trends.  Figure 22 
depicts the mean salary trend over time from the individual firm as compared to the 
industry average, as gathered from the Current Population Survey (Baker et al., 1994b).  
The industry average is plotted using the y-axis on the left side of Figure 22, while the 
sample firm is plotted using the y-axis to the right.  Furthermore, to normalize the data, 
the average salary is displayed in 1988 real dollars (Baker et al., 1994b). 
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Figure 22.   Mean Salary Over Time for the Sample Firm Compared to the Industry 
Standard  
(Baker et al., 1994b) 
Though the firm’s average salary follows the general industry trend, the 
average salary is much higher in the sample firm over the time period studied, which 
suggests the existence of efficiency wages (Baker et al., 1994b).  Additionally, Baker et 
al. (1994b) found evidence of a cohort effect, where incumbent wages follow a pattern of 
progression over time that differs significantly from entrant wages.  As stated by Baker et 
al. (1994b), “cohorts who earn more on entry maintain their advantage through time 
[…and] wages are not solely determined by marginal product” of labor (p. 923).  This 
may suggest that employees are satisfied with the efficiency wages and choose to accept 
the normal career progression and standard annual pay increases, even if they are slightly 
disadvantaged based on their date of entry. 
As one of the largest employers in the United States, the Navy pays 
officers initial wages that can be considered competitive, depending on the geographical 
location of the recruits and their level of general human capital.  However, the Navy is a 
non-profit organization, so it is difficult to evaluate if entry-level basic pay is, in fact, 
based on Efficiency Wage Theory.  However, considering the high-level of firm-specific 
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human capital possessed by senior SWOs and the pay compression of the basic pay table 
(in which pay at junior ranks is close to pay at more senior ranks, relative to civilian 
compensation structures), the earlier wages may be efficiency wages to attract talent 
(Asch & Warner, 2001). 
b. Performance-based Compensation as an Incentive 
Pay for performance ties rewards directly to metrics of organizational, 
workgroup, and/or individual performance.  Pay-for-performance schemes 
can be applied to link a reward to a specific output […] or subjective goal. 
(Savych, 2005, p. 35) 
With the exception of higher pay associated with promotions, the Navy 
does not yet use performance-based compensation as an incentive (Savych, 2005).  
Annual performance evaluations (i.e., FITREPS) are not directly tied to officers’ 
compensation; and special and incentive pays do not address the difference in 
performance between SWOs (Savych, 2005).  However, the Defense Advisory 
Committee on Military Compensation (DACMC) recently recommended that the 
Department of Defense consider pay reform and the effects of such a system (DACMC, 
2006). 
Many civilian firms use performance-based compensation systems to 
create incentives for high performance.  For example, Baker et al. (1994b) deduced that 
their sample firm had an incentive program that recognizes “individual rewards are based 
on the employee’s performance that year” (p. 952).  In theory, success is determined by a 
sequence of interlocking interactions: effort must be directly tied to expected output; 
certain output must result in a particular outcome; the outcome must be accurately 
captured in a performance evaluation; and the performance-based component of pay must 
be determined by the results of the evaluation (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b).  According 
to Savych (2005), performance-based pay provides a strong performance incentive, as 
employees increase productivity and work effort if they are subsequently rewarded with 
higher pay.  Furthermore, variable merit-based pay sorts workers into different jobs based 
on “their abilities and willingness to exert effort” (Savych, 2005, p. 36).  Higher-
performing employees prefer jobs that have performance-based aspects of their 
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compensation plan, since their work effort is rewarded (Savych, 2005).  Lower-
performing employees prefer jobs with guaranteed steady wages, since relative wages 
remain constant across all performance levels.  Therefore, in internal labor markets, 
performance-based compensation systems screen poor-performing employees during 
“ports of entry” and ports of exit through self-selection (Rosen, 1992, p. 227). 
A negative aspect of individual performance-based compensation is that 
workers may allocate more effort to activities that are directly recorded in performance 
evaluations, thereby removing effort on normal work activities that have little impact on 
individual evaluation yet are important for the success of the company (Ehrenberg & 
Smith, 2006).  Since personnel budgets are limited, pay is relatively distributed among 
employees.  This constraint of resources may cause competition among employees, 
which, if left unchecked, may lead to a negative workplace environment.  Additionally, 
financial incentives are often “not formally tied to one’s own performance,” since 
accurately capturing performance is quite difficult (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b, p. 
2,386).  Instead, many civilian firms pay variable bonuses that encapsulate overall firm 
performance and resemble profit sharing plans, which barely reflect individual 
performance. 
3. Tournament Theory 
a. Promotion Tournaments 
According to Lazear and Rosen (1981), promotion tournaments offer 
incentives within firms and other organizations.  In the SWO community, officers 
compete with their peers for promotions, as the Navy’s promotion process restricts the 
number of SWOs promoted in a given fiscal year through promotion zones and 
limitations imposed by promotion opportunity.  As stated by Warner and Asch (1995):  
In the [Navy], the reward for effort is promotion.  In the junior ranks, 
promotion is based on individual skill acquisition.  But beyond the junior 
ranks, the promotion system resembles a contest or tournament in which 
only a fraction of those eligible for promotion are actually selected. (p. 
381) 
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Therefore, the SWO promotion system follows the promotion tournament theory for 
promotion to Lieutenant Commander (O-4) and senior ranks.  According to Ehrenberg 
and Smith (2006), promotion tournaments have three important components: 
Who will win is uncertain, the winner is selected based on relative 
performance (that is, performance compared with that of the other 
‘contestants’), and rewards are concentrated in the hands of the winner so 
that there is a big difference between winning and losing (p. 376). 
By holding SWO promotion boards that independently make promotion 
decisions, promotions are not always certain, especially when the selection rate decreases 
as the seniority of rank increases.  Additionally, naval officers are selected based on the 
quality of their service records, which indicates relative performance as compared to their 
peers being considered at the same promotion board.  Though Surface Warfare Officers 
do not know exactly who will be selected for promotion each year, most officers 
understand methods for improving the quality of their own service records. These 
methods include increased performance, greater responsibility, larger breadth of work, 
additional qualifications, and further education.  Finally, SWOs selected for promotion 
are provided financial rewards, higher authority, and greater responsibility afforded by 
the next higher rank.  Furthermore, the “up-or-out” rules in the military amplify the 
rewards of promotion, since officers selected for promotion to certain ranks earn the right 
to remain in the military longer than those who do not promote (Asch & Warner, 2001, p. 
525).  For instance, Commanders (O-5) currently reach mandatory retirement at 28 years 
of service unless they are promoted to Captain (O-6) prior to their 28th year, which 
authorizes an extension on active duty past 28 years of service (Secretary of the Navy, 
2005). 
Most civilian companies apply tournament theory to reward and motivate 
managers and executives.  In a comprehensive study, Bognanno (2001) examined pay 
and promotion in civilian corporations by analyzing a database containing over 600 
firms, beginning in the year 1981 through 1988.  To isolate the tournament effects at the 
highest hierarchical levels, Bognanno (2001) only studied data for executives who 
comprised the top four hierarchical levels in their respective organizations, which 
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included 73,062 executives.  Two ordinary least squared (OLS) regressions were run to 
provide a baseline for analysis.  Bognanno’s (2001) three subsequent regressions 
respectively controlled for: 
• Firm fixed effects 
 
• Firm and individual fixed effects using years in current job 
 
• Firm and individual fixed effects using years in the same 
job before promotion to the next highest level. 
 
Table 11 contains the regression results of Bognanno’s (2001) study, 
including coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for each independent variable.  The 
dependent variable in all regressions was the natural logarithm of compensation, which 
















Table 11.   Regression Results of the Natural Log of Compensation on Hierarchical Level 
and Individual Characteristics, with and without Firm and Individual Fixed 
Effects  





Testing for wage differentials among the hierarchical levels, Bognanno 
(2001) found that promotion to each level predicts an increase in salary, which acts as the 
reward from winning the promotion tournament.  For example, after controlling for firm 
fixed effects, an increase from Level 4 to Level 1 (CEO) raised pay by 159.84 percent; an 
increase from Level 4 to Level 2 raised pay by 75.2 percent; and an increase from Level 4 
to Level 3 raised pay by 27.27 percent (Bognanno, 2001).  However, controlling for both 
firm and individual fixed effects, the wage differential between Level 4 executives and 
CEOs were significantly reduced to either 17.28-percent (using dummy variables for 
years in current job) or 24.25 percent (using dummy variables for years in the same job 
before promotion to the next level).  Additionally, after controlling for firm and 
individual fixed effects, Bognanno (2001) found that the number of years that executives 
remained in their current job decreased pay by 1.82 percent at Level 1, 0.64 percent at 
Level 2, and 0.26 percent at Level 3.  According to Bognanno (2001), this negative trend 
suggests that executives value periodic promotions to keep annual pay from losing real-
dollar value over time. 
A criticism to Bognanno’s (2001) methodology is that the OLS 
regressions did not include performance metrics.  By excluding performance, this effect 
was left in the error term of the regressions, thereby causing omitted variable bias and 
perhaps violating the zero-conditional mean assumption (Wooldridge, 2006).  Despite 
this bias, Bognanno’s (2001) study provided further empirical evidence of the 
prerequisite conditions of promotion tournaments, including “(1) a relatively high rate of 
promotion from within; (2) pay gaps that increase with hierarchical level; (3) hierarchical 
levels that serve as an important determinant of pay; and (4) large rewards (in present 
value terms) from promotion” (p. 310). 
Though a high rate of internal promotion is essential for promotion 
tournaments, individual promotion speed can act as a signaling device to outside 
employers (Huang, Lin, & Chuang, 2006).  Fast promotion suggests a high level of 
individual ability, talent, and productivity (Huang et al., 2006).  Since outside employers 
value these traits, they may try to recruit such stellar workers, which may lead to a high 
turnover rate of talent in the current company.  This threat strengthens the firm’s need for 
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a rewards scheme for promotion and a performance-based component in the 
compensation system in order to create an incentive for high-performing employees to 
stay. 
b. Risk Taking in Tournaments 
Most literature assumes participants in promotion tournaments are either 
risk-neutral or risk-adverse workers (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b).  In reality, the level 
of risk taking is different among workers participating in tournaments.  As such, some 
workers have flexibility in selecting projects or jobs, based on their perceived relative 
risk (Hvide, 2002).  For Surface Warfare Officers, particular jobs are associated with 
certain risk (such as job assignments in which work is taxing), yet rewards for success are 
high (i.e., increased probability of promotion).  Provided with an assignment choice, 
officers can either take: 
• A relatively easier job assignment and not work to their full 
potential to accomplish the mission 
 
• A tougher job assignment and work to their full potential, thereby 
bearing the risk of either accomplishing the mission or failing to 
achieve success (depending on the match between ability and 
task).18 
This important decision depends on the level of risk a SWO is willing to 
take.  Risk-adverse officers tend to choose the first option, while risk-seeking officers 
would probably select the second option.  True risk-neutral officers have no preference 
either way.  However, it is unclear if SWOs possess the prerequisite knowledge of the job 
assignments to make an informed decision.  Even if armed with the career-impacting 
information, officers’ decisions for assignment include other factors: duty location, length 
of the tour, and family requirements. 
In civilian companies in which incentives are directly tied to performance, 
employees compete with coworkers for both performance-based pay and promotions.  In 
the context of motivation for risk taking, Hvide (2002) proposed: 
                                                 
18 Not all SWO job assignments are mutually negotiated between detailing or placement officers and 
the officer receiving the job assignment (i.e., SWOs do not have a choice in all job assignments).  
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In tournaments where risk taking is an option, the principal gets what he 
does not pay for.  Rewarding a high relative performance yields low levels 
of effort and expected output, while rewarding a ‘mediocre’ relative 
performance yield high levels of effort [...] Although risk taking is not 
necessarily harmful in itself, high risk taking is associated with low effort, 
which is harmful to production.  Hence, if the reward to CEOs depends 
strongly on how well its firm performs as compared with other firms in an 
industry, for example, through bonus plans anchored in relative 
performance, the CEOs in the industry take high risks and put in low work 
effort in equilibrium.19 (pp. 892-893) 
If the strongest performers with an elevated level of productivity are 
highly rewarded, then other workers are persuaded to take risks to compensate for the 
disparity (Hvide, 2002).  If the propensity for risk taking among workers is extremely 
high, negative implications for the firm may arise, since “high risk taking is associated 
with low effort” (Hvide, 2002, p. 892).  Hvide (2002) claims that Chief Executive 
Officers (CEOs), who are compensated relative to the performance of their firms, tend to 
be risk takers and provide “low work effort in equilibrium” (p. 892).  On the other hand, 
if the highest reward is awarded to the “mediocre” performer, then other workers will be 
motivated to take low risks and be highly productive (Hvide, 2002).  Again, this concept 
is best illustrated by CEOs.  According to Hvide (2002), CEOs who provide a moderately 
high level of output (e.g., “mediocre” performance) through hard work and low risk 
taking should be rewarded at the highest reward level to provide incentives for other 
CEOs to follow (p. 892).  Nevertheless, this relationship seems to fit only the highest-
level of management, which may only be relevant for flag officers (i.e., Admirals) in the 
Navy. 
c. Weaknesses of Promotion Tournaments 
Though promotion tournaments can be used as effective tools for 
motivating employees to work at their full potential, tournaments may also “discourage 
cooperation among co-workers” (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b, p. 2392; Lazear & Rosen, 
1981).  Workers “may allocate effort away from increasing their own output and toward 
                                                 
19 Hvide (2002) defines “mediocre” as a moderately high level of output (p. 892). 
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reducing the output of others” (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006, p. 377).  If not kept in check 
by the firm, this incentive to sabotage coworkers can lead to overall decreased 
productivity in the firm, since the allocation of effort is not efficient (Savych, 2005).  
Additionally, the threat of sabotage undermines the principles of organizational 
cooperation and teamwork, creating a hostile working environment where employees are 
always cautious of some workers and do not trust others (Savych, 2005). 
To combat this problem inherent to promotion tournaments, many firms 
use wage compression in their pay system (Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b).  This pay 
compression keeps relative wages similar between the different hierarchical levels in the 
firm, resulting in a possible overlap in pay between levels.  However, the overlap reduces 
the effectiveness of tournaments since rewards for promotion are relatively small 
between the winners and losers in the tournament (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006).  Pay 
compression can be further amplified if tenure is used in the pay equation.  For instance, 
a prior-enlisted Navy Lieutenant (O-3E) with 18 years of total service earns $5,916 per 
month in basic pay, while a Lieutenant Commander (O-4) with 11 years of service earns 
basic pay of $5,799 monthly (Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
2008a).  Therefore, the tenure dimension (e.g., years of service) of the basic pay table 
creates the possibility for a lower-ranking Surface Warfare Officer to earn higher wages 
than a more senior SWO.  This pay compression is exacerbated by the addition of 
retention bonuses in the junior officer ranks compared to the compensation of more 
senior officers whose tenure precludes eligibility for many of these bonuses.  
Furthermore, employees on the fast track may interfere with the efficiency 
of the promotion tournament, since the probability of fast track employees winning the 
promotion is much higher than those employees not on the fast track (Baker et al., 
1994a).  Within this context, the probability of winning can be reasonably estimated by 
all employees, and provides a disincentive for employees not on the fast track to continue 
participating in the promotion tournament.  Additionally, fast track employees are often 
identified early; thus, relative performance is only judged at lower-levels, and subsequent 
promotions may be based on the potential to succeed at the next higher position (Baker et 
al., 1994a).  The Navy’s promotion of some SWOs who are “below zone” suggests a fast 
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track in the SWO community (Secretary of the Navy, 2006, pp. 8-9).  However, the 
likelihood that officers on the fast track will remain there for their entire careers is 
minimal, since officer promotion is limited by promotion zones and time-in-grade 
requirements. 
4. Employee Performance, Turnover, and Pay Relationships 
a. “Curvilinear” Relationship in a Civilian Firm 
In reference to civilian organizations, Trevor et al. (1997) proposed a 
relationship between performance and employee turnover that is “curvilinear,” such that 
turnover is more probable for high performers as well as low performers (p. 45).  It was 
hypothesized that average performers would have a higher probability of remaining with 
their current employers.  The logic behind the “curvilinear” theory is that higher 
performers will promote at a higher rate, thereby signaling higher ability and an increased 
propensity to leave and seek better employment elsewhere (Trevor et al., 1997).  For 
lower performers, the theory predicts either poor employee-job matching or poor 
employee-organization matching, as lower-performing workers are more likely to 
voluntarily quit or be fired (Trevor et al., 1997).  This “curvilinear” relationship can be 
seen in the parabolic-shaped graph created by plotting the survival probability against 
performance level (as depicted in Figure 23 and Figure 24). 
By using personnel records from 1983 through 1988 for 5,143 exempt 
employees in a single petroleum firm, Trevor et al. (1997) employed a proportional 
hazards model to estimate the conditional probability of employee turnover as a function 
of tenure, salary, demographic variables, average performance rating, average annual 
salary growth, and number of promotions.  The hazard function estimates the probability 
of exiting conditional on employees surviving up to the starting time of the observation 
period (t).  The survival function is the probability of surviving past time t (Trevor et al., 
1997).  All employees were categorized by their average performance ratings on a scale 
of 1.0 through 5.0 in increments of 0.5 points.  As hypothesized, Trevor et al. (1997) 
found that both poor performers (1.0 rating) as well as top performers (5.0 rating) had 
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statistically significant lower probabilities of retaining when compared to the average 
performer (3.0 rating).  As depicted in Figure 23, this relationship was consistent for 
different tenure lengths: three, four, and five years from initial hire.  
 
Figure 23.   Curvilinear Relationship of Survival Probability and Average Performance 
Rating by Tenure as Measured in Years from Initial Hire  
(Trevor et al., 1997, p. 52) 
Additionally, Trevor et al. (1997) hypothesized that positive salary growth 
will negatively impact turnover, which will be most pronounced at the highest 
performance levels.  If high-performing employees are paid relatively higher salaries by 
their current employer, they have little incentive to quit (Sturman et al., 2003).  By using 
an interaction variable for salary growth and performance and an interaction term for 
promotion and performance in the proportional hazards model, Trevor et al. (1997) found 
statistical evidence that salary growth has a negative impact on the probability of exit, as 
shown in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24.   Curvilinear Relationship of Survival Probability and Average Performance 
Rating by Level of Salary Growth  
(Trevor et al., 1997, p. 57)20 
Figure 24 implies that if high performers are not compensated adequately 
(i.e., low salary growth), then the disparity will lead to a low survival probability at all 
performance levels.  However, if salary growth were to remain relatively close to mean 
salary growth, it is more likely for high performers to retain, as the survival probability is 
predicted to be approximately 0.40 for 5.0 performers.  Furthermore, if high performers 
receive high salary growth, their probability of staying increases further (survival 
probability of approximately 0.90 for 5.0 performers). 
Finally, Trevor et al. (1997) hypothesized that when salary growth is held 
constant, promotions will be positively related to turnover based on signaling theory.  
Nine separate proportional hazard regression models were run to examine the effects of 
salary growth and promotions on turnover at each average performance level.  Along 
with the number of observations used in each regression, the resultant coefficients for 
salary growth and promotion independent variables are displayed in Table 12. 
                                                 
20 Low salary growth is one standard deviation below the mean salary growth, and high salary growth 
is one standard deviation above the mean (Trevor et al., 1997). 
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Table 12.   Proportional Hazard Regressions of Voluntary Turnover on Average Annual 
Salary Growth and Average Annual Promotions, for Each Average Performance 
Category  
(Trevor et al., 1997, p. 56) 
 
 
According to Table 12, holding salary growth constant, promotions have a 
statistically significant coefficient for the bottom three performance levels, though the 2.5 
performance level has only a weak statistical significance at the 10-percent level (Trevor 
et al., 1997).  Therefore, promotions are only positively related to turnover in the lower 
spectrum of the performance scale.  Additionally, holding promotion constant, salary 
growth has a statistically significant negative effect on turnover for every performance 
category (Trevor et al., 1997).  Therefore, higher pay increases (based on performance) 
improve the likelihood that employees will stay with the organization (Trevor et al., 
1997). 
Though the Trevor et al. (1997) study was enlightening, the methodology 
had three distinct flaws.  First, the regression models may have omitted important 
variables that further explain turnover, such as industry experience (not just tenure with 
the firm) and employee education level, which may have caused omitted variable bias in 
the study.  Second, the zero-conditional mean assumption was violated, since worker 
ability was likely captured in the residual of the regression.  Ability is probably correlated 
with salary growth, performance, and promotions, therefore yielding a positive bias.  A 
better-defined proxy for ability could have satisfied this assumption.  Third, the authors 
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provide little explanation for the retention decision’s correlation with wage growth.  
Trevor et al. (1997) suggest that workers prefer rising wage profiles; in other words, 
firms should start new employees with low wages and gradually increase wages over 
time based on tenure.  This logic is counterintuitive since employees would have little 
incentive to join such firms, when they have the opportunity to earn higher wages 
elsewhere.  
b. U.S. Department of Defense Government Employees 
Using similar theoretical constructs as Trevor et al. (1997), Gibbs (2006) 
examined variables that predict the probability of voluntary turnover of US Department 
of Defense government employees.  Gibbs (2006) developed linear probability regression 
models in which the probability of exiting was the dependent variable, and the 
independent variables included education, a dummy variable for performance (equal to 1 
if an employee’s most recent performance rating was the best possible), year, 
demographic variables, and interaction variables.  Gibbs’ (2006) sample included:  
• 315,401 General Schedule (GS) employees in Grades 11 through 15 
• 110,689 Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS) 
employees in Grades 13 through 15 
• 28,254 China Lake employees in Grades 2 through 4.21   
After dividing the sample by pay plan and pay grade, Gibbs (2006) conducted eleven 





                                                 
21 Both PMRS and China Lake employees were governed by pay systems that rewarded performance.  
Under the PMRS, employees had similar grades as the GS system but also “competed for merit increases 
based on performance evaluations” within each grade (Gibbs, 2006, p. 202).  At the Naval Weapons Center 
at China Lake, California, government employees fell under an experimental pay plan that included flexible 
personnel and pay management.  Conversely, GS employees only received step pay increases within each 
grade based solely on tenure. (Gibbs, 2006) 
 108
Table 13.   Linear Probability Models Predicting Employee Exits  
(Gibbs, 2006, p. 212) 
 
 
According to Table 13, the coefficients for performance rating dummy 
variables for Grade 3 and Grade 4 at China Lake had large positive values (7.9809 and 
7.2429 respectively) and were statistically significant at the 5-percent significance level.  
These results indicate that receiving the highest performance rating on the most recent 
performance evaluation will drastically increase the probability of leaving the 
organization.  Furthermore, the statistically significant negative interaction term of rating 
and year shows that the effect diminished over time.  The effect of performance on the 
probability of exit was not statistically significant for the other pay plans and pay grades, 
with the exception of Grade 13 under the PMRS pay plan in which high performance 
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predicts an increased probability of leaving (Gibbs, 2006).  Additionally, Gibbs (2006) 
reasoned that “the regressions show no substantial difference between exits and stays in 
quality or performance” (p. 211). 
The specificity of the sample in Gibbs’ (2006) study may have uncovered 
some self-selection bias as well, since most Department of Defense scientists and 
engineers have specific skill sets that may not be transferable to the civilian labor market, 
but which increased their probability of retention in the federal government.  
Furthermore, graduate degrees are probably obtained by higher ability workers, which 
means this sample of government employees may not be representative of the population 
of the federal workers. 
c. Theoretical Utility Analysis 
As an extension of the work started by Trevor et al. in 1997, Sturman et al. 
(2003) conducted a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the utility of performance-based 
compensation.  In this study, the authors compared the costs of retaining talent to the 
benefits the organization receives from retaining them.  In an aggregate database, 
Sturman et al. (2003) consolidated: 
1. Employee record data from the study by Trevor et al. (1997) to 
calculate turnover probabilities 
2. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the WorldatWork 2002 
survey for pay levels and benefit costs 
3. Other pertinent data from published research studies to estimate the 
cost of turnover and the value of different levels of employee 
performance. 
 
The methodology used by Sturman et al. (2003) is shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25.   Flow Chart of Utility Analysis Methodology  
(Sturman et al., 2003, p. 1002) 
 
Sturman et al. (2003) devised three theoretical pay strategies for utility 
analysis.  In Pay Strategy 1, all employees receive the same average pay increase of 4 
percent without a link to performance.  Pay Strategy 2 is a performance-based system 
where above-average performers (i.e., greater than 3.0 ratings on a 5.0 scale) receive 
larger pay increases, and below average performers receive the 4-percent base pay 
increase.  Pay Strategy 3 continues to pay above-average performers higher-than-average 






average performers.  In Table 14, Sturman et al. (2003) compared the utility of the three 
different pay strategies under three different deviations relative to the average 
performer.22 
 
Table 14.   Utility Analysis Results of Different Pay Strategies at Three Different Deviation 
Categories  
(Sturman et al., 2003, p. 1026) 
 
According to Table 14, the total four-year investment values were 
estimated by subtracting both service costs and movement costs from the service values 
(Sturman et al., 2003).  This utility analysis indicates that Pay Strategy 2 yielded the 
highest 4-year value in the “SDY=30%” category, and Pay Strategy 3 yielded the highest 
4-year value in both the “SDY=60%” and “SDY=90%” categories.  For all three deviation 
categories, a performance-based strategy yields a higher net value than the control 
strategy in which there is no performance-based component (Sturman et al., 2003).  
Therefore, performance-based pay systems proved to be valuable investments in this 
theoretical analysis.  The Navy may benefit from establishing a performance-based pay 
system than rewards higher performers by higher annual pay raises and punishes low 
performers by encouraging voluntary turnover (Sturman et al., 2003). 
                                                 
22 Sturman et al. (2003) developed three deviation categories: SDY=30%, SDY=60%, and SDY=90%. 
Respectively, these categories suggest that “an employee performing better than 84% of the employee 
population is worth 30% of salary, 60% of salary, or 90% of salary more to the organization than an 
average performer (i.e., someone performing at the 50th percentile) in the same job” (Sturman et al., 2003, 
p. 1018). 
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Sturman et al. (2003) provided an excellent framework for an actual firm-
specific utility analysis; however, the data used in the study was gathered from multiple 
sources and was purely hypothetical.  Also, employee performance was assumed to 
remain constant from 2003 through 2007, which may be a bad assumption since 
performance likely fluctuates over time.  The utility analysis also excluded administrative 
and other miscellaneous labor costs from the overall calculations, which may have 
created a positive bias in the results.  Finally, the SDY approach assumes a normal 
distribution of performance, which may be highly unlikely if performance scores are 
skewed due to “grade inflation” or leniency error (Bjerke, Cleveland, Morrison, & 
Wilson, 1987, p. 1). 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
In the context of motivating individual and organizational behavior, whether 
focusing on Surface Warfare Officers or civilian managers, two questions with a variety 
of answers exist: 
• What is the basis of human motivation? 
• “[W]ho am I serving?” (Herzberg, 1979, p. 60)   
Human motivation, as explained by SHRM (2007b), illustrates three fundamental 
principles of human behavior that elucidate an individual’s actions: 
1. Human behavior is caused, meaning there is a reason for each action. 
2. Behavior is goal-oriented, meaning action is not random. 
3. Each person is unique (due to upbringing and genetics, no two people 
are alike). 
In the workplace, a tangible employee-employer relationship influences 
organizational behavior.  This relationship affects future retention decisions and initially 
influences an individual’s decision to join an organization by laying the foundation of 
employee-employer fit.  Various theories and principles provide perspective on 




environment.  Aspects of the following seven theories explain employee motivation and 
lay the foundation for performance-based compensation in organizations, including the 
SWO community: 
• Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy Theory 
• Behavioral Reinforcement Theory 
• Agency Theory 
• Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene Theory 
• Management Philosophy Theories 
• Expectancy Theory 
• Equity Theory 
1. Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy Theory 
Individual behavior is an amorphous concept.  How does one influence behavior?  
What contributes to individual behavior?  How do employers maximize employee 
behavior?  These important questions comprise the foundation of the employee-employer 
relationship.  McShane and Von Glinow (2007) describe the MARS (motivation, ability, 
role perceptions, and situational factors) Model, which explains individual behavior.  
Motivation is defined as what voluntarily drives an individual in a particular direction at a 
desired level of intensity.  Ability represents someone’s talent and learned skills, such as 
particular skill sets used to perform tasks.  Role perceptions define the employee-job fit, 
which is how a worker fits into the workplace.  In addition, situational factors include the 
surrounding environment and extraneous interactions that impact a particular individual. 
(McShane & Von Glinow, 2007) 
Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy, as depicted in Figure 26, further explains the 
components that influence individual motivation.  Decisions that affect day-to-day 
matters as well as the employer-employee relationship stem from earlier research on 




Motivation begins with individual needs and their underlying drives.  
Needs are deficiencies that energize or trigger behaviors to satisfy those 
needs.  Unfulfilled needs create a tension that makes us want to find ways 
to reduce or satisfy them.  The stronger your needs, the more motivated 
you are to satisfy them.  Conversely, a satisfied need does not motivate.  
Drives are instinctive or innate tendencies to seek certain goals or 
maintain internal stability.  Drives are hardwired in the brain—everyone 
has the same drives—and they most likely exist to help the species 
survive. (p. 92)  
 
Figure 26.   Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy  
(Adapted from McShane & Von Glinow, 2007, p. 93) 
 
Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy categorizes all basic needs into five levels: 
physiological, safety, social, esteem, and self-actualization.  Physiological needs satisfy 
the essential needs for survival: air, food, water, sex, and shelter (SHRM, 2007b).  Safety 
is the next higher need; a stable environment and the absence of pain, illness, or threats 
encompass the safety need.  Social interaction comprises the need for love and affection, 
which satisfies the social need.  The next level is the need to satisfy self-esteem through 
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personal accomplishments as well as recognition and respect from others.  The need for 
self-actualization or self-fulfillment is located at the top of the needs hierarchy.  Self-
actualization represents the need to reach an individual’s full potential.  Though 
individuals may be motivated by several needs at once, the lowest-level need is the 
primary motivator until it is completely satisfied.  Lower-level needs must be fulfilled 
before an individual moves to the next higher need in the hierarchy.  However, self-
actualization is never fully satisfied; it can only be momentarily fulfilled. (McShane & 
Von Glinow, 2007) 
Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy Theory has not been universally accepted, but the 
fundamentals of satisfying personal needs remain the foundation for individual and 
organizational behavior (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007).  Just as workers modify their 
behavior to satisfy certain needs, organizations function in a similar fashion.  Though the 
needs structure may vary for individuals and organizations based on values or particular 
goals, individuals must satisfy the lowest unfulfilled level prior to attaining the next 
higher need.  Applying Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy Theory to organizational behavior 
among Surface Warfare Officers is no different.  SWOs seek to fulfill their basic needs en 
route to self-actualization.  They achieve this through on-time or early promotion to the 
next higher rank, thereby fulfilling their rank potential.  According to Maslow’s Needs 
Hierarchy, once one rank is achieved, the goal is only momentarily satisfied as the quest 
for self-actualization continues.  Until a SWO becomes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, there will always be a higher promotion goal which can motivate behavior. 
2. Behavioral Reinforcement Theory 
Further explanation of individuals’ actions beyond the theoretical influence of 
Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy is provided by behavioral reinforcement theory.  Also known 
as operant conditioning or modification theory, Behavior Reinforcement Theory 
“explains learning in terms of the antecedents and consequences of behavior” (McShane 
& Von Glinow, 2007, p. 55).  Simply stated, an understanding of how employees learn 
can provide employers valuable information in determining the best method to influence  
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and maximize employees’ work activities.  The goal is to reinforce the activities that 
achieve positive results and to either ignore or eliminate the actions that are 
counterproductive. 
McShane and Von Glinow (2007) recognized that three principles form the basis 
of Behavior Reinforcement Theory:  
1. Antecedents—the events that lead up to the action 
2. Behavior—the response to previous events 
3. Consequences—the results of the conduct. 
In general, antecedents influence workers’ behavior, which results in certain 
consequences.  Furthermore, there are “four types of consequences that strengthen, 
maintain, or weaken behavior […] known as contingencies of reinforcement:” positive 
reinforcement, negative reinforcement, punishment, and extinction (McShane & Von 
Glinow, 2007, p. 55; SHRM, 2007b).  Positive reinforcement rewards individual behavior 
in order to encourage continued performance that warrants further recognition (SHRM, 
2007b).  Negative reinforcement removes punishment in an attempt to reinforce behavior 
that does not warrant punishment (SHRM, 2007b).  Punishment attempts to prevent 
negative behavior by imposing restrictions or intervention that eliminates specific 
activities (SHRM, 2007b).  Lastly, extinction is simply ignoring behavior until it ceases 
to exist (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007; SHRM, 2007b). 
 Positive reinforcement, the preferred method of employers to encourage effort 
that achieves organizational goals, is categorized as either a contrived or natural 
motivator (SHRM, 2007b).  Contrived reinforcement includes extrinsic rewards, such as 
salary increases and bonuses.  Natural motivators are intrinsic motivators and address 
Maslow’s need for esteem.  Natural motivators exist in the form of attention, recognition, 
praise, and positive performance feedback.  This type of motivation costs the 
organization very little, but it positively impacts individual and organizational 
performance (SHRM, 2007b). 
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 Organizational supervision is critical to the timely and effective employment of 
appropriate reinforcement techniques.  SWOs are subjected to various positive and 
punitive measures to motivate individual behavior via the chain of command supervisory 
structure, the military legal process, and the Navy’s awards system.  However, unlike 
civilian organizations, the Navy currently has limited opportunity to positively reinforce 
behavior with contrived reinforcement methods.  In the SWO community, direct financial 
compensation, such as a performance bonus, does not exist.  Though personal awards 
may be authorized, top performers are often rewarded by receiving yet more 
responsibility and further opportunity for promotion. 
3. Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed agency theory or the principal-agent 
model to explain the interactions between divergent interests of firms (i.e., principals) 
and the firms’ managers or employees (i.e., agents).  The Agency Theory rests on the 
premise that agents are “motivated by self-interest, are rational actors, and are risk-
averse,” while it is the principal’s responsibility to motivate agents on their behalf (Stroh, 
Brett, Baumann, & Reilly, 1996, p. 751).  Managers are driven to maximize salary while 
minimizing effort.  They are motivated by opportunities that further their own cause, such 
as promotions, salary, and other self-serving interests, that may directly contradict 
organizational goals.  “[A]gency theory is predicated on the assumption that people 
prefer to avoid both work and risk” (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998, p. 283).  Conversely, the 
firm’s goals are to align the managers’ goals with those of the firm at the lowest possible 
cost to the firm, in an attempt to maximize overall profits.  This balance requires firms to 
manage and motivate the actions of its agents and to optimize agent compensation 
consistent with profit and performance maximization.  Stroh et al. (1996) explained that a 
dilemma is created when the agent’s task is less structured (i.e., less job programming), 
when the task entails risk, or when the goals between the principal and agent differ. 
An effective and efficient firm monitoring system, coupled with appropriate 
compensation for employees, is necessary when conflicting interests exist between 
principals and agents.  An inherent problem associated with agency theory is that “the 
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agent’s rational self-interest and effort aversion create the potential for moral hazard—the 
agent may act to maximize his or her outcomes (e.g., compensation) without extending 
effort toward achieving the principal’s objectives” (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998, p. 284).  
The less an agent is monitored by the principal, the greater the risk associated with the 
potential moral hazard (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998).  Therefore, monitoring and agent 
accountability are incorporated into the employer-employee (i.e., principal-agent) 
relationship.  Additionally, firms use two types of compensation packages to align the 
efforts of individual agents with the efforts of the organization.  Firms use either variable 
pay (e.g., bonuses, incentives, profit sharing, and stock options) or fixed pay (e.g., annual 
salary) (Ekanayake, 2004).  Depending on the type of job and the particular job market, 
risk is associated with variable pay.  Variable pay is dependent on individual and group 
outcome, whereas fixed pay offers greater consistency over time.  Compensation is 
further determined by behavior-based (as determined by level of effort) or outcome-based 
(i.e., incentive-based) pay systems (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998).  While performance is a 
component of both compensation schemes, a predominantly structured incentive-based 
pay system creates greater pay variability as pay is more closely tied to outcome and is 
usually captured by performance metrics.  As a result, “[o]ptimal compensation contracts 
must, therefore, reflect the trade-offs inherent in this balance by using enough incentive 
pay to align the agent’s interests with those of the principal without shifting too much 
risk and compensation variability onto the agent” (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998, p. 284). 
Studies on civilian organizations show that using greater incentive pay has the 
effect of aligning the behavior of agents with organizational goals, thereby increasing 
shareholder return, growth in sales, and overall performance (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998).  
It may be immature to presume in the SWO community that incentive pay via 
performance-based compensation would directly improve readiness, training proficiency, 
or tax payer savings, but “incentive pay can be useful for aligning the actions of agents 
with desired organizational outcomes” (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998, p. 284).  It is 
hypothesized that this interaction is consistent across all sectors in the labor market. 
Application of the agency theory model to the military environment differs little 
from its application in the civilian sector.  However, the Navy, unlike most civilian firms, 
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does not act on behalf of shareholders or owners.  The military (principal) has a clearly 
defined objective to meet national security needs in the most cost-effective means 
possible as promulgated by the President’s national security policy and the annual 
Defense Authorization and Appropriation Bills.  Meanwhile, despite intrinsic rewards 
inherent in military service, Surface Warfare Officers (agents) seek to maximize their 
compensation by preferring to get paid more for less effort. 
Surface Warfare Officers are monitored by the chain of command, and 
performance is recorded by the Navy’s fitness reporting (FITREP) system—a key 
component of the current fixed pay system.  However, monitoring in the Navy does not 
necessarily fit the constructs of monitoring in the civilian sector.  Not all aspects of 
officer behavior can be closely observed via “formal information systems, such as 
budgeting and management reporting, and informal information sources such as 
managerial observation and surveillance” (Ekanayake, 2004).  Most SWOs, particularly 
Ensigns (O-1) through Lieutenants (O-3), have some form of direct supervision.  
However, some activities often require mid-grade and senior officers to serve as senior, 
unit representatives for long periods of time with very little oversight.  Workers under 
less rigid monitoring systems are efficiently motivated through incentive-based 
compensation measures.  SWOs who contest the goals of the Navy are not promoted and 
eventually leave at the completion of their service obligation.  Those who retain continue 
to receive a uniformly fixed salary, which is consistent across all services based on time 
in service and rank.  Additionally, SWOs receive special and incentive pays that are not 
directly tied to performance. 
4. Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene Theory 
In describing the Motivation-Hygiene Theory, Herzberg (1987) dispelled the 
belief of two diametrically opposed concepts of understanding human behavior: 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction.  Applying Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy Theory, Herzberg 
focused on two specific needs: the need to achieve, which develops into psychological 
growth (i.e., esteem leading to self-actualization); and the need to avoid pain while 
acquiring other basic biological needs (i.e., safety and physiological).  The need to 
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achieve consists of intrinsic factors: achievement, recognition, motivation derived from 
work, responsibility, and growth or advancement in the organization.  Herzberg (1987) 
referred to intrinsic needs as growth or motivator factors.  Meanwhile, hygiene factors are 
extrinsic to the job.  Known as “KITA […] kick in the ass” factors, they encompass 
aspects of the job such as coworker relations, company policy, supervision, salary, 
working conditions, status, and job security (Herzberg, 1987, p. 109).  Various studies 
show that improving the quality of hygiene factors leads to job satisfaction, while 
unacceptable hygiene factors lead to employee dissatisfaction.  Though extrinsic or 
hygiene factors, including work-related components like job security and salary, are not 
the primary factors motivating employees, hygiene factors must be sufficient for intrinsic 
factors to effectively motivate.  Thus, intrinsic or motivational factors have been found to 
be the primary cause of employee satisfaction. (SHRM, 2007b; Herzberg, 1987) 
The military is no stranger to applications of Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene 
Theory.  The 2000 Military Exit Survey indicated that 30 percent of the respondents were 
dissatisfied with the quality of leadership (DMDC, 2001).  Loyalty, patriotism, benefits, 
job security, and educational benefits were cited as the most influential factors affecting 
retention past the initial service obligation in the 2004 SWO Continuation Intentions 
Quick Poll (NPRST, 2004).  Furthermore, in the 2005 SWO Junior Officer Survey, 
leading and training subordinates, relationships with peers in the wardroom, leadership 
challenges using skills and abilities, mental challenges using skills and abilities, and 
relationships with senior enlisted personnel were cited as key components to junior 
officer satisfaction in the SWO community (Department of the Navy, n.d.).  All of these 
examples support the positive impact of intrinsic motivators and extrinsic hygiene factors 
throughout SWOs’ careers and ultimately in their career intentions.  These data do not 
discount the value of adequate compensation; however, they indicate that job satisfaction 
encompasses a mixture of factors that must be present to motivate employees to perform. 
5. Management Philosophy Theories 
In 1960, McGregor introduced two opposing management perspectives that 
describe employee behavior and the thought process that drives such behavior in his 
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book, The Human Side of Enterprise (as cited in Pierce, 1991).  Theory X and Theory Y 
represent assumptions on personnel philosophies and explain how employees approach 
leadership.  As leaders in the workplace, managers must be knowledgeable of employees’ 
knowledge, skills, and abilities in order to achieve organizational goals (Pierce, 1991; 
Carson, 2005).  Both theories are predicated on the concept that management is 
responsible for adhering to the firm’s guiding principles and “organizing the elements of 
productive enterprise—money materials, equipment, people—in the interest of economic 
ends” (Pierce, 1991, p. 9). 
a. Theory X and Theory Y 
The principles of Theory X perceive employee behavior negatively, as 
employees must be directed, motivated, and controlled to meet organizational goals.  
According to Theory X, employees are essentially lazy; they prefer to work as little as 
possible.  Workers lack discipline, prefer not to have responsibility, need to be led, 
dislike change, appear apathetic to organizational needs, and are not intelligent.  Theory 
X workers must have close supervision, and they require thorough oversight and external 
motivation to accomplish their tasks. (Pierce, 1991; Carson, 2005) 
By comparison, Theory Y workers are proactive as well as responsive to 
organizational needs (Carson, 2005).  Applying principles of motivation, Theory Y 
workers learn from the organization and apply efforts accordingly.  Their behavior is 
goal-oriented and tends to be more intrinsically motivated (Pierce, 1991).  In describing 
the Theory Y worker, Pierce (1991) stated: 
The motivation, the potential for development, and the readiness to direct 
behavior toward organizational goals are all present in people.  
Management does not put them there.  It is a responsibility of management 
to make it possible for people to recognize and develop these human 
characteristics for themselves. (p. 10) 
Working with Theory Y employees, management must coordinate the efforts of 




objectives.  Managing Theory Y personnel involves creating opportunities for employees 
to flourish, coupled with less direct supervision from leadership. (Pierce, 1991; Carson, 
2005) 
Discussed in the subsequent sections, additional management philosophies 
include Theory Z, the Peter Principle, and Theory A.  Though unrelated to one another, 
these concepts complete the cycle of management approaches applied in modern industry 
and provide ample room to develop new management approaches.   
b. Theory Z 
Theory Z, prevalent in Japan, is structured around “very intense 
competition to qualify for the better schools and thereby be assured of career employment 
in a major firm or organization” (Pierce, 1991, p. 10).  Japanese firms offer employees 
the opportunity to earn lifetime employment—a concept foreign to US organizations in 
which the typical worker may only hold a job for approximately eight years, and only 25 
percent of the workforce hold jobs that last 20 years or longer (Hall, 1982).  Through firm 
placement assisted by the Imperial University and select private schools, Japanese 
graduates are matched with employers in lieu of the traditional application and hiring 
practices common in the United States.  Employees hired into major firms are assured 
life-long jobs and an accompanying retirement package.  Typically, promotions within 
major firms do not occur until 10 years of tenure, while longevity within the firm is 
capped by a mandatory retirement age of 55.  For employees reaching this age, Theory Z 
employment practices allows for placement in satellite companies to extend their careers.  
This structure creates extreme competition within the school system and is responsible 
for developing high-quality employees with unprecedented firm loyalty. (Pierce, 1991) 
c. Peter Principle 
Within the Navy, promotion to Lieutenant Commander (O-4) and to more 
senior levels is based primarily on two factors: performance and the number of vacancies 
at higher levels.  The Peter Principle contends that “individuals are promoted to their 
level of incompetence” (Pierce, 1991, p. 11).  Two management issues surface because of 
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such promotion practices.  First, many employees may not enjoy the same success in a 
higher hierarchical level if they are promoted out of a lower position in which they did 
well, were comfortable with, and contributed at their maximum performance level.  
Either these employees were ill-equipped to assume the higher-level position and 
surpassed their skill level or they simply did not like the new position.  Once promoted, 
they become despondent and unsuccessful.  Second, as upper hierarchical levels are filled 
by unqualified employees, promotion opportunities for more qualified and motivated 
employees are hampered.  This results in higher job turnover as these highly qualified 
employees seek job opportunities elsewhere (Pierce, 1991). 
d. Theory A 
Theory A recognizes that not all employees are capable of being groomed 
for command or upper-level management positions.  Employees have varying potential, 
personal goals, and career aspirations.  Theory A borrows concepts from Theory Y 
(regarding attitude and commitment) and Theory Z (which values human capital 
throughout the employee lifecycle) to explain how to deal with valuable employees who 
may not achieve the higher expectations resulting from promotion.  Theory A provides an 
“honorable demotion” for employees who get promoted beyond their expertise and 
productivity (Pierce, 1991, p. 11).  US management does not consistently practice 
demoting employees back to a level in which they achieved the most success, thereby 
limiting organizational movement to an up-or-out system, similar to the Navy’s 
promotion system.  Employees are promoted, retired, or terminated from the firm, 
resulting in lost valuable human capital at the vacated position.  If employees do not 
perform well at the next higher level, as explained by the Peter Principle, they do not 
suddenly become less effective at that original position.  If terminated, former employees 
take their accumulated general human capital to other firms.  This practice maintains 
valuable firm-specific human capital and continues to take advantage of the motivation 
and goal orientation described in Theory Y. (Pierce, 1991) 
Not all management philosophies directly apply to the Navy.  Some 
leaders may follow Theory X, while others have more confidence in their subordinates 
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and lead via Theory Y.  Inherent to the SWO promotion process, the Peter Principle 
offers an interesting perspective on why some officers do not continue to receive 
promotions.  Regardless of the management philosophies to which junior officers have 
been exposed during their careers, the leadership and management style of their 
supervisors affects their performance, qualifications, and productivity, as well as 
influences future retention decisions. 
6. Expectancy Theory 
Vroom introduced the concept of Expectancy Theory in his 1964 book titled Work 
and Motivation (as cited in Isaac, Zerbe, & Pitt, 2001).  Further research developed 
expectancy theory, which suggests “that the expenditure of an individual’s effort will be 
determined by expectations that an outcome may be attained and the degree of values 
placed on an outcome in the person’s mind” (Isaac et al., 2001, p. 214).  Based on 
expectancy theory, leaders have the opportunity to motivate subordinates by allowing 
them to meet self-serving interests that also directly support organizational goals.  The 
greater the alignment of these two goals, the more success both the worker and the 
organization may experience.  Depicted in Figure 27, the Expectancy Theory of 
Motivation has three levels: 
1. E-to-P expectancy: individual effort will lead to a certain level of 
performance 
2. P-to-O expectancy: individual action or performance will lead to 
outcomes 
3. Outcome valences: outcomes will yield one or more levels of 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction. (Isaac et al., 2001; McShane & Von 

















Figure 27.   Expectancy Theory of Motivation  
(Adapted from McShane & Von Glinow, 2007, p. 96) 
Direct leadership applications are applied at each level of the expectancy theory 
model to increase employee motivation.  As shown in Figure 27, employee motivation 
can be influenced at each level by adjusting the input.  Thus, managers can increase 
employee confidence at the effort-to-performance (E-to-P) level, by reinforcing the 
capacity of reaching a desired level of performance through hard work and cognitive 
ability. This system develops a positive environment that fosters employee and 
organizational growth.  Performance-to-outcome (P-to-O) expectancy matches higher 
performance with greater rewards.  Greater rewards encourage greater performance from 
individuals.  Lastly, outcome valences are based on individual attitudes and values; 
therefore, outcome valences are not universally interchangeable motivational tools.  
Rewards should be tailored to meet individual needs rather than the division or 
department as a whole. (Isaac et al., 2001; McShane & Von Glinow, 2007; SHRM, 
2007b) 
Isaac et al. (2001) described expectancy theory as “a process of motivation [that] 
emphasizes individual perceptions of the environment and subsequent interactions arising 
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as a consequence of personal expectations [… which] mainly relies upon extrinsic 
motivators to explain causes for behaviours [sic] exhibited in the workplace” (p. 214).  
Leaders with the opportunity to manage intrinsic motivation with extrinsic rewards are in 
a position to significantly influence behavior in the workplace.  Conversely, weaknesses 
in the relationship between the levels of expectancies severely alter employee motivation.  
Figure 28 provides a detailed list of managerial issues regarding the successful 
implementation of expectancy theory motivation (Isaac et al., 2001). 
 
 
Figure 28.   Issues for Managers to Address Using Expectancy Theory on Followers  
(Isaac et al., 2001, p. 221) 
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In the SWO community, there are limited opportunities to apply Expectancy 
Theory to influence individual officer’s performance.  The Navy awards program is one 
popular method to distinguish individual achievement and to motivate behavior.  
Additionally, the Navy’s FITREP program is another way to recognize superior 
performance.  However, neither program is relatively timely for acknowledging 
individual accomplishments.  Furthermore, neither program serves as well as the extrinsic 
motivators (i.e., performance bonuses or instantaneous job promotions) employed in the 
civilian sector. 
7. Equity Theory 
Regardless of employer, equity theory is based on the principal that all workers 
desire equal treatment.  Furthermore, equity theory describes how perceptions of fairness 
are developed as employees make comparisons with fellow coworkers.  Awareness of 
inequity occurs when the ratio of an individual’s input-to-outcome varies relative to the 
ratios of other employees, holding the quality of inputs constant.  Outcomes are 
contingent upon extrinsic rewards such as pay and benefits, but may also contain intrinsic 
rewards such as recognition.  Inputs are comprised of education, work experience, skills, 
qualifications, effort, and performance.  Three conditions of Equity Theory represent the 
different levels of input-to-outcome ratios: under-reward inequity, equity, and over-
reward inequity.  As expected, under-reward inequity occurs when employees are not 
being rewarded equally.  Equity is present when employees receive relatively equal 
outcomes for equal input.  Over-reward equity occurs when individuals receive greater 
outcomes from the same level of input as other workers. (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007; 
SHRM, 2007b) 
McShane and Von Glinow (2007) offered various options for reducing the level 
of inequity among coworkers: 
• Reduce inputs—reduce your own effort 
• Increase outcomes—ask for a pay raise or take advantage of company 
benefits (either authorized or unauthorized) 
• Increase comparison (individual or group) inputs—increase the workload 
or level of performance of the comparison coworker 
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• Reduce comparison (individual or group) outcomes—decrease the rewards 
to the comparison coworker 
• Change perceptions about input-to-outcome ratios—convince yourself an 
equitable situation exists 
• Change the comparison unit—establish a new comparison coworker 
• Leave the environment—spend more time away from the workplace or 
quit.   
Employers also have options to improve the perception of fairness: an open dialogue 
about the perceived inequality, an unbiased and consistent distribution of outcomes, and 
respectful treatment of all employees (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007). 
The greatest competitive comparison made between coworkers involves either 
relative position or salary (Lazear, 1989).  Labor unions and management may desire 
uniform salary in an attempt to create a more harmonious workplace; however, “the 
morale of high-quality workers is likely to be adversely affected by pay that regresses 
toward the mean” (Lazear, 1989, pp. 561-562).  According to Lazear (1989), competition 
is good for individual as well as organizational productivity.  An employer who 
recognizes hard work through a monetary outcome signals that hard work yields positive 
financial rewards, which can often be a powerful motivator.  However, in a competitive 
environment, sabotage may occur, which negatively influences employee cooperation 
and results in decreased productivity or efficiency.  In his study of pay equality, Lazear 
(1989) determined that profit-maximizing firms utilize a more equitable wage structure, 
thereby minimizing less productive behavior.  However, paying workers based on their 
relative performance remains a successful motivational management tool.  Lazear (1989) 
contends that the desired outcome, reduced workplace competition, and increased 
productivity nurtured by a cooperative environment determine the level of pay 
compression toward a uniform pay structure. 
Within the Navy, pay compression exists in each pay grade.  All Surface Warfare 
Officers within the same grade receive regular uniform military compensation comprised 
predominantly of basic pay and other basic allowances.  The only pay variation occurs in 
special and incentive pays or allowances that consider service location, deployment 
status, and specialty skills (e.g., nuclear training, language proficiency, etc.).  The 
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competitive structure or tournament theory of promotion provides the only true 
opportunity to observe applications of equity theory.  It appears that similar service 
records may be reviewed by the promotion board (comprised of senior-ranking officers), 
and some SWOs may receive the promotion while other eligible SWOs may not.  
Knowledge of the promotion of lower-quality officers creates a severe motivational 
dilemma among non-selected officers.  Even though a flat pay scale seemingly eliminates 
pay inequity, outcome rewards in the form of job recognition and promotion (ultimately 
creating higher pay) create an under-reward inequity situation for some SWOs.  This 
situation may become more prevalent at more senior-level promotion boards.  Often, 
career retention decisions have already been made at these higher hierarchical levels.  
However, under-reward inequity influences the decision to retain in the Navy beyond 20 
years of service. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Navy’s internal labor market with limited lateral entry opportunities 
exacerbates the complexity and impact of recruiting, promoting, and retaining quality 
Surface Warfare Officers.  Manning shortfalls in mid-grade and senior-level ranks 
highlight this concern and create severe spillover effects that affect SWOs near major 
career decision points or ports of exit.  Officer retention decisions are influenced by labor 
economic theories, such as general and firm-specific human capital, efficiency wages, the 
military’s promotion tournament system, the relationship between performance and 
turnover, and the correlation between performance and pay.  Additionally, organizational 
behavior theories offer explanations for individual SWO motivation, including how 
compensation motivates performance, which increases the probability of retention.  These 
economic and organizational behavior theories provide the foundation for analysis of 
retention behavior in the SWO community and the future application of performance-
based compensation in the Navy. 
How much longer can the Surface Warfare Officer community continue to 
operate doing more with less?  As the Global War on Terrorism surpasses its fifth year at 
the time of this writing, the strain on the Navy is severe.  Continued support of 
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requirements outside of traditional SWO community billets, whether through individual 
augmentation (IA) assignments or Global War on Terrorism Support Assignments 
(GSA), reduces manning levels in critical billets.  The SWO community manpower is 
spread thin.  Based on studies that reveal high performance has a positive effect on 
retention, compensation systems that recognize higher-performing employees may be 
effective in addressing retention issues.  By paying high-performing employees even 
more (i.e., efficiency wages), senior leaders may increase SWOs’ probability of retention. 
Labor economic theory and organizational behavior concepts outline the analysis 
of SWO pay and performance data.  This is the first step in assessing the current SWO 
retention bonus system for possible reform, as quantitative data support the challenges 
facing manpower planners regarding the costs and benefits associated with retaining a 
qualified and talented officer workforce.  These economic and organizational behavior 
theories frame the forthcoming analysis of Surface Warfare Officer pay and performance 
data. 
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V. PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION IN PRACTICE 
A. OVERVIEW 
To succeed in an environment in which declining budgets are juxtaposed 
against aggressive growth targets, organizations must obtain the highest 
possible level of performance from their workforces.  Already an 
ambitious goal, this task is made particularly challenging by the 
overwhelming number of viable approaches to performance management 
and the lack of consensus and understanding as to which strategies 
effectively drive performance. (CLC, 2002, p. 2a) 
To develop a better understanding of performance-based compensation in today’s 
workplace and its implementation in the surface warfare community, it is critical to 
review how organizations implement pay for performance in their business practices.  
This chapter discusses performance-based compensation applications in the labor market.  
The first section covers implementation of pay for performance and commonly used 
performance-based compensation methods.  The second section analyzes government-
directed, performance-based compensation demonstration projects at select federal 
agencies.  The third section analyzes a return to skills comparison study between the 
General Schedule (GS), Performance Management Recognition System (PMRS), and 
China Lake compensation systems.  The fourth section reviews two successors to the 
demonstration projects: the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National 
Security Personnel System (NSPS) performance-based compensation systems.  The fifth 
section reviews performance-based compensation in the civilian sector.  The final section 
analyzes problems encountered during performance-based compensation implementation. 
B. IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION 
The US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) presents a compelling argument 
as to why the federal pay system must change its compensation strategy in its 2002 White 
Paper, A Fresh Start for Federal Pay: The Case for Modernization.  The OPM contends 
that in order “to recruit, manage, and retain the human capital” needed to meet today’s 
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challenges and those of the future, the government must change its pay structure (OPM, 
2002, p. v).  The OPM’s White Paper (2002) discusses transforming the current pay 
structure into one that is: more performance-oriented, focused on compensation measures 
more closely linked to individual performance, aligned with organizational goals, and 
tied to more competitive salaries.  Major contentions the OPM (2002) cited regarding the 
federal GS pay system included the following: 
• It is market-insensitive, reflecting only level of work and locality. 
• It is performance-insensitive, as pay raises are primarily linked to time in 
grade. 
• It is dependent on internal equity, and does not utilize external labor 
market rates or the value an individual contributes to the organization. 
So how do organizations transform their pay systems into a performance-based 
structure?  When adopting performance-based compensation, organizations must 
consider employee performance and existing compensation theories, such as human 
capital theory, efficiency wage theory, and tournament theory, among others.  
Additionally, the US Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) (2006) contended that “[1] 
the coverage of a pay for performance system, [2] the types of performance to be 
rewarded, [3] how performance will be measured, [4] the form that pay for performance 
will take, and [5] the delegation and review of pay decisions” must be carefully analyzed 
in making compensation changes (p. xi).  According to Turner (2006), organizations 
implement performance-based compensation primarily in an attempt to satisfy two goals: 
1. To motivate employees to increase their effort (i.e., performance) 
2. To better align employee efforts with organizational goals. 
However, organizations must also realize there are unintended consequences and 
secondary spillover effects of a compensation program on its employees.  Not every 
impact will be positive. 
The Corporate Leadership Council (2002) states that performance can be 
positively influenced by either providing employees the know-how, experience, or 
resources to improve their performance or by influencing employee attitudes that drive 
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performance.  Implementation of a performance-based compensation system as the tool 
that drives performance requires that employees: 
1. Value pay in recognition for their performance 
 
2. Understand performance-oriented job expectations 
 
3. Believe that they can achieve the desired level of performance 
 
4. Have confidence that they will be justly recognized and compensated for 
their effort (MSPB, 2006).   
Motivational behavior theory suggests limitations on the impact that extrinsic 
rewards have on changing workers’ habits and motivation.  MSPB (2006) identifies 
seven critical components of a successful performance-based compensation system: 
• A culture that supports pay for performance 
 
• Effective and fair supervision 
 
• A rigorous performance evaluation system 
 
• Adequate funding 
 
• A system of checks and balances to ensure fairness 
 
• Appropriate training for supervisors and employees 
 
• An ongoing system of evaluation (p. xii). 
. 
However, organizations may be successful in implementing performance-based 
compensation while not satisfying each of these components.  Similarly, other 
organizations may satisfy and implement each of the seven components, yet are 
unsuccessful in their performance-based compensation program because of their business 
design or industry structure.  For example, it may be incongruous to apply performance-
based compensation to jobs in which the primary focus is “quality, safety, or teamwork” 
(MSPB, 2006, p. xi).  Therefore, an organization should evaluate its objectives, 
measurement criteria, and incentive structure before implementing a performance-based 
compensation system. 
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So how and why do organizations choose performance-based compensation?  Pay 
for performance links financial rewards such as pay raises, bonuses, or other monetary 
compensation directly to individual or organizational productivity (MSPB, 2006; Risher, 
2004).  Employee effort is associated with expected financial compensation and, as a 
performance-based component of pay, provides an incentive to increase performance.  
Increased employee productivity and work effort are subsequently rewarded with higher 
pay.  In performance-based compensation systems: 
• Top performers receive the largest compensation and are motivated to 
continue their high level of performance. 
• Average performers receive relatively modest pay raises and are provided 
an incentive to work harder to achieve higher raises. 
• Poor performers receive no pay raises (and sometimes pay cuts) and are 
encouraged to improve their performance or, through functional turnover, 
influenced to leave the organization (MSPB, 2006). 
Conversely, both Strickler (2006) and Rabin (2006) argue that human motivation 
in the workplace is not driven solely by financial compensation.  Employee performance 
is comprised of both self-interested motives and social preferences.  Pride, sense of duty, 
and satisfaction are but a few of the intrinsic values that influence employee behavior and 
are tied to on-the-job performance. 
The decision to implement performance-based compensation and “the 
effectiveness of pay for performance in facilitating recruitment, retention, and motivation 
(and the resulting improvements in individual and organizational performance) depend 
heavily on matching the approach to the situation” (MSPB, 2006, p. 3).  Ultimately, 
organizations strive to encourage top employee performance at a cost which allows them 
retain top talent while maximizing overall profits.  This concept applies equally to 
organizations that use public funds to achieve organizational goals within a constrained 
budget.  However, private organizations keep a more watchful eye on “the overwhelming 
importance of the so-called bottom-line—the need to maintain adequate levels of 
profitability” (Risher, 2004, p. 26).  By shifting from a tenure-based to a performance-
based compensation system, the SWO community can take advantage of these benefits, if 
the pay scale is structured properly and incorporated so that it matches existing 
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organizational culture.  Figure 29 depicts the process of an evolving organizational 
culture toward a performance-oriented workplace. 
 
Figure 29.   Changing Organizational Culture with Pay for Performance  
(MSPB, 2006, p. 4) 
In evaluating an organization’s compensation structure in accordance with Figure 
29, change agents must determine whether the organization is ready to undergo such a 
transformation.  Decisions influencing compensation reform must include:  
• A specific timeline for program implementation  
• A determination of which employees will be affected by the compensation 
change 
• A comprehensive performance evaluation system, 
• A decision on how compensation will be awarded and where the funding 
will come from 
• A program monitoring system so that it achieves the intended effects 
• A continuous training program to ensure success. 
These steps require time, and they involve employee participation and buy-in at all 
affected levels of the organization. (MSPB, 2006; Risher, 2004) 
Successful performance-based compensation implementation requires 
organizations to invest in a substantial amount of research, planning, communication and 
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training (MSPB, 2006; Risher, 2004).  Furthermore, a performance-based compensation 
system is a program that requires continuous attention.  As stated by MSPB (2006): 
Organizational goals will change; performance goals and measures will 
become obsolete; performance may improve or decline; managers may 
make errors in evaluating performance or allocating rewards.  For all of 
these reasons and more, agencies need to monitor the operation and 
effectiveness of their pay for performance systems and modify them 
accordingly.  Only by giving the pay systems and related organizational 
requirements the ongoing attention that they warrant will agencies be able 
to obtain optimal results from their pay for performance systems. (p. xiv) 
Performance-based compensation structure is complicated by the fact that most 
organizations do not have a sufficient wage differential among their employees.  Many 
firms use pay systems that are independent of performance, such as:  
egalitarian pay systems apparently motivated by horizontal equity 
considerations, the asymmetric effects of rewards and punishments, tenure 
and up-or-out promotion systems, survey-based and seniority-based 
systems, profit sharing […] and the general reluctance of employers to 
fire, penalize, or give poor performance evaluations to employees. (Baker, 
Jensen, & Murphy, 1988, p. 594) 
In circumstances in which high-performing employees operate at twice the level of 
production as lower-performing employees, rarely do their wages reflect twice the 
increased productivity or value to the company (Medoff & Abraham, 1980; Baker et al., 
1988; Hudson, 2005).  Organizations in which there is minimal pay differentiation create 
a disincentive for either the high performer to provide extra effort or the low-performing 
employee to change less-than-productive habits. 
A primary difference between performance-based compensation and other pay 
systems is that performance-based compensation systems are characterized by “annual 
salary increases [that] are based on an appraisal of an employee and, more specifically, 
on the appraisal rating” (Risher, 2004, p. 20).  In this manner, companies utilizing 
performance-based compensation use evaluations to measure how well “in the year of 




performance rating should reflect an employee’s current level of performance relative to 
the level of performance deemed normal for someone in his or her position” (Medoff & 
Abraham, 1980, p. 708). 
In implementing performance-based compensation, Risher (2006) claims that 
three pay structures represent employer compensation options:  
1. Pay for performance, which measures previous years’ performance. 
2. Pay for competence, which measures how employees develop their job 
skills to achieve organizational goals. 
3. Pay for contribution, which involves a combination of performance and 
competency. 
Furthermore, once an organization has decided to implement a performance-based 
compensation policy, leadership must decide not only what performance metric to use, 
but also how to distribute financial rewards.  Two commonly used practices are annual 
salary increases and bonuses.  Additionally, some organizations use internal equity and 
stock options to recognize and financially motivate their employees, though these options 
are unfeasible for Navy compensation applications since the US military is not a publicly 
traded organization. 
1. Annual Salary Increases 
Many organizations set annual salary increases to keep pace with established 
market pay levels, in which annual pay increases represent a percentage of the 
organization’s total combined salaries.  Therefore, if market salaries experience a 4-
percent annual increase, an organization may increase their salary budget by 4 percent to 
match market conditions.  However, in a performance-based system, not all employees 
receive the market standard 4-percent annual raise.  Tied to employee evaluations, an 
employee’s performance rating dictates the percentage of salary increase.  Companies 
utilizing such a system and allocating a 4-percent total salary budget increase, for 
example, will allocate different percentage increases based upon employee ratings.  
Performers who exceed expectations (i.e., top performers) earn a larger percentage 
increase—a 5- to 10-percent range.  Average performers might receive the 4-percent 
market increase.  And, lower performers will likely receive less than the 4-percent market 
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increase.  In this scenario, since the organization’s salary budget is fixed, there exists a 
“zero-sum game problem […] since each plus has to be offset with a minus” (Risher, 
2004. p. 22).  Thus, the total amount of pay increase of the top performers is matched by 
the salary decrease of the lower performers. 
Other deviations may occur to annual salary increases based on market conditions 
and pay strategies.  In situations in which an organization’s salary level is below the 
market level, and the organization can afford to adjust its salary by a higher rate to better 
match the market salary level, then top and average performers may see a significantly 
higher-than-market-level increase.  The reverse situation may also occur if organizations 
cannot afford to match market level increases.  In such cases, even the top performers are 
subject to a less-than-market-level annual salary increase, but still a larger salary increase 
relative to the lower-performing employees within the organization. 
2. Performance Bonuses 
Some firms compensate performance by utilizing a bonus structure.  Bonuses are 
financial rewards allocated to employees based on individual or group effort or 
productivity for actions that have been completed during a previous evaluation period.  
According to Risher (2004), recognized bonus structures include: 
1. Spot awards to recognize individual effort on particular actions or 
contributions. 
2. Year-end bonuses representing annual achievement. 
3. Technical achievement awards for developing specific technical ideas. 
4. Key contributor awards used to recognize and retain particularly valuable 
employees. 
5. Gain-sharing bonuses as a group incentive that are awarded and aligned 
with worker productivity. 
6. Goal-sharing awards that recognize organizational or group goals. 
The first four bonuses represent compensation for individual effort, while the remaining 
two bonuses are awarded for group activity. 
 Furthermore, annual salary increases are often absorbed into organizational policy 
as entitlements.  Employees will no longer differentiate salary raises in terms of 
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productivity or compensation for their effort and will come to expect their annual salary 
adjustment regardless of their contribution to the organization.  By comparison, bonuses 
more clearly represent compensation for a quantifiable effort. (Risher, 2004) 
 Compensation research identifies a clear distinction between financial rewards 
used as incentives and those categorized as bonuses.  Bonuses recognize performance 
based upon “after-the-fact decisions” (Risher, 2004, p. 25).  Incentives are based on goals 
set at the beginning of the evaluation period that are used to motivate employees to meet 
the particular performance targets.  Currently, the Navy’s retention bonus program for 
Surface Warfare Officers does not include a performance-based component.  SWOs are 
financially rewarded for accepting an additional obligation of commitment, such as the 
completion of two department head tours for the Junior SWO CSRB and the SWOCP 
bonus programs (Chief of Naval Operations, 2006). 
3. Miscellaneous Rewards 
Profit sharing or the award of stock options based on a company's profitability, 
commissions-based awards (more common with sales personnel), and per-job 
compensation (which is more common in manufacturing) are other forms of 
compensation not used as commonly as annual salary increases and bonus compensation 
mechanisms.  All of these pay schemes, however, are similar in their purpose.  They 
identify and attempt to adequately compensate employee performance by awarding 
higher levels of performance with increased compensation.  Unfortunately, internal 
equity compensation plans are not practical in the public sector and, therefore, are 
unrealistic options for the SWO community. 
C. GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS 
Recruitment and retention of highly skilled employees in the federal government 
are increasing concerns that emerged in the 1980s.  Between the 1980s and 1990s, the 
wages earned by highly skilled federal employees fell substantially behind those wages 
earned in the private sector (Gibbs, 2006). 
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Private-sector labor-market returns to various measures of skills increased 
dramatically.  For example, the college wage premium and the returns to 
experience both increased […] These trends were widespread in the 
private sector.  They have been observed within and between occupations, 
firms, establishment, and industries; within demographic groups; and 
within managerial ranks. (Gibbs, 2006, p. 199) 
In response to growing concerns in the public sector regarding recruitment and 
retention of highly skilled federal employees, the widening wage differential compared to 
the private sector, and the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978, Congress authorized 
personnel demonstration projects to study pay reform and performance management 
systems in government organizations.  Under the direction of the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM), 17 demonstration projects were approved with the common focus 
“that the federal government needs to fundamentally rethink its current approach to pay 
and better link pay to individual and organizational performance” (GAO, 2004, p. 2).  
While 12 of the 17 demonstration projections resulted in implementation of performance-
based compensation programs, the GAO (2004) report discusses only six.  These 
demonstration projects covered 27 locations, spanned both US coasts, and included over 
39,000 federal employees: 
• The Navy Demonstration Project at China Lake (China Lake) 
• The National Institute of Standards and Technology  (NIST) 
• The Department of Commerce (DOC) 
• The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) 
• The Naval Sea Systems Command Warfare Centers (NAVSEA) at 
Dahlgren, VA, and Newport, RI 
• The Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel Demonstration Project 
(AcqDemo). 
During the three decades of demonstration projects, an abundance of knowledge 
and practical experience were obtained regarding employing performance-based 
compensation measures.  From these projects, nine components were deemed critical to 
implementing successful pay-for-performance compensation measures: 
1. Align individual performance expectations with organizational goals. 
2. Connect performance expectations to crosscutting goals. 
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3. Provide and routinely use performance information to make program 
improvements. 
4. Require follow-up actions to address organizational priorities. 
5. Use competencies to provide a fuller assessment of performance. 
6. Link pay to individual and organizational performance. 
7. Make meaningful distinctions in performance. 
8. Involve employees and stakeholders to gain ownership of performance 
management systems. 
9. Maintain continuity during transitions. (GAO, 2004, pp. 1-2) 
By employing these elements, agencies were more likely to successfully establish a 
performance-based compensation program resulting in their transformation into a “high-
performing organization [sic] […] that [is] more results-oriented, customer-focused, and 
collaborative in nature, and ha[s] recognized that an effective performance management 
system can help them drive internal change and achieve desired results” (GAO, 2004, p. 
1). 
Each agency was authorized by the OPM to develop specifically tailored 
performance-based compensation programs designed to meet the particular needs of each 
organization.  Each agency developed variations in its procedure to tie employee 
performance to job requirements, to link performance to awards or pay increases, to 
control the overall cost of the program, and to determine the manner in which the 
program was managed and communicated within the organizational hierarchy.  
Organizations evaluated employee performance derived from either organization-wide 
competencies; behavior related to accomplishing the organization’s mission, goals, and 
values; or position-based competencies (i.e., those actions related to successfully 
completing individual job requirements).  Associated with a corresponding performance 
evaluation, compensation increases were generally applied in one of three categories: 
permanent pay increases, one-time awards, or a combination of the two.  Employees 
receiving the highest performance evaluation qualified for the highest compensation 
increase, while lower marks received smaller amounts.  Organizations like China Lake 
used a five-point performance evaluation scale, while other agencies used a four-
increment rating scale.  Since each organization was responsible for managing its overall 
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budget, innovative methods to handle salary increases were created.  One such method 
was pay banding, which is allocating graduated percentage increases based on seniority; 
lower pay-band levels would receive a higher percentage increase than higher-level 
employees.  Additionally, there were added training and administrative costs that 
organizations incurred when changing to their new compensation schemes. (GAO, 2004) 
The success of these demonstration projects was too inconclusive to generalize to 
all federal agencies.  However, of the 17 projects, 12 have permanently adopted 
performance-based compensation systems.  Furthermore, the valuable lessons learned 
have paved the way for further research and a more performance-oriented federal 
workforce. 
D. PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION COMPARISON STUDY 
In Gibbs’ (2006) study analyzing compensation among US Department of 
Defense scientists and engineers, valuable data were obtained on two early performance-
based compensation demonstrations: the Performance Management and Recognition 
System (PMRS) and China Lake.  These demonstrations were designed to add more 
flexibility into the pay structure to remain more competitive with the private sector in 
recruiting and retaining quality personnel to fill increasingly more technical job 
assignments.  These pay plans would challenge the more rigid General Schedule (GS) 
pay structure comprised of 15 pay levels, each one including 10 steps, with raises 
“awarded primarily for seniority [time in grade] so that pay for performance came about 
chiefly through promotions” (Gibbs, 2006, p. 202). 
1. Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS) 
Compared to the GS pay system, the PMRS offered a more flexible pay plan that 
awarded increased salary in the upper GS levels (Grades 13 through 15) based on 
performance evaluations (Gibbs, 2006).  The PMRS was mandated by the Civil Service 
Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978 to institute performance-based compensation in federal 
organizations (Perry & Petrakis, 1988).  As designed, employees covered under the 
PMRS would receive compensation based on their performance evaluations.  Employees 
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receiving evaluation appraisals of “fully successful or better [were] assured of receiving 
the full annual comparability adjustment and all or part of the equivalent within grade 
increase” (Perry & Petrakis, 1988, p. 361).  Those workers rated above “fully successful” 
would be eligible for additional awards or bonuses, which were capped at a 2-percent 
increase if an employee received an evaluation rating that was two levels above “fully 
successful” (Perry & Petrakis, 1988, p. 361).  Total bonus allocations were limited to no 
more than 1.5 percent of the total payroll.  The first pay-for-performance, or merit-based 
pay system, implemented under the CSRA was “hailed as [a] means for bringing 
responsiveness and efficiency back to the federal sector” (Perry & Petrakis, 1988, p. 
359).  However, limitations in program execution left workers disenchanted and 
discouraged as the merit-based pay system did not provide adequate “funding for merit 
pay pools, [contained] pay inequities between managers and non-managers, and low 
validity of performance appraisal ratings” (Perry & Petrakis, 1988, p. 359). 
The PRMS was considered a significant improvement over the original merit-
based pay system that was first enacted after the CSRA.  However, flaws were still 
present.  The Government Accounting Office reported that more than 1/3 of the surveyed 
employees were dissatisfied with the 1.5-percent total payroll scheme that forced bonuses 
into a limited distribution, citing that “the manipulation of ratings undercuts the validity 
of the performance appraisal system” (Perry & Petrakis, 1988, p. 363).  Other critics 
claimed that the PMRS failed to address the primary issue: improving employee 
performance (Perry & Petrakis, 1988).  According to Perry and Petrakis (1988), 
additional arguments were made in the following areas: 
• Bonuses should be larger—larger bonuses are more likely to sustain high 
performance. 
• Promotions should be considered as a substitute for rewards—representing 
recognition of employee performance—and should be a permanent form 
of pay increase. 
• Punishment was uncertain, as it was not clear how the PMRS addressed 
consistently underperforming employees. 
• The differentiation between leavers vs. stayers was uncertain; it was vague 
how the PMRS affected functional turnover. 
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The PMRS included additional discrepancies.  The seven critical components 
listed by the US Merit Systems Protection Board lay the groundwork to successfully 
implement performance-based compensation.  The PMRS did not follow these 
components.  In particular, inadequate funding seemed to limit the rewards to only 1.5 
percent of the total payroll.  The evaluation system was plagued as a “time-consuming 
and sometimes unpleasant task” in which supervisors had difficulty “measuring and 
documenting performance differentials” (Perry & Petrakis, 1988, p. 365).  Employees, 
who were not confident that their performance would be accurately reflected in their 
evaluations, were provided little incentive to work hard.  Furthermore, Perry and Petrakis 
(1988) argued that the inherently self-focused recognition system in performance-based 
compensation detracted from achieving organizational goals.  Ultimately, the PMRS was 
terminated in 1993. 
2. China Lake 
The demonstration project at China Lake introduced a multi-tiered promotion 
ladder that rewarded more technical skills while using pay banding in five primary pay 
grades, in lieu of the 15 pay grades under the GS system.  The compensation changes 
(which included wider pay bands) introduced to a select employee group of China Lake 
scientists and engineers were designed to create greater salary flexibility and performance 
incentives not present under the existing GS system (Gibbs, 2006).  According to the 
Government Accountability Office (2004), the China Lake compensation changes were 
designed to: 
• Develop an integrated approach to pay, performance appraisal, and 
classification; 
• Allow greater managerial control over personnel functions; and  
• Expand the opportunities available to employees through a more 
responsive and flexible personnel system. (p. 43) 
In instituting a compensation demonstration project, China Lake applied several 
critical components that would later be identified by the US Merit Systems Protection 
Board (2006) as critical elements in performance-based compensation.  China Lake’s 
management process was thoroughly involved in the compensation reform.  From 
 145
modifying position responsibilities to supervisor reviews, employees involved in the 
demonstration project received constant feedback on their performance.  Additionally, 
China Lake instituted a check-and-balance process that provided a secondary review of 
all performance evaluations and a grievance procedure for any employees dissatisfied 
with their review.  Ultimately, the initial success of the trial run was evident in the 
increased quality of recruits at China Lake (Gibbs, 2006).  Further evidence of China 
Lake’s demonstration success occurred in 1994, when its compensation system was 
permanently signed into public law (GAO, 2004). 
3. Summary 
Gibbs’ (2006) return to skills analysis of three different pay plans within the 
federal government provided mixed results.  Table 15 shows the impact of the more 
flexible pay plans on the PMRS and China Lake test groups with reference to the GS pay 
system over the 15-year period from 1982-1996. 
 
Table 15.   Trends in Returns to Unobserved Skills in GS, PMRS, and China Lake Pay Plans 
between 1982-1996 (Adapted from Gibbs, 2006) 
              Years of Service        
    1-5     6-10      11+   
GS     BA MA PhD   BA MA PhD  BA MA PhD 
Engineer  1982 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mathematician 1982 1.00 - -  1.00 1.00 -  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Scientist  1982 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Engineer   1996 0.92 0.96 0.91   0.93 0.91 0.89  0.84 0.90 1.01 
Mathematician 1996 0.72 - -   0.93 0.83 -  0.96 0.97 1.13 
Scientist   1996 0.97 1.08 0.99   0.87 0.86 0.91  0.92 0.92 1.07 
              
PMRS     BA MA PhD   BA MA PhD  BA MA PhD 
Engineer  1983 - - -  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mathematician 1983 - - -  - - -  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Scientist  1983 - - 1.00  - - 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Engineer   1996 - - -   0.98 0.94 1.20  1.01 1.05 1.05 
Mathematician 1996 - - -   - - -  1.02 1.10 1.00 
Scientist   1996 - - 0.83   - - 1.01  1.05 1.05 1.07 
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China Lake   BA MA PhD   BA MA PhD  BA MA PhD 
Engineer  1983 1.00 1.00 -  1.00 1.00 -  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Mathematician 1983 - - -  - - -  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Scientist  1983 - - -  - - -  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Engineer   1996 1.09 1.15 -   0.90 0.98 -  0.99 1.04 0.97 
Mathematician 1996 - - - - 0.97 - -  1.18 1.07 1.26 
Scientist   1996 - - -   0.96 - -  1.01 1.10 0.95 
Represented in Table 15, employees who experienced a positive return to skills 
and subsequent increased salary are depicted with a value greater than one.  Under the GS 
pay system, nearly all degree holders in each of the three occupational fields experienced 
a decreasing return to skill during their career.  The two exceptions, however, included 
scientists with Master’s Degrees in the lowest experience category and PhD holders with 
greater than 11 years of experience.  Under the PRMS pay plan, PhD holders with 6-10 
years of experience and all degree holders with greater than 11 years of experience 
observed a positive return to skills.  At China Lake, employees experienced similar 
positive returns to skills in the most experienced category, in addition to engineers in the 
1-5 years-of-experience group. (Gibbs, 2006) 
The results of the PMRS and China Lake pay system demonstration projects are 
more consistent with the growth of salary and return to skills seen in the private sector.  
Depicted in Figure 30, the return to skills, as observed by the median salary, remains flat 
within the GS pay system.  There is approximately the same salary differential between 
GS 7 and GS 15 employees at the start of their careers as there is toward the end.  Thus, 
there is no observed return to skill. (Gibbs, 2006) 
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Figure 30.   Median Salary by Grade, General Schedule Scientists and Engineers  
(Gibbs, 2006, p. 203) 
By comparison, Figure 31 shows a growing separation of return to skill 
throughout workers’ careers.  In the private sector, there is a growing separation between 
salaries paid at the lowest level (i.e., Level 1) and the highest level (i.e., Level 8) as 
workers gain experience.  Therefore, the private sector tends to reward experience in a 
much more lucrative manner than is witnessed in the government sector.  Level 1 and 
Level 8 employees do not continue to receive the same pay raise throughout their careers, 
which is unlike pay raises in the GS system. (Gibbs, 2006) 
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Figure 31.   Median Salary by Level of Responsibility, Private-sector Engineers  
(Gibbs, 2006, p. 203) 
Of great interest to this analysis is whether or not the more flexible pay systems 
created a greater ability to attract and retain quality employees.  There appeared to be 
little evidence that the DOD experienced any decline in its ability to attract 
and retain high-quality SEs [scientists and engineers] over the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Measured quality and performance of new hires relative to 
promotes, and of exits relative to stays, were essentially flat over the 
period.  These findings hold for the most important federal pay plan, the 
General Schedule, as well as for two other plans that were intended to 
provide greater flexibility in personnel management. (Gibbs, 2006, pp. 
212-213) 
Analysis of Gibbs’ (2006) study may suggest little need for the federal 
government to switch to a compensation structure that models the private sector.  
Because federal employment has significant intrinsic value that cannot be captured by 
simple economic models, results were not as conclusive as proponents of performance-
based compensation would like to argue.  Patriotism, stability, security, and a vast 
research budget are just some of the reasons cited in Gibbs’ (2006) study that explain 
why the PMRS and China Lake pay models do not behave according to existing 
economic theory. 
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E. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE-BASED 
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 
From early compensation demonstration projects conducted at select federal 
agencies across the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 
National Security Personnel System (NSPS) have emerged with variations of 
performance-based compensation programs.  These programs represent modifications to 
the more rigid General Schedule (GS) federal pay system and apply over 25 years of 
experience from the earlier performance-based compensation demonstration projects.  
The following sections provide a review of the performance-based compensation systems 
of these two programs. 
1. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
“In November 2002, Congress established the Department of Homeland Security 
and provided it human capital flexibilities to design a performance management system 
and specifically to consider different approaches to pay” (GAO, 2004, p. 2).  The Federal 
Register published the Department of Homeland Security’s final regulations establishing 
the Human Resource Management System (HRMS) and “the affected subsystems 
[which] include those governing basic pay, classification, performance management, 
labor relations, adverse actions, and employee appeals” (DHS & OPM, 2005, p. 5,272).  
Under legislation approved by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the HRMS represents 
a shift in the methodology of paying DHS employees.  In lieu of the tenure-based system 
employed by the General Schedule pay plan, the DHS is developing a “far more market-
sensitive […] and performance-based classification and pay system” (DHS & OPM, 
2005, p. 5277).  The DHS compensation plan was designed so that employees would no 
longer receive a uniform annualized cost of living (base pay) adjustment along with a 
locality rate pay increase if their performance did not justify the salary increase.  Future 
pay increases would be tied to individual performance standards, with better-performing 
employees capable of earning a larger annual increase.  HRMS designers recognized that 
“this system does not assume that individuals are motivated by pay, but rather that we 
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have an obligation as an employer to reward the highest performers with additional 
compensation” (DHS & OPM, 2005, p. 5,277). 
Integrating performance-based compensation into the massive DHS 
organizational structure has meant adopting a multi-year timeline for progressive 
implementation to over 110,000 DHS employees.  This timeline originally established 
management and supervisor training in the first phase in 2005 with conversion of 
identified agencies completing subsequent transition by 2009.  Due, in part, to the fact it 
has represented a fundamental shift in federal compensation practices in existence for 
over 50 years, this transition has not been accomplished quickly or without opposition.  
With significant American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) union 
resistance and legislative pressure, the implementation process has slowed significantly. 
(CRS, 2005) 
Developing a performance-based compensation system required developing a new 
pay classification out of the GS pay scale.  “The current 15 grades and ten steps of the 
General Schedule pay system will be abolished and replaced, within each occupational 
cluster, by open pay bands without steps” (CRS, 2005, p. 3).  HRMS designers developed 
functional work areas organized by type of work, qualifications, and competency, with 
four pay levels for each pay band.  These new levels are identified as: 
• Entry/development 
• Full performance 
• Senior expert 
• Supervisory (CRS, 2005, p. 3). 
Promotion and salary progression through these four pay bands are designed to be 
competency-based and solely dependent on how well employees perform their jobs. 
To determine compensation policy and the proper amount of salary increase 
within this structure, the Homeland Security Compensation Committee was established.  
Chaired by the DHS Undersecretary for Management and consisting of 14 members, its 
responsibilities include establishing “the annual allocation of funds between market and 
performance pay adjustments and the annual adjustment of rate changes and locality and 
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special rate supplements” (CRS, 2005, p. 30).  The design under HRMS permits 
employees to realize greater control over their career and salary progression, as they are 
no longer forced to wait for longevity-based step increases. 
The lengthy process of merging 22 individual agencies under the umbrella of the 
Department of Homeland Security Performance Management System has begun with a 
limited performance-based compensation program affecting senior DHS employees.  It 
has now been “deployed […] to approximately 10,000 employees in multiple components 
and [training has been provided to] 350 senior executives and more than 11,000 managers 
and supervisors in performance leadership” (DHS, 2007, p. 6).  Court rulings siding in 
favor of the AFGE, concerned about employee bargaining rights, severely hindered the 
performance-based pay system implementation progress within DHS (“Judge blocks 
merit pay at pentagon,” 2006).  Union intervention in the HRMS roll-out resulted in a 
limited performance-based pay system similar in size to some of the original 
demonstration projects.  This, however, signifies that the foundation has been established 
to continue performance-based compensation throughout DHS. 
2. National Security Personnel System (NSPS) 
In November 2003, the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) was enacted 
by the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act as the performance-based management 
system to cover more than 700,000 federal Department of Defense (DoD) employees 
(GAO, 2005).  Two years later, the DoD (2005) published final regulations establishing 
the NSPS and provided forward progress regarding the implementation of performance-
based compensation.   
NSPS is designed to promote a performance culture in which the 
performance and contributions of the DoD civilian workforce are more 
fully recognized and rewarded.  The system offers the civilian workforce a 
contemporary pay-banding construct, which will include performance-
based pay.  As the Department moves away from the General Schedule 
system, it will become more competitive in setting salaries and it will be 
able to adjust salaries based on various factors, including labor market 
conditions, performance, and changes in duties. (DoD, 2005a, p. 66,118) 
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According to the Government Accountability Office (2007a), the NSPS is comprised of 
three major components: 
1. A performance-based compensation management system 
2. An appeals process 
3. A labor relations system. 
Under the new performance-based compensation management system, one of the 
most apparent changes is a new pay plan that uses pay bands in lieu of the 15-grade, 10-
step GS pay plan.  Figure 32 is one of the four new NSPS pay plans (for the Standard 
Career Group) replacing the GS pay system displayed in Figure 33.  Depending on the 
occupational career group, the NSPS has created three or four significantly wider pay 
bands instead of the 15 pay grades associated with the GS system.  These four pay plans 
correspond to new career groups: the Standard Career Group, the Scientific & 
Engineering Career Group, the Medical Career Group, and the Investigative & Protective 
Services Career Group.  Within career groups, there are pay schedules that represent the 










Figure 32.   DoD NSPS Standard Career Group Pay Plan  




Figure 33.   2008 GS Salary Table  
(OPM, 2008, p. 1) 
One of the main differences between the pay systems shown in Figure 32 and 
Figure 33—elimination of the longevity-based step increase within pay grades—is 
fundamental to the decision to shift to NSPS.  Designers of NSPS “believe Congress and 
the American people expect their public employees to be paid according to how well they 
perform, rather than how long they have been on the job” (DoD, 2005a, p. 66,124).  
Further support is contained within NSPS’ mission to “place the right civilian employee 
in the right job with the right skills at the right time at the right cost” (NSPS, 2004, p. 6).  
Performance-based compensation supports this mission statement. 
a. Performance Management 
The Performance Management System of NSPS is a five-step process 
depicted by the Performance Management Lifecycle shown in Figure 34.  During this 
lifecycle, employees work closely with their supervisors to develop the specific job 
requirements of the individual position and to attain the level of performance that 
becomes the basis for the year-end evaluation. 
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Figure 34.   Performance Management Lifecycle  
(Adapted from NSPS, 2008b) 
 
During the Plan phase, Step 1, supervisors and employees establish the job 
objectives and components that determine job success.  During the Monitor and Develop 
phases, Step 2 and Step 3, continual communication occurs between employee and 
supervisor.  Throughout this process, employees are kept informed of their progress and 
any areas in which they may require further improvement.  The next phase, Step 4, is the 
Rate Phase—when the supervisor writes the employee evaluation for the covered period.  
Employees receive performance-based compensation in the Reward Phase, Step 5, for 
evaluations that are 3.0 or better, based on a five-point scale.  Employees earning a 
performance evaluation of a 1.0 or 2.0 rating are not eligible to receive a performance-
based salary increase. (NSPS, 2008b) 
b. Performance-based Compensation Component 
The performance-based compensation component under NSPS legislation 
corresponds to annual performance evaluations and is paid in addition to cost-of-living 
adjustments.  Employee performance is the combined average of all performance 
categories in an employee’s occupational career group.  An evaluation of 5.0 on the five-
point scale represents the top performance rating and guarantees the largest performance-
based compensation increase, while performance ratings of 1.0 and 2.0 represent below 
1 2
3 4 5 
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average performance and are not associated with performance increases.  According to 
the NSPS (2008c), the following performance descriptions are associated with each 
performance rating: 
• 5—Role Model 
• 4—Exceeds Expectations 
• 3—Valued Performer 
• 2—Fair  
• 1—Unacceptable 
The amount of performance-based increase is calculated as a function of 
the employee’s average evaluation rating and the base salary.  Lower-performing 
employees with a 2.0 performance rating may still be authorized to receive a local and 
inflationary cost-of-living salary increase, while 1.0-rated performers are not authorized a 
salary increase.  In addition to performance-based compensation payouts, 5.0-rated 
employees may also receive an additional pay increase, called an Extraordinary Pay 
Increase.  Additionally, any team member with over a 3.0 performance rating may be 
eligible for Organizational/Team Achievement Recognition (OAR).  These are additional 
performance-based compensation awards may be awarded as salary increases, bonuses, 
or a combination of the two compensation vehicles (NSPS, 2008c). 
c. NSPS Payout 
On January 24, 2008, more than four years after the National Defense 
Authorization Act established NSPS and its performance-based compensation system, 
many of the 110,000 federal employees in the first phase of NSPS implementation 
received their first performance-based annual pay raise.  The average NSPS pay raise 
represented a 5.9-percent salary increase plus a 1.7-percent bonus (not be added to the 
base pay for next year’s calculations), or a 7.6-percent total increase.  However, 0.2-
percent of the employees received no raise at all.  Compared to the previous GS pay 
system, the majority of the federal employees faired significantly better under the NSPS.  
By comparison, the average GS pay raise was only 3.5 percent.  And, though the majority 
earned significantly more than they would have under the GS pay system, 5.13 percent of 
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the employees received a smaller pay raise.  The 2008 payouts correspond to 57 percent 
of the employees receiving a rating of 3.0; 36 percent of the employees receiving a 4.0 
rating; and 5.0 percent of the employees receiving the highest rating of 5.0 (NSPS, 
2008d).  Thus, the 5.13 percent who received a smaller increase under the NSPS 
represent a combination of the 0.2 percent who received no raise as a result of 1.0 or 2.0 
performance ratings and 5,425 employees who received a rating of 3.0 or “valued 
performer” rating, but still earned a smaller increase. (Barr, 2008, p. 1) 
F. PRIVATE-SECTOR PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPENSATION 
Civilian organizations searching for methods with which to provide a competitive 
advantage in recruiting, enabling, and retaining quality employees have routinely turned 
to performance-based compensation to achieve their goals.  Ideally, performance-based 
compensation helps accomplish organizational objectives through a multi-faceted process 
of: 
• Attracting and retaining quality performers. 
• Providing an incentive that aligns employee activities with organizational 
objectives. 
• Providing motivation to develop process improvement. 
• Providing teamwork and collaboration.   
Where successfully implemented, these results may achieve financial success and 
employee satisfaction; however, unsuccessful execution “can have a destructive effect on 
intrinsic motivation, self-esteem, teamwork, and creativity” (Beer & Cannon, 2004, p. 4).  
The Corporate Leadership Council (2004) provides interesting insight pertaining to 
employee behavior, motivation, and compensation: 
While rational incentives may create compelling reasons for employees to 
remain with organizations and meet basic performance requirements, it is 
the employees who derive pride, inspiration, and enjoyment from their job 
and organization who put forth the highest levels of effort.  In fact 
improvements in emotional commitment can produce three to seven times 
the total impact on discretionary effort achieved through improvements in 
rational commitment. (p. 36) 
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Data from the Corporate Leadership Council’s 2004 Employee Engagement 
Framework and Survey further support this statement.  Satisfaction with total 
compensation resulted in a 9.1-percent increase in discretionary effort and a 21.1-percent 
increase in employees’ intent to retain (CLC, 2004).  These numbers show the effect 
compensation has on two functions of a performance-based compensation system: the 
ability to motivate employee effort and the ability to affect employee retention.  The next 
section discusses two large corporations that have opposite experiences in implementing 
performance-based compensation: 
• PepsiCo, the international food and beverage company 
• Hewlett-Packard (HP), the American-based technology company 
specializing in the computer sector 
1. Successful Implementation 
PepsiCo implemented a dual-performance evaluation system that measures 
employee performance in two areas: people objectives and business objectives.  People 
objectives focus on “managing and developing people, demonstrating teamwork and 
collaboration, and ensuring personal growth and development,” while business objectives 
focus on positive corporate growth and corporate profits (CLC, 2005, p. 9).  Using a five-
point performance evaluation scale, both metrics are linked to performance-based 
compensation for all employees and have bonuses and long-term incentives for select 
employees.  Introduced in 2001, this evaluation structure has: 
increased manager commitment to people management as well as higher 
levels of employee satisfaction with the performance management 
process.  In addition, PepsiCo indicates the practice has fueled and 
sustained a culture shift among employees; dedication to people 
management, teamwork, and self development is now an expected 
competency within the organization. (CLC, 2005, p. 5) 
Several features of PepsiCo’s dual-performance rating system are credited, in 
part, for the success of its evaluation program.  First, PepsiCo keeps the people-objectives 
rating and the business-objectives rating separate at all times.  This eliminates one rating 
from influencing the other.  Second, the people-rating is given significant clout, affecting 
“34 percent of managers’ merit increases and individual bonuses” (CLC, 2005, p. 5).  
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Third, managers performing poorly in either rating category are placed on a performance-
improvement program designed to achieve positive results in weak areas.  Lastly, “a 
forced distribution overlay, introduced in 2004, enables PepsiCo to better differentiate 
senior executives’ performance and more accurately award long term incentives to ‘top’ 
performers in the organization” (CLC, 2005, p. 5). 
PepsiCo reports that its performance rating system has been quite successful, 
which results in better manager accountability and performance separation for people 
management, a positive culture shift within the organization, and a level of quality 
management that has transcended across all work sectors—improving both individual and 
team effort (CLC, 2005).  Furthermore, PepsiCo states that its success is owed to several 
key components of its management system: 
• Separate performance ratings applied to nearly all employees 
• A well-defined performance criteria in both people and business 
objectives 
• Thorough evaluations maintaining the separation between people and 
business categories 
• Performance-based compensation separately linked to employee ratings in 
each category 
• Application of appropriate performance objectives and awards to senior 
leadership 
• A means to correct underperforming employees (CLC, 2005, p. 8). 
In developing people objectives, PepsiCo’s management has developed four 
specific metrics that correspond with organizational objectives and are tied to specific 
areas of responsibility.  Employees’ accountability in the areas of “creating a diverse and 
inclusive organization, managing and developing people, teamwork and collaboration, 
and personal development and growth” is crucial for the growth of the individual and the 
organization as well (CLC, 2005, p. 10).  Management works closely with its subordinate 
employees to align personal employee objectives with organizational objectives. 
During the evaluation process, managers hold each employee to the mutually 
developed standards.  In this process, management receives 360-degree feedback: from 
the employee, from the employee’s subordinates, from team members, from customers, 
 160
and from organizational surveys.  The process has one final step—a manager calibration 
meeting—which reviews ratings and ensures accuracy before assigning the final 
employee ratings.  Employees receive a second rating on their business performance, as 
well.  Together, these ratings determine the overall performance-based compensation, 
with people ratings affecting 34 percent of the overall merit increase.  Accountability to 
correct deficient performance in either rating category is included in this rating process.  
Employees receiving a 2.0 or lower rating must complete a “performance improvement 
plan” with a 60-day to 6-month deadline to produce results (CLC, 2005, p. 16).  
Employees failing to improve within their allotted time are either dismissed from the 
company or forced to change positions within the company. (CLC, 2005) 
Since the program's inception in 2001, PepsiCo has reported a “positive culture 
change at PepsiCo; employees embrace the People Management focus and are motivated 
by the ability to drastically improve their performance in an attainable and clearly defined 
category” (CLC, 2005, p. 18).  
 2. Failed Implementation 
In the early 1990s, Hewlett-Packard (HP) managers in thirteen divisions and sites 
attempted performance-based compensation initiatives to improve company performance.  
No initiative survived the test of time, although this does not imply that all aspects of the 
programs were unsuccessful.  Beer and Cannon (2004) discussed details of five of the 
thirteen HP compensation initiatives in their study, Promise and Peril in Implementing 
Pay-For-Performance: 
• The San Diego site 
• Boise Printer Formatter Shop 
• PRCO Loveland 
• Colorado Memory Systems 
• The Workstations Group. 
The San Diego site developed “team pay-for-performance (PFP)” to motivate 
team goals in the areas of process improvement, production, and quality (Beer & Cannon, 
2004, p. 6).  They developed three performance metrics (i.e., Levels I, II, and III); team 
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members would receive monthly performance payouts if they achieved a certain level of 
performance during the previous month.  Additionally, the San Diego site created a 
“skill-based pay system called pay-for-contribution (PFC)” which rewarded employees 
based on learning new competencies within the team organization (Beer & Cannon, 2004, 
p. 7). 
The results of these programs were mixed.  Many employees prospered during the 
PFP program, with most teams achieving Level II or III performance marks.  As a result 
of the unexpected success and resulting expense, in part due to the low performance 
metrics, managers were forced to raise the performance standards and to make them more 
stringent.  This change had severe consequences, as it eroded trust that management had 
previously developed with employees.  Some workers viewed the change as an 
unprovoked reduction in earned salary.  Another side-effect occurred as a bi-product of 
the success some teams experienced; it developed competition that prevented further 
teamwork and team-building.  By comparison, no one liked the PFC skill-based pay 
system.  It did not develop into the competency-developing tool management had 
previously predicted.  The institution of performance testing had the exact opposite 
effect, as employees could actually drop in pay level by performing poorly on these tests.  
The results of these efforts forced the San Diego site to drop both pay initiatives 
approximately one year after they were established. 
The Boise Printer Formatter Shop implemented a skill-based pay system as a 
function of both individual and team performance.  It was administered, in part, through 
peer evaluation.  Compensation could be adjusted within a pay level as a result of 
individual employee productivity, as well as through team performance.  Like the San 
Diego site, this HP division found itself paying more than it expected in performance 
payouts.  And, similar to the San Diego site, competition among employees created an 
environment that was not conducive to teamwork.  Due to the unprecedented payouts, 
negative competitive atmosphere, difficulties in administering peer evaluations, and a 
perception that employees were overly focused on pay instead of on organizational goals, 
the Boise site never experienced the intended results; it subsequently dropped the 
program. (Beer & Cannon, 2004) 
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PRCO Loveland, a fabrication division, attempted to initiate performance-based 
compensation as an incentive to meet end-of-period goals.  The division did not reach the 
end-of-the-month target; therefore, PRCO Loveland never had to pay the one-time goal 
or attainment bonus.  Though workers never received their bonus, employee productivity 
and motivation improved.  However, an unintended consequence resulted when some of 
the employees felt slighted by what they perceived as a “bribe […] to reach a goal they 
were already motivated to reach” (Beer & Cannon, 2004, p. 10).  Management 
discontinued this approach in future goal setting. 
Colorado Memory Systems (CMS), a company acquired by HP, developed a 
“gain sharing program […to] increase the following desired behaviors: individual 
initiative and responsibility; willingness to learn; adaptiveness [sic]; teaming and 
collaboration; hustle; willingness to confront conflict; and focus and attentiveness” (Beer 
& Cannon, 2004, p. 10).  Designed to motivate these behaviors and bring previous CMS 
employees’ salaries closer to the HP salary range, it positively affected employee 
behavior in the areas of teamwork, communication, and focus.  However, issues 
regarding pay equality, long-range goal orientation, and program metrics led to another 
short-lived initiative at HP. 
 Finally, the Workstation Group introduced a one-time incentive package to 
motivate program managers and engineers in introducing a new product to the market.  
Successful in this endeavor, HP rewarded managers with stock and salary rewards, while 
engineers received a salary increase when the product was delivered six months ahead of 
schedule.  Not without criticism, however, many employees, “including the vice 
president in charge of personnel, believed that the perception of high priority was the 
most important motivating factor leading to the early completion of the workstation” 
(Beer & Cannon, 2004, p. 11).  Ironically, “[a]n HP survey showed that 70 percent of the 
employees felt that they would have worked just as hard on the project without the 
incentive program.  But […] 60 percent of the employees surveyed recommended that 
incentive programs be used with other projects at HP” (Beer & Cannon, 2004, p. 11). 
By the mid-1990s, all thirteen performance-based compensation initiatives had 
been discontinued or cancelled under company reorganization.  Some programs had 
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achieved their intended goals, such as delivering a product to the market ahead of 
schedule or meeting performance goals.  However, managers in each of the HP divisions 
individually determined that the continued expense of these performance-based 
compensation initiatives was not cost effective compared to the existing HP business 
model.  The business model that included trust and communication between manager and 
employee, a team-oriented work culture, and a proven successful compensation program 
proved difficult to improve. 
G. PROBLEMS IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE-BASED 
COMPENSATION 
Labor economics theory suggests greater earning profiles are associated with 
increased human capital, which is associated with greater productivity (Medoff & 
Abraham, 1980; Ehrenberg & Smith, 2006).  Employees who have more experience have 
a greater accumulation of human capital and operate at a higher level of productivity than 
less-experienced and low-valued capital employees.  Correspondingly, more productive 
employees are paid an increased wage due to their increased human capital and added 
worth to the employer.  However, “there exists no evidence that corresponding pieces of 
the experience-earnings and experience-productivity profiles have the same sign” 
(Medoff & Abraham, 1980, p. 704).  However, Medoff and Abraham (1980) argue that it 
is “very difficult to measure an individual worker’s productivity in an advanced industrial 
society” (p. 704).  Additionally, there is little evidence that more productive employees 
are necessarily operating at a higher level of performance than what is expected of them. 
Regarding performance-based compensation, Turner (2006) claims if motivation 
is driven by expectancy theory, then incentive-based compensation should be a relatively 
large percentage of employee compensation.  
Motivating employees by using performance-contingent rewards is a long-
established management practice.  Pay for performance is used to promote 
two ends. First it is expected that these systems will motivate employees 
to increase their effort and thereby their performance.  Expectancy theory 




[…] Second, these compensation plans are often introduced to better align 
the efforts of employees with organizational goals and objectives set by 
management. (Turner, 2006, p. 23) 
Regardless of the difficulties associated with measuring productivity and 
individual performance, companies utilizing performance-based compensation are 
cognizant of the fact that they must reward their employees accordingly.  In performance-
based compensation schemes, top performers in a particular grade receive a 
proportionately higher amount of compensation relative to the average or the below-
average performers in that same grade.  However, “evidence from research on 
compensation plans indicates that explicit financial rewards in the form of transitory 
performance-based bonuses seldom account for an important part of a worker’s 
compensation” (Baker et al., 1988, p. 595).  This evidence leads researchers to question if 
employees are really receiving performance-based compensation.   
Medoff and Abraham (1980) analyzed two large manufacturing firms, Company 
A and Company B, with their results shown in Table 16.  Employee performance ratings 
are shown in column 1, the earnings premium relative to the lowest performance rating is 
represented in column 2, and the percent of employees in that level receiving the 











Table 16.   Salary Premiums Associated with Performance Ratings, and Frequency 
Distribution of Performance Ratings, for Managers in Two Large Manufacturing 
Firms  
(Baker et al., 1988, p. 595, as adapted from Medoff & Abraham, 1980) 
 
 
Their findings indicate that the within-grade salary differential of employees in 
professional and managerial positions was minimal.  Medoff and Abraham (1980) 
concluded that even though experience was rewarded by higher salaries, employee 
experience did not result in a significantly higher level of performance.  Both Company 
A and Company B administered performance evaluations by employees’ immediate 
supervisors indicating “how well an individual in the year of evaluation, is carrying out 
the responsibilities of his or her job” (Medoff & Abraham, 1980, p. 708).  Employees in 
Company A earning “not acceptable” or “acceptable” ratings were below-average 
performers; “good” was an average performance mark; and “outstanding” was awarded 
to the top performers.  In Company B, employees earning “satisfactory” or “good” 




performers; and marks of “excellent” indicated top performance.  Though Company B 
had two lower levels of performance, no employees received those marks. (Medoff & 
Abraham, 1980) 
There is a 7.8-percent wage difference between the lowest and the highest ranking 
employees in Company A, while Company B shows only a 6.2-percent difference 
between the same employee performance classifications.  Additionally, Medoff and 
Abraham’s (1980) findings show that while nearly 95 percent of Company A’s 
employees received ratings of “good” or better, only 20.2 percent were above-average 
performers.  Meanwhile, Company B evaluated over 98 percent of their employees as 
“good” or better, but only 3.8 percent were recognized as above average.  Furthermore, 
their study showed only a 2.5-percent and a 2.6-percent earnings premium between 
employees who received an average performance rating and those that earned the top 
performance mark for Companies A and Company B respectively. (Medoff & Abraham, 
1980) 
In a 1985 study by Guzzo, Jette, and Katzell, the effects of monetary 
compensation on worker productivity were measured.  The authors concluded there were 
no performance benefits from financial rewards.  According to Turner (2006), the data 
from the study:  
produced no significant effects for financial incentives.  The non-
significant result for financial incentives suggests that, on average, the 
motivational value of incentives across these studies was zero.  The use of 
financial incentives did not produce performance improvement. (pp. 26-
27)   
Additional arguments contend that “money actually lowers employee motivation, 
by reducing the intrinsic rewards that an employee receives from the job” (Baker et al., 
1988, p. 596).  Some performance-based compensation critics claim that employee 
motivation is decreased due to improper evaluation and performance measurements.  
“[E]vidence indicates that pay is not very closely related to performance in many 
organizations that claim to have merit increase salary systems […] suggest[ing] that 
many business organization do not do a very good job of tying pay to performance” 
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(Baker et al., 1988, p. 595).  Performance-based compensation may even affect quality as 
employees become more concerned with chasing a performance bonus.  Others assert 
additional negative side-effects of performance-based pay: deteriorated organizational morale 
and reduced productivity.  These spillover effects more likely occur in organizations in which 
the performance-based compensation is incongruent with the current organizational culture; 
such was the case with Hewlett-Packard. 
Furthermore, union pressure and court cases, filed by the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and the American Federation of 
Government Employees, have stalled the implementation of performance-based 
compensation programs on the grounds of collective bargaining rights issues.  Court cases 
have blocked, delayed, and forced revision to DHS and NSPS performance-based 
compensation programs (“Judge blocks merit pay at pentagon,” 2006).  Union workforces in 
the private sector face similar challenges, as the AFL-CIO are involved from the planning 
stages to the implementation phases of performance-based compensation programs (DoD, 
2005a).  Unions are strongly involved in performance-based compensation transition 
processes, highlighted by 36 labor unions’ participation in the NSPS’ “meet-and-confer 
process” during the initial planning phase (DoD, 2005a, p. 66122). 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Arguments exist on both sides of the spectrum as to the organizational benefits of 
instituting performance-based compensation.  What works in one industry may not work 
in another.  However, prior to rushing to judgment and implementing a performance-
based compensation system, organizations must conduct a thorough top-to-bottom 
organizational analysis that includes cultural and strategic objectives.  In order to 
establish an effective performance-based compensation system, an organization must first 
understand what it expects from such a system.  Will it be a vehicle for increasing 
performance, improving retention, or organizational change?  It is essential for Navy 
leadership and policy makers to respect both the intended consequences and the 
unintended spillover effects when considering performance-based components of the 
SWO retention bonuses—as newly minted weapons to combat the Surface Warfare 
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VI. MODELING THE RETENTION EFFECT OF ADDING A 
PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPONENT TO THE SWO CRITICAL 
SKILLS BONUS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The SWO community has identified retention issues at critical ports of exit in the 
mid-grade and senior level officer ranks (Crayton et al., 2002; Commander Naval Surface 
Forces, 2008b).  Current SWO incentive pays offered to junior Surface Warfare Officers, 
(i.e., SWOCP and Junior SWO CSRB) are designed primarily to capture and retain 
officers early in their careers.  Combined, these incentive pays allocate up to $75,000 for 
those officers who commit to serving through their department head tours, or 
approximately 10.5 YCS (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005b; Navy Personnel Command, 
2008a).  These two retention bonuses address the requirement to retain 275 SWO 
department heads; however, they do not directly combat the inventory shortage in the 
mid-grade and senior officer ranks at later critical ports of exit (Monroe & Cymrot, 
2004).  As depicted in Figure 8 and Figure 9, it takes several years for increased retention 
at 9 YCS to spill over and influence later SWO inventory shortages.  Therefore, a more 
immediate solution is required to directly address retention at the 13-year port of exit to 
affect the current SWO inventory through 15 YCS and beyond.  The following data 
analysis addresses retention at the 13-year critical retention point, utilizing the SWO 
Critical Skills Bonus to capture mid-grade officers.  The existing SWO Critical Skills 
Bonus is void of a performance metric and does not discriminate officer quality or 
economic rents of retention decisions for the targeted SWO population.  The following 
models examine the potential retention effects of adding a performance-based component 
to the SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  
The first section describes the dataset and sample utilized in the multivariate 
econometric and optimization models.  The second section provides a description of the 
dependent and independent variables.  The third section details the methodology 
employed in developing the 13-year retention, tier characteristics, pay elasticity, and 
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optimization models.  Section four explains the hypothesized effects of the independent 
variables of interest.  The fifth section discusses the descriptive statistics, and the sixth 
section presents the results of the econometric regression models and optimization 
models.  The last section addresses model limitations. 
B. DATASET AND SAMPLE 
1. DMDC Dataset 
To analyze retention among Surface Warfare Officers, a comprehensive dataset 
was provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  The dataset consists of 
personnel records for 20 officer cohorts (separated by commissioning year) and includes 
all Navy officers who were commissioned Ensigns (O-1) from fiscal year (FY) 1987 
through FY 2006.  The personnel records contain three data entry points: the record at the 
time of accession, the current record, and the loss record.  The accession record displays 
the pertinent data for each officer at time of commissioning.  The current record shows a 
snapshot of data at the end of FY 2006 for officers remaining on active duty.  For officers 
who separated from active duty prior to the end of FY 2006, the current record represents 
the last month the officer was on active duty.  Finally, the loss record provides data for 
naval officers at time of separation from active duty, if they indeed separated. 
These personnel records, which are annual snapshots of the officers’ pay in 
December of the respective calendar year, were merged with corresponding pay records 
over the 20-year period.  Pay records capture officers’ total cash compensation, 
including: basic pay, allowances, special and incentive pays, and bonuses.  The merged 
dataset contains personnel data (coded as fixed over time) combined with time-series pay 
data. 
2. Surface Warfare Officer Sample 
To focus on the surface warfare community, only officers with the current 
designators of 116x (i.e., SWO in training) or 111x (i.e., qualified SWO) were included 
in the analysis (Director of Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education Policy 
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Division, 2007a).23  Furthermore, the sample was restricted to officers who possess at 
least a bachelor’s degree and were commissioned between the ages of 20 and 42.  Since 
the SWO promotion process relies on lineal numbers, the sample does not include 
officers who commissioned through the United States Naval Academy (USNA), since 
USNA graduates have a systematic promotion difference based on lineal number 
assignment when compared to officers commissioned through other sources (Chief of 
Naval Operations, 2005a).  These restrictions provide a SWO sample of 9,110 officers. 
Time to promote to Lieutenant Commander (O-4) was utilized as a proxy for 
performance, which restricted the sample further.  Officers who did not promote to O-4 
are left out of the regression models.  To analyze realistic promotion timing, the sample 
only includes officers who promoted to O-4 between 9 YCS and 12 YCS.  Therefore, the 
resultant sample size is 1,331 SWOs. 
C. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
1. Dependent Variables 
a. 13-year Retention 
The 13-year retention variable (i.e., retention13yr) is a dichotomous 
variable that captures whether or not a SWO retained to at least the first day of the 
thirteenth year of commissioned service.  This variable considers officers who remained 
in the surface warfare community and accumulated enough active duty time to have 
reached at least 13 YCS.  Of the 1,331 sample size, 902 officers remained on active duty 
long enough to reach 13 YCS by the end of FY 2006. 
                                                 
23 The fourth digit of the officer designator (represented by an “x”) defines the current duty status of 
the officer.  A “5” indicates that the officer is in the Navy Reserve; while a “0” indicates that the officer is 
in the Regular Navy on active duty. (Director of Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education Policy 
Division, 2007a) 
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b. Performance Tiers 
To create a proxy for performance, the sample was categorized by the 
elapsed time from commissioning date to the date of promotion to O-4.  Previous studies 
have shown that promotion is a better proxy for performance than performance 
evaluations (FITREPS).  FITREPs only identify a portion of performance and exhibit 
grade inflation, where performance grades are skewed toward the higher end.  Medoff 
and Abraham (1980) found that performance ratings are not strongly correlated with 
wages.  Moreover, Gibbs (1995) discovered that time in grade for a less structured 
civilian firm is the best predictor of performance.  Therefore, a more comprehensive 
performance measure is required—time to promotion.  This measure is likely to include 
more performance (and ability) information than FITREPs, such as: advanced degrees, 
training, professional qualifications, visibility in past job assignments, joint education and 
assignments, and personal awards. 
Based on the three-year timeframe for promotion to O-4, from 9 YCS to 
12 YCS, the sample was divided into three performance categories that correspond to the 
year of commissioned service in which officers promoted to O-4.  Table 17 depicts the 
division of the sample. 





Time to Promote 
to O-4 (in YCS) 
Time to Promote 




Tier-1 Performers tier1perform 9 – 10 YCS 3287 – 3652 days Below Zone 
Tier-2 Performers tier2perform 10 – 11 YCS 3653 – 4017 days In Zone 
Tier-3 Performers tier3perform 11 – 12 YCS 4018 – 4382 days Above Zone 
 
Based upon the O-4 promotion opportunity as established by the 
Department of Defense, this distribution approximates the Navy’s promotion tier system 
(Yardley et al., 2005; Secretary of the Navy, 2006).  Tier-1 performers correspond to 
“below zone” promotions; tier-2 performers proxy those promoted “in zone;” and tier-3 
performers represent those SWOs who promoted “above zone” (Secretary of the Navy, 
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2006, pp. 8-9).  These promotion categories rank the SWO sample by relative level of 
performance, with tier 1 as the highest level of performance and tier 3 as the lowest level 
of performance.  Each performance variable (i.e., tier1perform, tier2perform, and 
tier3perform) is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value of: 
• 1 if a SWO belongs in that category; or  
• 0 if that SWO is a member of another performance category. 
2. Independent Variables 
a. Accession Age 
The accession age variable (i.e., age) is a continuous variable that 
represents the age (in years) at which the SWO was commissioned.  This variable is a 
proxy for the maturity level at time of accession.  Older officers have more years of life 
experience and may act more maturely, while younger officers are generally 
inexperienced and less seasoned.  Though not perfectly correlated with accession age, 
maturity level may indirectly impact qualifications, education, sub-specialty codes, Joint 
Professional Military Education (JPME), and performance. 
b. Marital Status and Number of Dependents Variables 
The marital status variable (i.e., married) is a binary variable that defines 
whether a SWO is married (i.e., married = 1 if a SWO is married; and married = 0 if a 
SWO is single).  Additionally, the number of dependents variable (i.e., dependents) is a 
continuous variable that specifies the number of documented dependents that the officer 
supports.  Primarily, dependents include spouse and children, though other family 
members who are supported by the SWO can be claimed as dependents for pay and tax 
purposes. 
c. Prior-enlisted Experience 
The prior-enlisted experience variable (i.e., prienlist) is a binary variable, 
which determines if an officer spent at least four years of active duty service in the 
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enlisted ranks.  As depicted in Appendix A, prior-enlisted status is influential in 
calculating basic pay, since the officer’s rank is designated with an “E” suffix if the 
officer is prior enlisted (e.g., O-1E, O-2E, and O-3E).  This categorically guarantees 
slightly higher basic pay than non-prior enlisted cohort counterparts.  Additionally, prior-
enlisted experience is a proxy for military-specific (and possibly general) training at the 
time of commissioning, since enlisted service includes basic military training and other 
technical training contingent on previous enlisted specialty. 
d. Gender 
Since gender is categorical, Table 18 defines the two dichotomous gender 
variables: male and female. 
 
Table 18.   Description of Gender Variables 
Gender Variable Name Description 
Male male = 1 if male = 0 if female 
Female female = 1 if female = 0 if male 
 
 
e. Race and Ethnicity Variables 
Because the DMDC coding used for race and ethnicity variables changed 
over time, race and race/ethnicity were combined to more concisely classify SWOs’ race 
and ethnicity into easy-to-understand categories.  Although Hispanic is an ethnicity and 
not a race, officers who are Hispanic are classified as such in the respective race and 
ethnicity variable.  Table 19 provides a description of the race and ethnicity variables 





Table 19.   Description of Race and Ethnicity Variables 
Race/Ethnicity Variable Name Description 
American Indian/ 
Native Alaskan amerindian 
= 1 if American Indian or Alaskan native 
= 0 if another race/ethnicity 
African American black = 1 if African American, not Hispanic = 0 if another race/ethnicity 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander asian 
= 1 if Asian or Pacific islander 
= 0 if another race/ethnicity 
Caucasian white = 1 if Caucasian, not Hispanic = 0 if another race/ethnicity 
Hispanic hispanic = 1 if Hispanic = 0 if another race/ethnicity 
Other other = 1 if race/ethnicity is classified as “other” = 0 if race/ethnicity is defined 
 
f. Education Variables 
The level of education acts as a proxy for the general training and 
education portion of SWOs’ human capital.  Most commissioning programs require that 
an officer possess at least a bachelor’s degree prior to accession; however, there are no 
higher educational requirements in the surface warfare community.  Therefore, officers 
possessing advanced degrees represent higher ability and higher motivation for those 
officers who strive to exceed minimum educational requirements in the SWO 
community.  Promotion boards realize the value added by higher education and normally 
view obtaining a graduate degree as a positive indicator of higher-quality officers.  Table 
20 illustrates the dichotomous education-level categories (i.e., bach, masters, and 







Table 20.   Description of Education-level Variables 
Education Level Variable Name Description 
Bachelor’s Degree bach = 1 if highest education level achieved is a bachelor’s degree = 0 if higher education 
Master’s Degree masters = 1 if highest education level achieved is a master’s degree = 0 if (bach = 1 or postmasters = 1) 
Post-Master’s 
Degree, Professional 
Degree, or PhD  
postmasters 
= 1 if highest education level achieved is a post-master’s 
    degree, a professional degree, or PhD 
= 0 if lower education than post-master’s degree 
 
g. Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
Just as graduate education implies higher quality in the officer corps, 
completing Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) also suggests high motivation 
and a higher level of military-specific (joint service) human capital that is significantly 
valued by the Navy (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2007).  Table 21 shows the 
binary JPME categories, including JPMEph1 and JPMEph2. 
 
Table 21.   Description of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Variables 
JPME Level Variable Name Description 
JPME Phase I JPMEph1 = 1 if completed JPME Phase I, but not JPME Phase II = 0 if not completed JPME Phase I or completed JPME Phase II 
JPME Phase II JPMEph2 = 1 if completed JPME Phase II (and JPME Phase I) = 0 if not completed JPME Phase II 
 
h. Commissioning Source Variables 
Officers’ accession points, or ports of entry, are defined by their 
commissioning sources (Rosen, 1992, p. 227; Asch & Warner, 2001).  Table 22 provides 









United States Naval 
Academy (USNA) academy 
  = 1 if commissioned through USNA 
  = 0 if another commissioning source 
Navy Reserve Officer 
Training Corps 
(NROTC) 
ROTC   = 1 if commissioned through NROTC   = 0 if another commissioning source 
Officer Candidate 
School (OCS) OCS 
  = 1 if commissioned through OCS 





  = 1 if commissioned through the Aviation 
  Cadet Program, Direct Appointment (DA) 
  Program, Aviation Training Program, or 
  “other” commissioning sources 
  = 0 if (academy = 1 or ROTC = 1 or OCS = 1)
 
The portion of the SWO sample that graduated from the United States 
Naval Academy (USNA) was not used in this study, since promotions (based on lineal 
numbers) are systematically different for USNA graduates and depend mostly on internal 
institutional rigidities rather than performance (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005a). 
i. Command Status 
The command status variable (i.e., command) is a dichotomous variable, 
which indicates if an officer is in command of a military unit or has previously held unit 
command (i.e., command = 1 if currently in command or previously commanded a unit; 
and command = 0 if never commanded a military unit).  Since holding a command 
position is highly desirable in the SWO community and requires a rigorous screening 
process, command is an indication of high ability and high quality.  Most Surface 
Warfare Officers do not have the opportunity to assume command until approximately 
9.5 YCS for Lieutenant Commander Command and 15 YCS for Commander Command 
(Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b).  However, limited command opportunities 
also exist at more junior levels, such as command of a Navy reserve center (i.e., Navy 
Operational Support Centers). 
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j. Cash Compensation 
The annual SWO cash compensation variable (i.e., pay) is a continuous 
variable that was calculated by adding the yearly sum of basic pay (i.e., basicpay), the 
annual total of other pays (i.e., otherpay), the annual aggregate of allowances (i.e., 
allowance), and the yearly total of bonuses (i.e., bonus).  As time-series data, each 
continuous variable has a value for each of the 20 years (e.g., pay2006, pay2005, etc.).  
Pay variables for SWOs, who were not on active duty during a particular year, were 
coded zero to eliminate any missing values for pay across the 20-year cross-section of 
cohort data.  Additionally, the logarithmic forms of these continuous independent 
variables were used for ease of interpreting the pay elasticity for each variable.  Table 23 

















Table 23.   Description of Cash Compensation (Pay) Variables 
Pay Variable Variable Name Description 
Total Pay pay  = Total annual cash compensation   = basic pay + other pays + allowances + bonuses 
Log(Total Pay) lpay  = Log(Total annual cash compensation)   = Log(basic pay + other pays + allowances + bonuses) 
Basic Pay basicpay  = Annual basic pay received   = (monthly basic pay x 12) 
Log(Basic Pay) lbasicpay  = Log(Annual basic pay received )  = Log(monthly basic pay x 12) 
Other Pays otherpay 
 = Annual total of other pays (e.g., hardship duty pay,  
 career sea pay, hostile fire and imminent danger pay, 
 diving duty pay, foreign language proficiency pay, etc.) 
 = (total monthly other pays x 12) 
Log(Other Pays) lotherpay  = Log(annual total of other pays)  = Log(total monthly other pays x 12) 
Allowances allowance 
 = Annual total allowances (e.g., Basic Allowance for 
 Housing, Basic Allowance for Subsistence, Family 
 Separation Allowance, Cost of Living Allowance, etc.) 
 = (total monthly allowances x 12) 
Log(Allowances) lallowance  = Log(annual total allowances)  = Log(total monthly allowances x 12) 
Bonuses bonus 
 = Annual total bonus payments (e.g., bonus payments 
 for the Nuclear Career Accession Bonus, Junior SWO 
 CSRB, SWOCP, SWO Critical Skills Bonus, Senior 
 SWO CSRB, etc.) 
Log(Bonuses) lbonus  = Log(annual total bonus payments) 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To evaluate the effectiveness of adding a performance-based compensation 
component to SWO retention bonuses, aspects of the current SWO community were first 
analyzed.  First, differences in partial effects of the performance tiers on 13-year 
retention yielded relative probabilities of retention.  Second, performance-tier 
characteristics econometric models revealed which quality characteristics increased or 
decreased the probability of a SWO being in a particular performance tier.  Third, using a 
panel form of the dataset, pay elasticity models yielded specific pay elasticities for each 
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performance tier, thereby determining the retention effect of increasing or decreasing 
cash compensation.  Finally, using the partial effects of performance tiers on 13-year 
retention and performance-tier pay elasticities, optimization models predicted the 
retention and cost effect of adding a performance-based compensation component to the 
SWO Critical Skills Bonus. 
1. Econometric Models 
For each econometric model, three separate regression techniques were 
performed: 
1. Linear probability model (LPM) with robust standard errors 
2. Univariate probit regression model 
3. Calculations of the partial effects of the explanatory variables from the 
univariate probit regression model (“dprobit”) 
Employing ordinary least squared (OLS) estimation, the linear probability model 
(LPM) with robust standard errors yielded partial effects of each independent variable.  
However, the LPM has several drawbacks as an estimation technique for dealing with a 
binary dependent variable.  Foremost, predicted values are not confined to the normal 
probability range from zero to one (Wooldridge, 2006).  According to Wooldridge 
(2006), intrinsic heteroskedasticity is caused by the inconsistent variance of the error 
term due to the distribution of the independent variable.  Furthermore, the partial effects 
of independent variables are constant in a linear probability model, which could yield 
different results depending on their relative weights for each prediction (Wooldridge, 
2006).   
Due to the drawbacks of LPMs given the binary dependent variables, probit 
models (with corresponding partial effects estimations) provided more accurate 
estimations.  As discussed by Wooldridge (2006), the function used in the probit model 
was the standard normal cumulative distribution function, represented by the following 
equation: 
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where ( )zφ is the standard normal density, represented by: 
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zzφ π −−=      (p. 584). 
Using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), conditional on the explanatory variables, 
this study estimated the partial effects of each independent variable using partial 
derivatives.  The statistics and data analysis computer program, STATA, calculated these 
partial effects using the dprobit function (Wooldridge, 2006). 
a. Model for 13-year Retention 
The first regression model analyzed the difference in the partial effects of 
performance tiers on 13-year retention.  The 13-year port of exit was selected to address 
the shortage of SWOs, which is prominent in the midgrade officer ranks and coincides 
with the SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  The following model specification was used in this 
study: 
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Due to perfect collinearity among other categorical variables, male, white, 
bach, ROTC, and tier1perform were excluded from the regression model.  Additionally, 
pay variables were not included in the model specification, since pay and performance 
tiers may be correlated due to faster promotion directly, causing an increase in cash 
compensation, which would lead to severe model bias.  The probability of retention 
through 13-years of commissioned service, Pr(retention13yr), is the z in the cumulative 
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distribution function of the probit model.  The coefficients of the explanatory variables in 
the dprobit model yield the partial effects of theβ s from the probit regression model. 
b. Models for Tier Characteristics 
Toward classifying which indicators of quality best predict assignment to 
a particular performance tier, econometric models were developed to predict the 
probability of being categorized as tier-1, tier-2, and tier-3 performers.  These regressions 
determine the validity of the performance proxies, which are based on time to promotion 
to O-4.  The model specification for tier-1 performers is as follows: 
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Pr(tier1perform) is the z in the cumulative distribution function for the 
probit model; therefore, the dprobit model predicts the partial effects of the independent 
variables on the probability of being a tier-1 performer.  Similar regression models were 
developed using tier2perfom and tier3perform as binary dependent variables to gather 
insight into the quality characteristics that define each performance tier. 
c. Models for Pay Elasticity 
Calculating the elasticity of pay by performance tier was a critical step in 
evaluating the effectiveness of adding a performance-based compensation component to 
SWO retention bonuses.  Since pay varies by year and an overall pay elasticity for each 
performance tier is needed for the optimization models, the dataset was transformed from 
time-series to panel-data form.  This process creates 20 observations (or records) for each 
individual SWO, one for each year of cohort data.  The following is the model 
specification for the pay elasticity models: 
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Separate models were estimated for the sub-samples representing each 
performance tier, so that the pay elasticity (i.e., the partial effects of lpay) for each tier 
could be predicted, holding all other independent variables constant.  Additionally, year 
dummy variables (i.e., YEARdummies) were included in the panel data models to control 
for differences in pay across time, such as inflation or systematic military basic pay 
increases.  Similar to the time-series retention models, Pr(retention13yr) is the z in the 
cumulative distribution function for the probit model.  The dprobit model yielded the 
partial effects of the β s on the probability of retention through 13 YCS for each 
performance tier. 
2. Optimization Models 
Based on performance-based compensation theory, a more optimal method is 
predicted for allocating the SWO Critical Skills Bonus to retain a higher quality SWO 
workforce, while still remaining within a fixed budget.  Payment of different bonus 
amounts to each performance tier will create a performance-based component of the 
bonus program, which rewards higher performing SWOs with higher bonus payments.  
To create the optimization models, it is assumed that all SWOs retaining through 13 YCS 
accept the 3-year obligation option for the SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  If a SWO intends 
to retain to 13 YCS (completing the first year of a three-year obligation of the SWO 
Critical Skills Bonus), accepting the monetary portion of the bonus is only logical.  Based 
on this assumption, the composition of the retained SWO community can be adjusted 
through optimization models by using two objective functions: 
1. Maximize 13-year SWO retention  
2. Maximize retention bonus differential between performance tiers. 
 184
However, the first step to developing optimization models involves calculating the 
present value of the SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  All financial computations and 
optimization models were developed using Microsoft Excel’s Solver component. 
a. Present Value of the SWO Critical Skills Bonus 
According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94 
(1992), the federal government uses a 7-percent discount rate for net present value 
calculations.  Therefore, based on the current payment scheme of the SWO Critical Skills 
Bonus for a 3-year obligation, present value (PV) calculations for the $46,000 total 
payment are illustrated in Table 24. 
Table 24.   Present Value (PV) Calculation for the 3-year Obligation Option of the SWO 




(in Yrs) Payment 
PV of 
Payment 
LCDR+2 0 $22,000.00 $22,000.00 
LCDR+3 1 $12,000.00 $11,214.95 
LCDR+4 2 $12,000.00 $10,481.26 
 Totals: $46,000.00 $43,696.22 
 
Based on these calculations, the net present value (NPV) for the 3-year obligation option 
of the SWO Critical Skills Bonus is $43,696.22. 
b. Maximizing 13-year Retention 
To optimize the SWO Critical Skills Bonus program, the number of SWOs 
retaining through 13 YCS is maximized through the first optimization model.  The 
decision variables are: 
• Tier1—the number of tier-1 performers retained 
• Tier2—the number of tier-2 performers retained 
• Tier3—the number of tier-3 performers retained 
• P1—the NPV of the retention bonus for tier-1 performers 
• P2—the NPV of the retention bonus for tier-2 performers 
• P3—the NPV of the retention bonus for tier-3 performers 
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The objective function is to maximize total SWO 13-year retention (i.e., MAXIMIZE 
Total Retention = Tier1 + Tier2 + Tier3), subject to the constraints contained in Table 
25. 
Table 25.   13-year Retention Optimization Model Constraints and Definitions 
Constraints Constraint Equations 
Total Budget ( ) ( ) ( )* * *Tier1 P1 Tier2 P2 Tier3 P3 Total Budget+ + ≤  
Bonus 
















oldP1 P≥  
Tier-1 Available 
Pool of LCDRs ( )Tier1 Tier1Available≤  
Tier-2 Available 
Pool of LCDRs ( )Tier2 Tier2Available≤  
Tier-3 Available 
Pool of LCDRs ( )Tier3 Tier3Available≤  
Tier1 Definition 









ε⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
Tier2 Definition 









ε⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
Tier3 Definition 









ε⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
Non-negativity 
Constraints P1, P2, P3, Tier1, Tier2, Tier3 ≥ 0 
Integer 
Constraints Tier1, Tier2, Tier3 must be integers 
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Definitions: Tier1Available = Number of tier-1 performers promoted to LCDR 
                     Tier2Available = Number of tier-2 performers promoted to LCDR 
                     Tier3Available = Number of tier-3 performers promoted to LCDR 
                     Tier1Retention = Probability of 13-year retention for tier 1 
                     Tier2Retention = Probability of 13-year retention for tier 2 
                     Tier3Retention = Probability of 13-year retention for tier 3 
                    Tier1ε  = Pay elasticity of tier-1 performers 
                    Tier2ε  = Pay elasticity of tier-2 performers 
                    Tier3ε  = Pay elasticity of tier-3 performers 
                    oldP  = NPV of current SWO Critical Skills Bonus ($43,696.22) 
 
The budget constraint ensures that the proposed performance-based 
component of the SWO Critical Skills Bonus does not cost the Navy any more than the 
current program.  The bonus hierarchy constraints create the performance-based 
component of the bonus structure.  In other words, tier-1 performers are paid higher than 
tier-2 performers, and tier-2 performers are paid more than tier-3 performers.  The 
retention probability constraints guarantee that the retention probabilities for each 
performance tier will remain in the normal probability range between 0 and 1, when the 
probabilities are adjusted for the elasticity of pay as the bonus payment scheme changes.  
Though not a binding constraint, the P1 retention bonus constraint secures a higher bonus 
payout for tier-1 performers than the current SWO Critical Skills Bonus permits.  The 
“available pool” constraints ensure that number of retained SWOs through 13 YCS does 
not exceed the number of available Lieutenant Commanders. 
The tier definition constraints use the retention probabilities and pay 
elasticities derived from the probit regression models for each performance tier.  For each 
tier, the baseline probability of retention through 13 YCS is modified by the product of 
the pay elasticity and the percent change in the bonus payment.  Holding performance tier 
constant, this modified 13-year retention probability is applied to the number of available 
Lieutenant Commanders to yield the actual number of retained SWOs.  This 
methodology ensures that the optimization model results conform to the empirical 
findings from the econometric models. 
Finally, to produce realistic results for the decision variables, the number 
of SWOs in each performance tier must be positive and integers. Additionally, the  
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resulting bonus payments for each performance tier must be positive.  Negative bonus 
payments would imply that the Navy is punishing officers for retaining by withholding 
basic pay. 
c. Maximizing the Retention Bonus Differential between 
Performance Tiers 
The second optimization model builds upon the results of the first 
optimization model that maximizes 13-year retention.  Since all constraints in the first 
optimization model are not necessarily binding, the second model adjusts the 
performance tier composition of the retained SWO population.  This optimization model 
maximizes the retention bonus differential between performance tiers, while constraining 
the total number of retained SWOs.  Tournament theory suggests this pay differential 
between levels will elicit more effort from SWOs.  Therefore, the Navy should provide 
greater compensation to higher performers, encouraging a higher level of performance. 
(Lazear & Rosen, 1981) 
The decision variables remain the same for both optimization models.  
However, the objective function of the second model is to maximize the bonus 
differential between performance tiers (i.e., MAXIMIZE (P1-P2) + (P1-P3)).  The same 
constraints apply for both optimization models; however, the bonus differential model 
adds a constraint for 13-year SWO retention to maintain the same retention rate as the 
first optimization model. 
E. HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
The following provides a summary of the three hypothesized effects of significant 
explanatory variables in this study: 
• The relationship between performance and SWO retention will be 
“curvilinear,” where tier-1 performers and tier-3 performers have 
lower probabilities of retention than tier-2 performers. 
• Quality variables (e.g., graduate education, JPME, and command 
status) will have a positive effect on the probability of 
classification as a tier-1 performer and a negative effect on the 
probability of being a tier-3 performer. 
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• Pay elasticity will be higher for tier-1 performers than for their 
lower performing counterparts, tier-2 performers and tier-3 
performers. 
1. “Curvilinear” Relationship between Performance and Retention 
Studying employee data in a large civilian firm, Trevor et al. (1997) found a 
“curvilinear” relationship between performance and employee retention, such that high 
performing employees and low performing employees had much lower survival 
probabilities than average performers (p. 45).  Additionally, Gibbs (2006) discovered that 
the highest performing China Lake employees (in Grades 3 and 4) had higher 
probabilities of leaving the organization than average- and lower-performing employees.  
Therefore, it is hypothesized that SWO retention will display a “curvilinear” relationship 
with performance tiers.  Tier-1 performers are predicted to have lower probabilities of 
retention than tier-2 performers, and tier-3 performers are also predicted to have lower 
probabilities of retention than tier-2 performers.  Furthermore, tier-1 performers are 
expected to have slightly higher retention rates than tier-3 performers, since poor 
performance in the Navy is unrewarded.  Internal labor market forces are estimated to 
push poor performers out of the organization at a higher rate than external market forces 
(i.e., civilian job opportunities) pull high performers from the Navy (Sturman et al., 
2003). 
2. Effect of Quality Variables on Performance Tiers 
Based on the assumption that promotion is a viable proxy for performance in the 
SWO community, the tiered performance categories were developed using time-to-
promote to Lieutenant Commander.  O-4 promotion boards positively favor measures of 
high quality, motivation, and performance, such as: graduate education, completion of 
JPME Phases I and II, and command opportunity (Asch & Warner, 2001; Secretary of the 
Navy, 2007b).  These measures are expected to have a positive effect on the probability 
of classification as a tier-1 performer and a negative effect on the probability of being 
categorized a tier-3 performer. 
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3. Pay Elasticity Differences between Performance Tiers 
Higher performers may receive more motivation from intrinsic sources (e.g., 
patriotism, leadership opportunities, and job security) rather than extrinsic sources (e.g., 
higher pay) (Norman, 1971; Strickler, 2006).  This would suggest lower pay elasticity for 
higher performers compared to average or lower performers.  However, Lazear (1989) 
argues that similar pay for both high performers and low performers leads to 
dissatisfaction and a higher propensity to leave the organization.  Since high-performing 
and higher-quality SWOs generally have more military-specific and general human 
capital, they are more likely to have better-paying job offers in the civilian sector (Rosen, 
1992; Baker et al., 1994a; Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b).  If these SWOs leave at a higher 
rate than their lower performing counterparts based on perceived pay inequity, then 
increasing military pay is expected to close the civilian-military pay gap.  Therefore, 
high-performing SWOs are hypothesized to have larger pay elasticities than their lower-
performing peers.  A tier-1 performer is predicted to have a higher pay elasticity than a 
tier-2 performer, and a tier-2 performer’s pay elasticity is anticipated to be higher than a 
tier-3 performer’s pay elasticity. 
F. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1. Performance-tiered SWO Sample 
The sample contains 1,331 Surface Warfare Officers who promoted to the rank of 
Lieutenant Commander (O-4) and were subsequently assigned into the three performance 
tiers.  Table 26 presents descriptive statistics for the portion of the SWO sample 







Table 26.   Descriptive Statistics for the Performance-tiered SWO Sample 
Variable # of Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
age 1331 24.4688 2.9217 
dependents 1331 2.2675 1.4875 
prienlist 1331 0.2449 0.4302 
female 1331 0.0406 0.1974 
amerindian 1331 0.0053 0.0724 
asian 1331 0.0323 0.1769 
black 1331 0.1074 0.3098 
hispanic 1331 0.0631 0.2433 
other 1331 0.0098 0.0984 
white 1331 0.7821 0.4130 
married 1331 0.8272 0.3782 
bach 1331 0.7288 0.4448 
masters 1331 0.2622 0.4400 
postmasters 1331 0.0090 0.0946 
JPMEph1 1331 0.0233 0.1509 
JPMEph2 1331 0.0128 0.1123 
OCS 1331 0.2757 0.4471 
othercomm 1331 0.0676 0.2512 
ROTC 1331 0.6566 0.4750 
command 1331 0.0887 0.2844 
tier1perform 1331 0.3516 0.4777 
tier2perform 1331 0.5973 0.4906 
tier3perform 1331 0.0511 0.2203 
retention13yr 902 0.7506 0.4329 
 
As a proxy for maturity level, the continuous variable age has a mean of 24.5 
years, with a 2.9-year standard deviation.  Based on the prior-enlisted variable, 24.5 
percent of the sample spent at least 4 years as prior enlisted service members.  Few 
SWOs possessed the quality characteristics desired by promotion boards, such as 
masters, postmasters, JPMEph1, JPMEph2, and command.  Of the entire performance-
tiered sample, 26.22 percent possess master’s degrees, 0.9 percent possess at least a post-
master’s degree, 2.33 percent have completed JPME Phase I, 1.28 percent have 
completed JPME Phase II, and 8.87 percent have held command.  The performance tiers 
(i.e., tier1perform, tier2perform, and tier3perform) establish the performance cutoffs 
used in the econometric and optimization models.  The sample distribution is as follows: 
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35.16 percent are tier-1 performers, 59.73 percent are tier-2 performers, and 5.11 percent 
are tier-3 performers.  Based on the sample mean, the 13-year retention rate is 75.06 
percent, which reflects a conditional probability dependent on promotion to O-4.  
Therefore, this 13-year retention rate is conditional on retention through at least 9 YCS. 
The mean of the 13-year retention variable is calculated from fewer observations 
than for other variables (i.e., 902 compared to 1,331 observations).  Some SWOs may 
stay beyond 13 YCS; however, due to the DMDC dataset not continuing beyond 
December 2006, the data is not mature enough to capture service to 13 YCS for newly 
minted Lieutenant Commanders.  For example, SWOs who promoted to O-4 in 2004 or 
later and have only served between 9 YCS and 10 YCS do not have the opportunity to 
impact the 13-year retention rate.  This delta in the number observations is observable in 
the following tables as well. 
2. Characteristics of Each Performance Tier 
To establish three performance tiers, the sample is divided by time to promote to 
O-4.  Table 27 displays the time to promote to O-4 for the three tiers. 
 
Table 27.   Descriptive Statistics for Time to Promote to O-4 by Performance Tier 






Deviation Min Max 
tier1perform 468 3525.553 99.5432 3287 3652 
tier2perform 795 3756.122 79.3995 3653 4013 
tier3perform 68 4174.441 96.5801 4020 4369 
 
The mean number of days to promote in the tier-1 performance category is 3,526 
days, or approximately 9.66 years.  The promotion window for tier-1 performers 
indicates officers who are on the “fast track” and correspond to officers promoted “below 
zone,” thereby promoting in the least amount of time (i.e., between 9 YCS and 10 YCS).  
Tier-2 performers promote between 10 YCS and 11 YCS, and they represent “in zone” 
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promotions, while tier-3 performers promote the slowest (i.e., between 11 and 12 YCS), 
corresponding to the “below zone” promotion category. (Secretary of the Navy, 2006, pp. 
8-9) 
Table 28, Table 29, and Table 30 display descriptive statistics for tier-1, tier-2, 
and tier-3 performers, respectively. 
 
Table 28.   Descriptive Statistics for Tier-1 Performers 
Variable # of Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
age 468 25.1987 3.0746 
dependents 468 2.3419 1.5578 
prienlist 468 0.3568 0.4796 
female 468 0.0470 0.2119 
amerindian 468 0.0085 0.0922 
asian 468 0.0214 0.1448 
black 468 0.0962 0.2951 
hispanic 468 0.0641 0.2452 
other 468 0.0000 0.0000 
white 468 0.8098 0.3929 
married 468 0.8483 0.3591 
bach 468 0.7585 0.4284 
masters 468 0.2286 0.4204 
postmasters 468 0.0128 0.1126 
JPMEph1 468 0.0150 0.1215 
JPMEph2 468 0.0021 0.0462 
OCS 468 0.4017 0.4908 
othercomm 468 0.0940 0.2922 
ROTC 468 0.5043 0.5005 
command 468 0.0684 0.2527 
retention13yr 155 0.8452 0.3629 
 














Table 29.   Descriptive Statistics for Tier-2 Performers 
Variable # of Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
age 795 24.1333 2.8038 
dependents 795 2.3006 1.4577 
prienlist 795 0.1899 0.3925 
female 795 0.0327 0.1780 
amerindian 795 0.0038 0.0614 
asian 795 0.0377 0.1907 
black 795 0.1119 0.3155 
hispanic 795 0.0642 0.2452 
other 795 0.0138 0.1169 
white 795 0.7686 0.4220 
married 795 0.8340 0.3723 
bach 795 0.6918 0.4620 
masters 795 0.3006 0.4588 
postmasters 795 0.0075 0.0866 
JPMEph1 795 0.0302 0.1712 
JPMEph2 795 0.0201 0.1405 
OCS 795 0.2038 0.4031 
othercomm 795 0.0553 0.2288 
ROTC 795 0.7409 0.4384 
command 795 0.1082 0.3108 
















Table 30.   Descriptive Statistics for Tier-3 Performers 
Variable # of Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
age 68 23.3677 2.0289 
dependents 68 1.3676 0.9759 
prienlist 68 0.1176 0.3246 
female 68 0.0882 0.2857 
amerindian 68 0.0000 0.0000 
asian 68 0.0441 0.2069 
black 68 0.1324 0.3414 
hispanic 68 0.0441 0.2069 
other 68 0.0294 0.1702 
white 68 0.7500 0.4362 
married 68 0.6029 0.4929 
bach 68 0.9559 0.2069 
masters 68 0.0441 0.2069 
postmasters 68 0.0000 0.0000 
JPMEph1 68 0.0000 0.0000 
JPMEph2 68 0.0000 0.0000 
OCS 68 0.2500 0.4362 
othercomm 68 0.0294 0.1702 
ROTC 68 0.7206 0.4520 
command 68 0.0000 0.0000 
retention13yr 61 0.2459 0.4342 
 
Demographic characteristics vary among performance tiers.  A continuous 
variable, age, represents maturity at accession.  Tier-1 performers exhibit the greatest 
maturity at accession, with an average age of 25.2 years.  When compared to tier-1 
performers, accession age decreases among tier-2 performers with a mean age of 24.1 
years, and the maturity level further decreases among tier-3 performers at an average 
accession age of 23.4 years.  However, the number of dependents supported by Surface 
Warfare Officers is relatively constant among tiers.  Tier-1 and tier-2 performers support 
the largest number of dependents (similar means of 2.3 dependents), while tier-3 
performers support a smaller number of dependents (a mean of 1.4 dependents).  By 
gender, 4.7 percent of tier-1 performers, 3.3 percent of tier-2 performers, and 8.8 percent 
of tier-3 performers are female.  On average, tier-1 and tier-2 performers exhibit nearly 
the same marital status, while tier-3 performers have a significantly lower marriage rate.   
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In examining the prior-enlisted effect, 35.7 percent of tier-1 performers, 19.0 
percent of tier-2 performers, and only 11.8 percent of tier-3 performers have at least 4 
years of prior-enlisted experience.  This implies that prior-enlisted experience may 
translate to other observable characteristics that make a SWO more desirable to the O-4 
promotion board.  Since prior-enlisted experience is an investment in military-specific 
training, the level of human capital may be elevated among SWOs who once wore blue-
shirts and dungarees. 
Tier-1 and tier-2 performers have unexpected education group means.  Nearly 23 
percent of tier-1 performers have at least a master’s degree, while approximately 30 
percent of tier-2 performers have at least a master’s degree.  A stark difference from tier-
1 and tier-2 performers, only 4.4 percent of the lower-quality, tier-3 SWOs have greater 
than a bachelor’s degree.  These observations indicate that the performance tiers are 
capturing performance. 
Analyzing the 13-year retention rate, tier-1 performers exhibit the largest value to 
the SWO community and have the greatest mean retention rate of 84.52 percent.  Tier-2 
performers have a mean retention rate of 77.41 percent, and tier-3 performers retain at a 
dismal rate of 24.59 percent.  The total number of observations for the retention13yr 
variable is smaller than the observations for other variables due to the maturity of the 
time series dataset.  Figure 35 is a graphical representation of the mean retention rates for 
the three performance tiers. 
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Figure 35.   Effect of Performance Tier on 13-year Retention Based on Descriptive 
Statistics 
Among the three performance tiers, Table 31 displays the t-test results for the 
difference in group means for the quality characteristics: master’s degree, post-master’s 













Table 31.   T-test for Tier Differences in Group Means for Quality Characteristics 
 # of Obs. Mean 
Standard 




 Tier-1 Performer 468 0.2286 0.4204 
   Non-Tier-1 863 0.2804 0.4495 
2.0526 1329 0.0403 
 Tier-2 Performer 795 0.3006 0.4588 
   Non-Tier-2 536 0.2052 0.4042 
-3.9003 1329 0.0001 
 Tier-3 Performer 68 0.0441 0.2069 
   Non-Tier-3 1263 0.2740 0.4462 
4.2224 1329 0.0000 
Post-Master’s Degree, Professional Degree, or PhD 
 Tier-1 Performer 468 0.0128 0.1126 
   Non-Tier-1 863 0.0070 0.0831 
-1.0811 1329 0.2799 
 Tier-2 Performer 795 0.0075 0.0866 
   Non-Tier-2 536 0.0112 0.1053 
0.6899 1329 0.4904 
 Tier-3 Performer 68 0.0000 0.0000 
   Non-Tier-3 1263 0.0095 0.0970 
0.8070 1329 0.4198 
JPME Phase I 
 Tier-1 Performer 468 0.0150 0.1215 
   Non-Tier-1 863 0.0278 0.1645 
1.4845 1329 0.1379 
 Tier-2 Performer 795 0.0302 0.1712 
   Non-Tier-2 536 0.0131 0.1136 
-2.0337 1329 0.0422 
 Tier-3 Performer 68 0.0000 0.0000 
   Non-Tier-3 1263 0.0245 0.1548 
1.3071 1329 0.1914 
JPME Phase II 
 Tier-1 Performer 468 0.0021 0.0462 
   Non-Tier-1 863 0.0185 0.1350 
2.5489 1329 0.0109 
 Tier-2 Performer 795 0.0201 0.1405 
   Non-Tier-2 536 0.0019 0.0432 
-2.9167 1329 0.0036 
 Tier-3 Performer 68 0.0000 0.0000 
   Non-Tier-3 1263 0.0135 0.1153 
0.9625 1329 0.3360 
Command Status 
 Tier-1 Performer 468 0.0684 0.2527 
   Non-Tier-1 863 0.0997 0.2997 
1.9179 1329 0.0553 
 Tier-2 Performer 795 0.1082 0.3108 
   Non-Tier-2 536 0.0597 0.2372 
-3.0598 1329 0.0023 
 Tier-3 Performer 68 0.0000 0.0000 
   Non-Tier-3 1263 0.0934 0.2911 
2.6452 1329 0.0083 
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In general, t-tests determine whether the group means between performance 
categories are statistically different from each other.  Because these quality variables are 
binary, the differences are expressed in percentage points (ppts).  The group mean for 
tier-1 performers is compared to the group mean of non-tier-1 performers, which includes 
both tier-2 performers and tier-3 performers.  The group mean for tier-2 performers is 
compared to non-tier-2 performers (i.e., tier-1 performers and tier-3 performers), and the 
group mean for tier-3 performers is compared to non-tier-3 performers (i.e., tier-1 
performers and tier-2 performers).  The p-values from the t-tests determine the statistical 
significance of the difference in group means between the performance tiers.  The 
following sections present the t-test results for each quality characteristic. (Wooldridge, 
2006) 
a. Master’s Degree 
Analyzing group means, 22.9 percent of tier-1 performers have a master’s 
degree, while 28.0 percent of non-tier-1 performers earned a master’s degree.  Based on 
the t-test, this difference is statistically significant.  Therefore, non-tier-1 performers are 
5.1 percentage points more likely to have a master’s degree than tier-1 performers.  This 
result is counterintuitive, since tier-1 performers are expected to have a higher probability 
of earning a master’s degree.  This discrepancy may be attributable to the significantly 
higher probability that tier-2 performers will earn a master’s degree.  If tier-2 performers 
realize their mediocrity in on-the-job performance, then they may try to improve their 
service record by adding graduate education to their résumé. 
Comparing tier-2 performers to non-tier-2 performers, tier-2 performers 
have a probability of earning a master’s degree that is 9.5-ppts greater than non-tier-2 
performers, which is statistically significant.  Furthermore, non-tier-3 performers have a 
23.0-ppt greater probability of acquiring a master’s degree (which is statistically 
significant at the 1-percent level) compared to lower-performing, tier-3 performers. 
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b. Post-Master’s Degree 
Performing t-tests for differences in group means for the post-master’s 
degree variable produced large p-values for all three performance tiers, which indicate 
that there is no statistical difference between the group means among the performance 
tiers.  Therefore, the group mean for tier-1 performers of 1.3 percent is statistically no 
different than the 0.7 percent group mean for non-tier-1 performers.  Similarly, there is 
no statistical difference between tier-2 performers and non-tier-2 performers, and 
between tier-3 performers and non-tier-3 performers. 
c. JPME Phase I 
Based on t-test results, only one tier had a statistically significant 
difference in group means: tier-2 performers.  Statistically significant at the 5-percent 
level, tier-2 performers have a probability of completing JPME Phase I that is 1.7-ppts 
greater than non-tier-2 performers.  Since this difference is relatively small, the effect 
may not be practically significant. 
d. JPME Phase II 
Testing the difference in group means for JPME Phase II proved 
statistically significant in two of the three performance tier comparisons.  The probability 
that non-tier-1 performers will have JPME Phase II complete is 1.6-ppts greater than for 
tier-1 performers.  Additionally, tier-2 performers have a probability of completing JPME 
Phase II that is 1.8-ppts larger than non-tier-2 performers. 
e. Command Status 
Testing the influence of command status (i.e., whether or not a SWO was 
selected to command a unit) between group means showed statistical significance among 
all three performance tiers.  However, the difference between tier-1 performers and non-
tier-1 performers was statistically significant at the 90-percent confidence level, while the 
other two were statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.  Non-tier-1 
performers have a probability of having held command that is 3.1-percentage points 
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greater than tier-1 performers, while tier-2 performers have a 4.9-ppt greater probability 
of being selected for command compared to non-tier-2 performers.  Moreover, non-tier-3 
performers have a probability of selection for command that is 9.3 ppts greater than tier-3 
performers.  Therefore, being a tier-2 performer increases the probability of having 
previously held or currently holding command, when compared to the other two 
performance tiers.  
3. Gender Differences 
Table 32 and Table 33 display descriptive statistics separated by gender.  Both 
tables have a difference in observations between the 13-year retention variable and the 
other independent variables due to the aforementioned lack of data maturity.  Particularly, 
402 observations are lost in the male SWO sub-sample, while the female sub-sample 



















Table 32.   Descriptive Statistics for Male SWOs 
Variable # of Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
age 1277 24.4793 2.9284 
dependents 1277 2.3195 1.4759 
prienlist 1277 0.2459 0.4308 
amerindian 1277 0.0055 0.0739 
asian 1277 0.0305 0.1721 
black 1277 0.1057 0.3076 
hispanic 1277 0.0634 0.2438 
other 1277 0.0102 0.1004 
white 1277 0.7847 0.4112 
married 1277 0.8395 0.3672 
bach 1277 0.7283 0.4450 
masters 1277 0.2631 0.4405 
postmasters 1277 0.0086 0.0924 
JPMEph1 1277 0.0235 0.1515 
JPMEph2 1277 0.0125 0.1113 
OCS 1277 0.2764 0.4474 
othercomm 1277 0.0681 0.2521 
ROTC 1277 0.6554 0.4754 
command 1277 0.0893 0.2852 
tier1perform 1277 0.3493 0.4769 
tier2perform 1277 0.6022 0.4896 
tier3perform 1277 0.0486 0.2150 







Table 33.   Descriptive Statistics for Female SWOs 
Variable # of Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
age 54 24.2222 2.7723 
dependents 54 1.0370 1.2126 
prienlist 54 0.2222 0.4196 
amerindian 54 0.0000 0.0000 
asian 54 0.0741 0.2644 
black 54 0.1481 0.3586 
hispanic 54 0.0556 0.2312 
other 54 0.0000 0.0000 
white 54 0.7222 0.4521 
married 54 0.5370 0.5033 
bach 54 0.7407 0.4423 
masters 54 0.2407 0.4315 
postmasters 54 0.0185 0.1361 
JPMEph1 54 0.0185 0.1361 
JPMEph2 54 0.0185 0.1361 
OCS 54 0.2593 0.4423 
othercomm 54 0.0556 0.2312 
ROTC 54 0.6852 0.4688 
command 54 0.0741 0.2644 
tier1perform 54 0.4074 0.4960 
tier2perform 54 0.4815 0.5043 
tier3perform 54 0.1111 0.3172 
retention13yr 27 0.6667 0.4804 
 
The majority of the variables have similar means, showing little gender-related 
variation.  However, the SWO community presents unique obstacles to family planning 
(and child-rearing) that are uncommon in civilian employment.  For example, most 
private-sector jobs do not require employees to deploy for several months away from 
home.  Because of distinct challenges in the SWO community, it is not surprising that 
women SWOs have different means among family-related variables.  Women SWOs 
have a 30.3-ppt lower marriage rate than their male counterparts; nearly 84 percent of the 
male sample is married, compared to 53.7 percent for women.  Female SWOs have 50-
percent fewer dependents compared to male SWOs, as well. 
Women demonstrate a higher percentage of tier-1 performance, with 40.7-percent 
of the female sub-sample placed into the tier-1 category, while tier-1 performers only 
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account for 34.9 percent of the male SWO sub-sample.  However, women have a much 
larger percentage of tier-3 performers.  Greater than 11.1 percent of the female sub-
sample are categorized as tier-3 performers, while less than 4.9 percent of the male sub-
sample are in the tier-3 performance category.  Lastly, 60.2 percent of the male sub-
sample is in tier 2, while 48.2 percent of the female sample is in the tier-2 performance 
category. 
Table 34 depicts the results from the t-test for gender difference in group means 
for 13-year retention. 
 
Table 34.   T-test for Gender Difference in Group Means for 13-year Retention 
 # of Obs. Mean 
Standard 
Deviation t-stat Df 
P-Value 
(2-tailed) 
 Male 875 0.7531 0.4314 
 Female 27 0.6667 0.4804 
1.0223 900 0.3069 
 
Based on the t-test for group means, there is statistically no difference in the 
retention rates between male and female SWOs at the 13-year retention level.  This 
evidence contradicts results of past studies on retention among female Surface Warfare 
Officers, such as the study by Crawford et al. (2006).  A possible explanation for the 
difference in results is that earlier studies tend to focus attention on female SWOs at the 
first port of exit, while this study uses the 13-year retention rate that is contingent upon 
promotion to Lieutenant Commander.  Female SWOs, looking to raise children full-time, 
have likely already left active duty well before their O-4 promotion boards. 
4. Surface Warfare Officer Cash Compensation 
Table 35 provides a 20-year snapshot of Surface Warfare Officer annual 
compensation over the period from 1987 through 2006.  Annualized for each calendar 
year, four components comprise the total cash compensation: basic pay, other pays, 
allowances, and bonuses.  The FY 2008 monthly basic pay table, shown in Appendix A, 
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presents the primary component of SWO pay, while Table 23 lists the components of the 
other compensation variables.   The basic pay table is based on rank and years of service.  
Other pays compensate SWOs for harsh work environments or provide compensation for 
specialized training, and include: hardship duty pay, hostile fire pay, and foreign 
language proficiency pay.  Allowances compensate SWOs for the cost of living 
associated with more expensive duty locations and offset additional expenses.  They 
include: Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), 
Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), and Family Separation Allowance.  Finally, bonuses 
such as the SWO Critical Skills Bonus are awarded to SWOs as a retention incentive and 
are limited to specific eligibility requirements, including policy changes over time. 
Table 35.   Descriptive Statistics of Pay by Calendar Year for SWO Sample 
 Whole SWO Sample SWOs Receiving Pay in the CY 







Calendar Year 2006 
basicpay2006 1331 $62,999.76 $27,281.03 1128 $74,337.48 $5,894.68
otherpay2006 1331 $1,339.20 $2,175.38 1128 $1,580.21 $2,281.12
allowance2006 1331 $23,958.03 $14,748.56 1128 $28,269.63 $11,606.26
bonus2006 1331 $169.05 $1,944.91 1128 $199.47 $2,111.39
pay2006 1331 $88,466.04 $39,504.71 1128 $104,386.80 $13,354.29
Calendar Year 2005 
basicpay2005 1331 $61,962.34 $23,129.44 1179 $69,950.70 $6,688.32
otherpay2005 1331 $1,543.78 $2,210.68 1179 $1,742.81 $2,273.89
allowance2005 1331 $22,650.94 $12,434.18 1179 $25,571.17 $9,991.07
bonus2005 1331 $137.49 $1,598.83 1179 $155.22 $1,698.05
pay2005 1331 $86,294.55 $33,225.53 1179 $97,419.89 $12,713.38
Calendar Year 2004 
basicpay2004 1331 $58,925.18 $20,824.79 1196 $65,576.44 $6,792.18
otherpay2004 1331 $1,628.05 $2,118.17 1196 $1,811.82 $2,158.76
allowance2004 1331 $21,608.57 $12,771.85 1196 $24,047.67 $11,083.51
bonus2004 1331 $88.66 $1,293.58 1196 $98.66 $1,364.33
pay2004 1331 $82,250.46 $30,603.39 1196 $91,534.59 $13,850.72
Calendar Year 2003 
basicpay2003 1331 $56,115.63 $18,464.44 1215 $61,473.18 $6,625.42
otherpay2003 1331 $1,650.55 $2,042.75 1215 $1,808.14 $2,070.36
allowance2003 1331 $19,670.12 $11,628.01 1215 $21,548.09 $10,374.50
bonus2003 1331 $92.04 $1,388.72 1215 $100.82 $1,453.25
pay2003 1331 $77,528.34 $27,122.73 1215 $84,930.23 $13,295.61
 205
Calendar Year 2002 
basicpay2002 1331 $52,947.50 $15,820.15 1237 $56,970.99 $6,316.89
otherpay2002 1331 $1,598.26 $2,024.99 1237 $1,719.72 $2,050.23
allowance2002 1331 $16,838.34 $10,333.25 1237 $18,117.89 $9,575.75
bonus2002 1331 $124.53 $1,494.77 1237 $133.99 $1,550.16
pay2002 1331 $71,508.63 $23,479.09 1237 $76,942.59 $13,219.35
Calendar Year 2001 
basicpay2001 1331 $48,757.66 $13,478.45 1252 $51,834.22 $5,791.56
otherpay2001 1331 $1,961.79 $2,613.40 1252 $2,085.58 $2,646.28
allowance2001 1331 $14,771.28 $8,915.12 1252 $15,703.33 $8,357.66
bonus2001 1331 $512.02 $2,686.50 1252 $544.32 $2,766.85
pay2001 1331 $66,002.74 $20,118.46 1252 $70,167.45 $11,741.03
Calendar Year 2000 
basicpay2000 1331 $45,770.64 $12,526.48 1255 $48,542.41 $5,636.21
otherpay2000 1331 $1,065.77 $1,496.36 1255 $1,130.31 $1,517.16
allowance2000 1331 $13,562.56 $9,102.28 1255 $14,383.88 $8,720.64
bonus2000 1331 $145.57 $1,500.04 1255 $154.38 $1,544.39
pay2000 1331 $60,544.54 $18,489.70 1255 $64,210.98 $11,268.31
Calendar Year 1999 
basicpay1999 1331 $41,610.82 $10,609.73 1271 $43,575.14 $5,676.40
otherpay1999 1331 $1,195.54 $1,570.54 1271 $1,251.98 $1,585.06
allowance1999 1331 $12,289.30 $7,829.56 1271 $12,869.44 $7,531.68
bonus1999 1331 $108.63 $1,200.81 1271 $113.76 $1,228.62
pay1999 1331 $55,204.29 $15,723.65 1271 $57,810.31 $10,399.03
Calendar Year 1998 
basicpay1998 1331 $38,373.41 $9,630.60 1280 $39,902.35 $5,949.01
otherpay1998 1331 $1,253.47 $1,654.27 1280 $1,303.42 $1,667.51
allowance1998 1331 $11,445.63 $6,343.32 1280 $11,901.67 $6,034.10
bonus1998 1331 $72.58 $939.58 1280 $75.47 $958.02
pay1998 1331 $51,145.09 $14,028.60 1280 $53,182.90 $9,807.52
Calendar Year 1997 
basicpay1997 1331 $35,407.29 $9,338.22 1285 $36,674.79 $6,618.53
otherpay1997 1331 $1,124.05 $1,381.18 1285 $1,164.29 $1,388.92
allowance1997 1331 $10,075.18 $6,311.77 1285 $10,435.84 $6,123.64
bonus1997 1331 $45.98 $791.79 1285 $47.63 $805.80
pay1997 1331 $46,652.50 $13,481.02 1285 $48,322.55 $10,367.49
Calendar Year 1996 
basicpay1996 1331 $26,796.11 $15,035.91 1057 $33,742.31 $7,080.71
otherpay1996 1331 $756.50 $1,194.54 1057 $952.60 $1,268.93
allowance1996 1331 $7,493.98 $6,683.91 1057 $9,436.60 $6,157.71
bonus1996 1331 $21.04 $471.29 1057 $26.49 $528.77





Calendar Year 1995 
basicpay1995 1331 $27,204.17 $13,344.70 1125 $32,185.56 $7,088.54
otherpay1995 1331 $621.05 $1,124.98 1125 $734.77 $1,189.08
allowance1995 1331 $7,609.42 $6,614.11 1125 $9,002.78 $6,261.68
bonus1995 1331 $15.03 $387.49 1125 $17.78 $421.45
pay1995 1331 $35,449.66 $18,125.33 1125 $41,940.89 $10,781.85
Calendar Year 1994 
basicpay1994 1331 $22,204.05 $15,079.81 953 $31,011.11 $6,654.97
otherpay1994 1331 $495.28 $1,048.68 953 $691.73 $1,183.37
allowance1994 1331 $6,257.27 $5,936.54 953 $8,739.16 $5,246.28
bonus1994 1331 $0.00 $0.00 953 $0.00 $0.00
pay1994 1331 $28,956.60 $19,983.64 953 $40,442.00 $9,639.98
Calendar Year 1993 
basicpay1993 1331 $19,372.90 $14,669.92 889 $29,004.88 $6,529.66
otherpay1993 1331 $365.67 $912.96 889 $547.48 $1,071.78
allowance1993 1331 $5,519.04 $5,261.31 889 $8,263.05 $4,331.33
bonus1993 1331 $37.57 $611.99 889 $56.24 $748.26
pay1993 1331 $25,295.19 $19,337.93 889 $37,871.64 $9,124.88
Calendar Year 1992 
basicpay1992 1331 $16,061.08 $13,915.25 806 $26,522.71 $6,488.61
otherpay1992 1331 $372.27 $975.63 806 $614.75 $1,193.06
allowance1992 1331 $4,774.90 $5,560.48 806 $7,885.10 $5,150.60
bonus1992 1331 $9.02 $279.49 806 $14.89 $359.12
pay1992 1331 $21,217.27 $18,691.79 806 $35,037.45 $9,613.33
Calendar Year 1991 
basicpay1991 1331 $12,538.21 $12,741.18 699 $23,874.61 $6,187.52
otherpay1991 1331 $235.15 $711.91 699 $447.76 $932.94
allowance1991 1331 $3,666.18 $4,325.34 699 $6,980.94 $3,531.95
bonus1991 1331 $0.00 $0.00 699 $0.00 $0.00
pay1991 1331 $16,439.53 $16,711.44 699 $31,303.31 $8,135.45
Calendar Year 1990 
basicpay1990 1331 $9,510.25 $11,178.95 582 $21,749.38 $4,406.99
otherpay1990 1331 $181.04 $594.09 582 $414.02 $843.39
allowance1990 1331 $2,678.71 $3,706.86 582 $6,126.06 $3,209.34
bonus1990 1331 $0.00 $0.00 582 $0.00 $0.00
pay1990 1331 $12,370.00 $14,648.35 582 $28,289.46 $6,329.73
Calendar Year 1989 
basicpay1989 1331 $6,607.11 $9,459.00 552 $15,931.28 $8,194.69
otherpay1989 1331 $52.34 $321.83 552 $126.20 $490.58
allowance1989 1331 $2,011.84 $3,049.31 552 $4,851.02 $2,940.45
bonus1989 1331 $10.52 $144.71 552 $25.36 $223.99





Calendar Year 1988 
basicpay1988 1331 $3,813.29 $7,275.59 517 $9,817.18 $8,796.77
otherpay1988 1331 $32.82 $243.59 517 $84.49 $385.45
allowance1988 1331 $1,595.21 $2,802.22 517 $4,106.81 $3,147.24
bonus1988 1331 $6.01 $134.20 517 $15.47 $215.11
pay1988 1331 $5,447.32 $9,874.43 517 $14,023.95 $11,437.14
Calendar Year 1987 
basicpay1987 1331 $1,946.84 $5,317.33 511 $5,070.93 $7,606.64
otherpay1987 1331 $10.91 $134.45 511 $28.41 $215.96
allowance1987 1331 $959.74 $1,746.62 511 $2,499.83 $2,024.39
bonus1987 1331 $0.00 $0.00 511 $0.00 $0.00
pay1987 1331 $2,917.49 $6,848.31 511 $7,599.17 $9,309.10
 
The “Whole SWO Sample” category consists of 1,331 observations, including 
those officers who promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Commander between 9 YCS and 
12 YCS.  The number of “SWOs Receiving Pay in the CY” varies markedly from the 
“Whole SWO Sample,” dependent on the year being analyzed.  This sub-sample will 
always be smaller than the whole sample due to the time component, since not all SWOs 
who promoted to O-4 served until December of each year and, therefore, left active duty 
earlier.  In calendar year (CY) 1987, for example, only 511 SWOs (e.g., officers in very 
junior ranks, such as O-1s or O-2s) were in the dataset.  Over time, this number increased 
as more officers accessed into the Navy and more retained longer on active duty.  Group 
means in CY 1997 depicted the closest similarity between the “Whole SWO Sample” and 
“SWOs Receiving Pay in the CY.”  Since the “Whole SWO Sample” has zero dollar 
values for years that the SWOs received no compensation (due to officers not being on 
active duty), the total pay for the “Whole SWO Sample” underreports the sample mean 
for each pay in each calendar year. 
G. ECONOMETRIC MODEL RESULTS 
1. 13-year Retention Models 
The results from the 13-year retention regression models are contained in Table 
36.  Column (1) shows the results from the linear probability model (LPM) with robust 
standard errors.  Column (2) displays results from the probit regression model, and 
column (3) presents the partial effects of the independent variables from the probit model. 
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Table 36.   13-year Retention Regression Models 





from Probit Model 
Dependent Variable retention13yr retention13yr retention13yr 
age -0.0090 -0.0348 -0.0103 
 (0.0079) (0.0304) (0.0090) 
dependents 0.0371 0.1482 0.0437 
 (0.0106)*** (0.0441)*** (0.0130)*** 
prienlist 0.0544 0.2067 0.0577 
 (0.0503) (0.2065) (0.0544) 
female 0.0617 0.2250 0.0608 
 (0.0688) (0.3085) (0.0755) 
amerindian -0.1689 -0.6991 -0.2500 
 (0.2202) (0.7221) (0.2867) 
asian 0.0810 0.3026 0.0791 
 (0.0662) (0.3159) (0.0718) 
black 0.0573 0.2065 0.0570 
 (0.0455) (0.1695) (0.0435) 
hispanic -0.0183 -0.0809 -0.0245 
 (0.0670) (0.2176) (0.0677) 
other -0.0390 -0.3855 -0.1287 
 (0.1301) (0.4405) (0.1615) 
married 0.0618 0.1766 0.0543 
 (0.0473) (0.1496) (0.0479) 
masters 0.0692 0.2666 0.0752 
 (0.0281)** (0.1168)** (0.0314)** 
postmasters    
    
JPMEph1 0.1805   
 (0.0272)***   
JPMEph2 0.1570   
 (0.0365)***   
OCS 0.0168 0.0315 0.0092 
 (0.0381) (0.1425) (0.0415) 
othercomm 0.2047 0.8565 0.1739 
 (0.0587)*** (0.3570)** (0.0432)*** 
command 0.2008 1.5127 0.2524 
 (0.0200)*** (0.3673)*** (0.0229)*** 
tier2perform -0.0638 -0.2643 -0.0738 
 (0.0333)* (0.1449)* (0.0380)* 
tier3perform -0.4980 -1.4116 -0.5133 
 (0.0651)*** (0.2262)*** (0.0771)*** 
Constant 0.8309 1.0888  
 (0.1843)*** (0.7104)  
Observations 902 855 855 
R-squared 0.18   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses    
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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When compared to tier-2 and tier-3 performers, holding all else constant, being a 
tier-1 performer increases the probability of 13-year retention.  Based on the partial 
effects from the probit model, tier-2 performers have a 7.38-percentage point (ppt) lower 
retention probability than tier-1 performers, which is statistically significant at the 10-
percent significance level.  Even more significant (at the 1-percent level), tier-3 
performers have a 51.33-ppt lower retention probability than tier-1 performers.  These 
results differ from the predicted “curvilinear” relationship between performance and 
retention, since tier-1 performers have a higher retention rate than tier-2 performers. 
Figure 36 displays the effect of each performance tier on the 13-year retention 
rate, including both the raw retention rate from the descriptive statistics and the adjusted 
rate from regression results. 
 

























Figure 36.   Effect of Performance Tier on 13-year Retention—Comparison of Descriptive 
Statistics and Regression Results 
The retention rates for each tier are comparable between the values generated 
from the probit model and the sample means.  Under both scenarios, tier-1 performers 
have an average 13-year retention rate of 84.52 percent.  Adjusted for performance tier 
partial effects from the probit model, tier-2 performers have a 13-year retention rate of 
77.14 percent, compared to the retention rate of 77.41 percent from the descriptive 
statistics.  Tier-3 performers retain at a meager 33.19 percent based on regression results, 
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contrasted to the 24.59-percent retention rate from the sample mean among tier-3 
performers.  The similarities between the raw and adjusted retention rates are consistent 
with the hypothesis that the performance proxy (i.e., time to promote to O-4) is capturing 
all observable performance measures. 
The partial effects of other independent variables were found to be statistically 
significant in the 13-year retention models, analyzing the results at the margin while 
holding all else equal (i.e., ceteris paribus).  Significant at the 1-percent significance 
level, the number of dependents had a positive effect on 13-year retention.  One 
additional family member (or dependent) increases the probability of retention by 4.37-
percentage points.  Officers taking care of larger families generally value the job security 
and the retirement annuity the Navy provides, and may be more inclined to retain for at 
least 20 years of service. 
Compared to SWOs with only a bachelor’s degree, officers who possess a 
master’s degree have a statistically significant 7.52-ppt increase in the probability of 
retention through 13 YCS.  This may indicate that the SWO community values higher 
education and provides incentives for graduate degrees, which increase the probability of 
retention.  The postmasters independent variable dropped from the econometric models 
due to unobserved collinearity.  Though JPME Phase I and Phase II are both positive and 
statistically significant in the LPM results, both joint education milestones predict 
retention perfectly and are, therefore, left out of the probit model.  According to the 
human capital model, SWOs investing time and energy to earn joint education (i.e., 
military-specific training) are more likely to retain in the Navy.  This increase in human 
capital is non-transferable to other civilian jobs. 
The variable othercomm, representing other commissioning sources (e.g., 
Aviation Cadet Program, Direct Appointment Program, Aviation Training Program, etc.), 
yields a positive and statistically significant partial effect on the probability of 13-year 
retention.  There is an unobservable factor that is unique to these commissioning sources 
that capitulates a 17.39-ppt increase in the probability of 13-year retention when 
compared to SWOs commissioned through the NROTC program. 
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Command status, command, has a statistically significant effect on retention.  
Having held, or currently holding, command of a unit increases the probability of 13-year 
retention by 25.24 percentage points, controlling for all other independent variables.  
Since holding command is a major career milestone in a SWO’s career, investing time in 
such a position yields Navy-specific benefits (such as positional prestige and increased 
promotion opportunities) that are forfeited if the officer decides to leave the service. 
2. Tier Characteristics Models 
a. Tier-1 Characteristics 
Analyzing the quality characteristics of tier-1 performers, Table 37 
contains the results from regression models that predict the probability of being classified 















Table 37.   Tier-1 Characteristics Regression Models 





from Probit Model 
Dependent Variable tier1perform tier1perform tier1perform 
age 0.0043 0.0122 0.0045 
 (0.0078) (0.0204) (0.0075) 
dependents 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002 
 (0.0104) (0.0298) (0.0110) 
prienlist 0.0884 0.2290 0.0861 
 (0.0500)* (0.1335)* (0.0510)* 
female 0.0793 0.2281 0.0870 
 (0.0704) (0.1826) (0.0715) 
amerindian 0.1409 0.3593 0.1392 
 (0.1770) (0.4969) (0.1980) 
asian -0.0921 -0.2962 -0.1022 
 (0.0622) (0.2231) (0.0708) 
black -0.0973 -0.2708 -0.0950 
 (0.0419)** (0.1206)** (0.0399)** 
hispanic -0.0597 -0.1573 -0.0563 
 (0.0561) (0.1495) (0.0517) 
other -0.4177   
 (0.0474)***   
married 0.0285 0.0884 0.0322 
 (0.0398) (0.1153) (0.0415) 
masters -0.0411 -0.1227 -0.0447 
 (0.0288) (0.0855) (0.0307) 
postmasters -0.0420 -0.1323 -0.0474 
 (0.1528) (0.3803) (0.1321) 
JPMEph1 -0.0972 -0.2981 -0.1026 
 (0.0754) (0.2602) (0.0823) 
JPMEph2 -0.2602 -1.2194 -0.2969 
 (0.0521)*** (0.5390)** (0.0612)*** 
OCS 0.1837 0.4981 0.1889 
 (0.0370)*** (0.0994)*** (0.0382)*** 
othercomm 0.1587 0.4536 0.1760 
 (0.0598)*** (0.1620)*** (0.0642)*** 
command -0.0564 -0.1709 -0.0611 
 (0.0433) (0.1362) (0.0470) 
Constant 0.1780 -0.8806  
 (0.1789) (0.4764)*  
Observations 1331 1318 1318 
R-squared 0.08   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses    
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
None of the quality variables (i.e., graduate education, completion of 
JPME Phases I and II, and command opportunity) have the hypothesized positive effect 
on being categorized into tier 1.  In fact, the only statistically significant quality variable, 
 213
JMPE Phase II, has a large negative partial effect.  This result is counterintuitive, since 
completing JMPE Phase II is a positive factor during SWO promotion boards. 
However, having at least 4 years of prior-enlisted experience increases the 
probability of being categorized as a tier-1 performer by 8.61-ppts, which is statistically 
significant at the 10-percent significance level.  Since prior-enlisted experience increases 
a SWO’s human capital based on more military-specific training, this experience is 
reflected in early promotion rates and contributes toward classification as a tier-1 
performer. 
Race and ethnicity variables yield mixed results in the tier-1 
characteristics regression models.  Compared to Caucasian SWOs, holding all other 
independent variables constant, being African American reduces the probability of being 
categorized as a tier-1 performer by 9.5-percentage points.  Additionally, SWOs who are 
classified as being other races or ethnicities (i.e., the variable other) are excluded in the 
probit model, since this categorization perfectly predicts officers not being categorized as 
tier-1 performers. 
SWOs accessing through the NROTC commissioning program have a 
reduced probability of being classified as a tier-1 performer, compared to OCS and other 
commissioning sources.  Statistically significant at the 1-percent level, commissioning 
through OCS increases the probability of being categorized in tier 1 by 18.89-ppts, and 
accession through other commissioning programs increase the probability of being a tier-
1 performer by 17.6-ppts. 
b. Tier-2 Characteristics 
Table 38 depicts regression model results, predicting the partial effects of 






Table 38.   Tier-2 Characteristics Regression Models 





from Probit Model 
Dependent Variable tier2perform tier2perform tier2perform 
age 0.0031 0.0079 0.0030 
 (0.0077) (0.0204) (0.0079) 
dependents 0.0104 0.0294 0.0113 
 (0.0106) (0.0294) (0.0113) 
prienlist -0.0863 -0.2190 -0.0852 
 (0.0503)* (0.1332) (0.0523) 
female -0.1114 -0.2931 -0.1155 
 (0.0701) (0.1817) (0.0724) 
amerindian -0.1477 -0.3938 -0.1557 
 (0.1769) (0.4971) (0.1968) 
asian 0.0799 0.2406 0.0891 
 (0.0677) (0.2128) (0.0751) 
black 0.0785 0.2130 0.0797 
 (0.0432)* (0.1179)* (0.0427)* 
hispanic 0.0679 0.1822 0.0684 
 (0.0570) (0.1479) (0.0538) 
other 0.2658 0.8794 0.2703 
 (0.1014)*** (0.4465)** (0.0938)*** 
married 0.0174 0.0487 0.0188 
 (0.0420) (0.1116) (0.0433) 
masters 0.0912 0.2603 0.0981 
 (0.0292)*** (0.0846)*** (0.0311)*** 
postmasters 0.0783 0.2114 0.0786 
 (0.1468) (0.3839) (0.1367) 
JPMEph1 0.1355 0.4057 0.1447 
 (0.0788)* (0.2589) (0.0832)* 
JPMEph2 0.2858 1.2859 0.3386 
 (0.0570)*** (0.5317)** (0.0664)*** 
OCS -0.2104 -0.5605 -0.2185 
 (0.0368)*** (0.0993)*** (0.0384)*** 
othercomm -0.1437 -0.3889 -0.1534 
 (0.0610)** (0.1597)** (0.0632)** 
command 0.1004 0.3015 0.1110 
 (0.0432)** (0.1357)** (0.0472)** 
Constant 0.5184 0.0431  
 (0.1778)*** (0.4743)  
Observations 1331 1331 1331 
R-squared 0.08   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses    






Several quality characteristics have a positive effect on being classified as 
a tier-2 performer.  Compared with SWOs who only have a bachelor’s degree, SWOs 
who possess a master’s degree increase their probability of being categorized in tier 2 by 
9.81-ppts, which is statistically significant at the 1-percent level.  Completing JPME 
Phase II yields a 33.86-ppt increase in being classified as a tier-2 performer.  
Additionally, command status has a statistically significant effect on being a tier-2 
performer.  Having held or currently holding command of a unit increases the probability 
by 11.1-ppts, which is statistically significant at the 5-percent level. 
Race and ethnicity variables have mixed results.  There is weak statistical 
evidence that African Americans have a 7.97-ppt increased probability of being classified 
as a tier-2 performer compared to Caucasian SWOs.  Furthermore, officers categorized as 
being other races or ethnicities have a 27.03-ppt increased probability of being a tier-2 
performer at the 5-percent significance level. 
The majority of tier-2 performers earn their commission through the 
NROTC program.  Statistically significant at the 1-percent level, commissioning through 
OCS decreases the probability of being categorized as a tier-2 performer by 21.85-ppts.  
The variable othercomm, or other commissioning sources, decreases the probability of 
being categorized as a tier-2 performer by 15.34-percentage points, which is statistically 
significant at the 5-percent significance level. 
c. Tier-3 Characteristics 
To examine the partial effects of individual characteristics influencing the 
probability of being classified as a tier-3 performer, Table 39 presents the regression 






Table 39.   Tier-3 Characteristics Regression Models 





from Probit Model 
Dependent Variable tier3perform tier3perform tier3perform 
Age -0.0075 -0.0989 -0.0076 
 (0.0033)** (0.0438)** (0.0033)** 
dependents -0.0106 -0.1681 -0.0129 
 (0.0042)** (0.0622)*** (0.0047)*** 
prienlist -0.0021 -0.0275 -0.0021 
 (0.0228) (0.2707) (0.0203) 
female 0.0321 0.1819 0.0162 
 (0.0429) (0.2615) (0.0269) 
amerindian 0.0068   
 (0.0205)   
asian 0.0122 0.1383 0.0119 
 (0.0394) (0.3263) (0.0314) 
black 0.0188 0.2009 0.0178 
 (0.0213) (0.2000) (0.0202) 
hispanic -0.0082 -0.1490 -0.0102 
 (0.0209) (0.3070) (0.0185) 
other 0.1518 1.2298 0.2416 
 (0.0957) (0.5377)** (0.1769) 
married -0.0459 -0.2222 -0.0195 
 (0.0258)* (0.1707) (0.0171) 
masters -0.0501 -0.8782 -0.0481 
 (0.0094)*** (0.2473)*** (0.0093)*** 
postmasters -0.0363   
 (0.0190)*   
JPMEph1 -0.0383   
 (0.0100)***   
JPMEph2 -0.0256   
 (0.0128)**   
OCS 0.0267 0.3603 0.0323 
 (0.0171) (0.1803)** (0.0185)* 
othercomm -0.0150 -0.3256 -0.0193 
 (0.0219) (0.3682) (0.0163) 
command -0.0440   
 (0.0071)***   
Constant 0.3036 1.2659  
 (0.0842)*** (0.9989)  
Observations 1331 1160 1160 
R-squared 0.05   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses    




As hypothesized, tier-3 performers do not exhibit the quality 
characteristics desired by the SWO community.  Compared to officers with bachelor’s 
degrees, having a master’s degree decreases the probability of being classified as a tier-3 
performer by 4.81-ppts, which is statistically significant at the 1-percent significance 
level.  Possessing a post-master’s degree or higher, completing JPME Phase I or Phase II, 
and having held or currently holding command all perfectly predict that a SWO will not 
be classified as a tier-3 performer.  Therefore, tier-3 performers practically correspond to 
“above zone” promoted Lieutenant Commanders (O-4). 
Conversely, demographic variables yield varied results.  As a maturity 
indicator, accession age has a small negative effect on being classified a tier-3 performer.  
Holding all else constant, a one-year increase in age will decrease the probability of being 
categorized as a tier-3 performer by 0.76-ppts, which is statistically significant at the 5-
percent level.  However, this value has a negligible impact on tier classification.  The 
number of dependents also yielded a statistically significant negative effect on being 
categorized in tier 3.  An additional dependent will yield a 1.29-ppt decrease in the 
probability of being a tier-3 performer.  When compared to Caucasian officers, SWOs 
categorized in other races or ethnicities have a 24.16-ppt increase in the probability of 
being classified as tier-3 performers, which is statistically significant at the 5-percent 
significance level.  Additionally, no SWOs with American Indian heritage are classified 
as tier-3 performers; therefore, the amerindian variable is not used in the probit model. 
Commissioning via the OCS program yields a statistically significant 
3.23-ppt increase in an officer’s probability of being classified into the tier-3 performance 
category, ceteris paribus, when compared to officers commissioned through NROTC. 
3. Pay Elasticity Models 
Pay elasticity model results for tier-1 performers are detailed in Appendix C.  The 
results for tier-2 performers are illustrated in Appendix D, and Appendix E contains the 
pay elasticity model results for tier-3 performers.  The pay elasticity coefficients for each 
performance tier, which are all statistically significant at the 1-percent significance level, 
are summarized in Table 40. 
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Table 40.   Pay Elasticity Coefficients from Econometric Models by Performance Tier 
Performance Tier LPM, robust SE Partial Effects from the Probit Models 
Tier-1 Performer 0.0151 0.0155 
Tier-2 Performer 0.0129 0.0112 
Tier-3 Performer 0.0158 0.0236 
Note:  All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% significance level 
 
According to the results of the pay elasticity models, cash compensation has a 
statistically significant positive, but small effect on 13-year retention for all performance 
tiers.  Interpreting the partial effects from the probit models, a 1-percent increase in pay 
yields: 
• A 1.55-ppt increase in 13-year retention for tier-1 performers 
• A 1.12-ppt increase in 13-year retention for tier-2 performers 
• A 2.36-ppt increase in 13-year retention for tier-3 performers 
These pay elasticity results by performance tier differ significantly from the 
hypothesized effects, as higher pay and bonuses have a greater retention effect on tier-3 
performers compared to tier-1 and tier-2 performers.  Therefore, a much smaller pay 
increase (or decrease) will have a magnified effect for tier-3 performers.  These pay 
elasticity results are used to adjust base 13-year retention rates accordingly, when varying 
bonus payments in the following optimization models. 
H. OPTIMIZATION MODEL RESULTS 
1. Theoretical Current Situation 
Table 41 illustrates the theoretical current situation, which is used to derive the 
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(at 13 YCS) 
PV of Bonus 
Payments 
Tier 1 0.3516 89 0.8452 75 $3,277,216.35
Tier 2 0.5973 151 0.7714 116 $5,068,761.29
Tier 3 0.0511 13 0.3319 4 $174,784.87
 Totals: 252  195 $8,520,762.51
 
 
The probabilities categorizing SWOs into each tier are derived using the tier 
category composition from the sample descriptive statistics.  In the SWO sample, tier-1 
performers account for approximately 35.16 percent of the sample, tier-2 performers 
represent 59.73 percent, and tier-3 performers are 5.11 percent of the sample.  This 
distribution is applied to the 252 SWOs selected for promotion by the FY 2007 
Lieutenant Commander promotion board to generate the performance tier allocation 
(Commander Navy Personnel Command, 2008a).  This distribution is used as the 
available pool constraint in the optimization models with the number of SWOs in each 
tier rounded to the nearest integer. 
The base 13-year retention rate for tier-1 performers is provided in the descriptive 
statistics, found in Table 28.  The 13-year retention rate for tier-2 performers is calculated 
by adjusting the retention rate of tier-1 performers by the partial effects of tier-2 
performers from the 13-year retention probit model.  Similar methodology is applied to 
tier-3 performers to yield their base 13-year retention rate.  Applying the base 13-year 
retention rates to the number of Lieutenant Commanders in each tier at the time of 
promotion produces the number of SWOs retained through the port of exit at 13 YCS.  Of 
the 252 SWOs promoted to O-4, 195 SWOs are predicted to retain to 13 YCS.  
Multiplying 195 SWOs by the net present value (NPV) of the current SWO Critical Skills 
Bonus (i.e., $43,696.22) yields the NPV of the total bonus payments, approximately 
$8.52 million.  This value constitutes the budgetary constraint for the optimization 
models. 
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2. Maximizing 13-year Retention and Maximizing the Retention Bonus 
Differential (between Performance Tiers) Models 
Appendix F displays the results of the 13-year retention optimization model.  
Appendix G depicts the results from the bonus differential optimization model.  The two 
optimization model results are compared with the theoretical current situation in Table 
42. 












Tier-1 Retention 75 81 89
Tier-2 Retention 116 112 104
Tier-3 Retention 4 0 0
       Total 13-year Retention 195 193 193
NPV of Retention Bonus Payments by Performance Tier 
NPV of Tier-1 Bonus 
Payment $43,696.22 $45,526.17 $48,060.20
NPV of Tier-2 Bonus 
Payment $43,696.22 $42,538.34 $40,471.35
NPV of Tier-3 Bonus 
Payment $43,696.22 $37,550.97 $37,550.97
Total Costs and Savings to the Navy 
Total Costs $8,520,762.51 $8,451,913.84 $8,486,378.16
Total Savings  $68,848.67 $34,384.35
 
To establish a tiered-bonus structure and remain within the existing budget, the 
optimization models reduce the total number of SWOs retaining through 13 YCS by 2 
officers.  However, these 2 SWOs are likely tier-3 performers.  By comparison to the 
current theoretical situation, the composition of the retained officers supports 6 more tier-
1 performers in the first optimization model and 14 more tier-1 performers in the second 
optimization model.  Retaining higher numbers of tier-1 performers increases the quality 
of the SWO community.  Based on the methodology to create the three performance tiers 
from the DMDC dataset, tier-1 performers exhibit characteristics highly desired by SWO 
Lieutenant Commander promotion boards.  Since graduate education, JPME completion, 
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and command status are all statistically insignificant variables in the tier-1 characteristics 
probit model, these desirable characteristics most likely include indicators not observed 
in the dataset, postulated as on-the-job performance.  Additionally, promotion boards 
consider person-job fit when selecting officers for promotion to O-4 (Fairburn & 
Malcomson, 2001).  Therefore, tier-1 performers are identified as having a good person-
job fit, which benefits both the officer and the SWO community. 
Moreover, tier-1 performers have a higher probability of retention than tier-2 and 
tier-3 performers.  Since there is a better person-job fit among tier-1 performers, this 
retention trend may extend beyond 13 YCS.  Conversely, tier-3 performers have a very 
low probability of 13-year retention.  If the conditional probability of retention trend 
continues in later years, retaining tier-3 performers at 13 YCS may be detrimental to the 
manpower plans for the SWO community.  These officers have a higher probability of 
leaving after the 3-year SWO Critical Skills Bonus obligation is complete.  The Navy 
must consider the effect of retaining tier-3 performers. 
Furthermore, tier-3 performers have a lower probability of promoting to 
Commander (O-5) by 18 YCS.  At the 18 YCS point in a SWO’s career, tier-3 performers 
have had at least one opportunity to be considered by an O-5 promotion board.  The mean 
promotion probabilities are presented in Table 43. 
 
Table 43.   Comparison of Mean Probabilities for Promotion to Commander by 18 YCS and 
by Performance Tier 
Performance Tier # of Obs. Mean Standard Deviation 
Tier-1 Performers 30 0.7333 0.4498 
Tier-2 Performers 234 0.6581 0.4754 
Tier-3 Performers 16 0.2500 0.4472 
 
Based on the cohort constructs, the DMDC sample contains 280 SWOs who 
retained through 18 YCS.  Given this sample, the O-5 promotion rate for tier-1 
performers is 73.33 percent, 65.81 percent for tier-2 performers, and a meager 25 percent 
for tier-3 performers.  The large promotion difference between tier-3 performers and 
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higher performers implies that tier-3 performers continue to exhibit poor performance 
and poor individual-job match at later points in their careers.  For Surface Warfare 
Officers, if an officer does not promote to Commander, that officer will never hold 
Commander Command.  These low performers add limited value to the SWO 
community, since heavy emphasis is placed on the importance of Commander Command.  
Throughout a SWO’s career, the Navy invests heavily in the training and preparation for 
the rigor of Commander Command.  SWOs who do not promote to O-5 are poor 
investments for the SWO community.  Additionally, non-prior-enlisted O-4s who do not 
promote to O-5 by 18 YCS will likely retire after 20 years of service.  In the “up-or-out” 
promotion system, O-4s in their terminal rank are required to retire at the 20-year mark, 
with very few exceptions (Secretary of the Navy, 2005).  Identifying these poor 
performers earlier in their career and encouraging functional turnover will save the Navy 
money in the long-term.  Therefore, decreasing the number of tier-3 performers and 
increasing the number of tier-1 and tier-2 performers will improve the overall quality of 
the SWO community.  By increasing the percentage of the sample that are eligible for 
promotion to O-5, the Navy would thereby increase the number of SWOs eligible for 
Commander Command while simultaneously reducing the current shortage in the O-5 
ranks.  For example, the resultant composition among tiers for both optimization models 
yields an additional Commander (O-5) by 18 YCS. 
Comparing the two optimization models in Table 42, there is a trade-off between 
the distribution of tiers and the total bonus expenditure.  Though the second optimization 
model, found in column (2), retains 8 more tier-1 performers and retains 8 fewer tier-2 
performers than the solution from the first optimization model, the resultant cost 
increases by $34,464.32.  However, both optimization models yield a net financial 
savings to the Navy, primarily due to the reduced overall retention of 2 SWOs. 
Though both optimization models simulate the effect of adding a performance-
based component to the SWO Critical Skills Bonus, the bonus payment differentials 
between performance tiers are maximized by the second optimization model, in column 
(2) of Table 42.  This bonus structure creates a higher incentive for tier-1 performers to 
retain.  Furthermore, a performance-based bonus structure may have spillover effects for 
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more junior SWOs, who are in earlier years of their careers.  If they witness that higher 
performance is rewarded by higher retention bonus payments, they may be motivated to 
increase their own performance. 
3. Cost-benefit Analysis of Increasing SWO Retention beyond the 
Optimal Solution 
An additional set of four optimization models address the impact of relaxing the 
retention constraint to meet the 195 SWOs observed in the theoretical current retention 
model, found in Table 41.  Column (1) matches the retention of 195 SWOs.  The models 
in columns (2) through (4) increase the retention requirement by 5 SWOs per model, 
while minimizing the total cost to implement the program.  The other constraints and 
decision variables remain the same as in the first two optimization models located in 
Table 42.  Presented as a cost-benefit analysis, the results of these optimization models 
are contained in Table 44. 
 















Tier-1 Retention 83 84 87 89 
Tier-2 Retention 112 116 118 121 
Tier-3 Retention 0 0 0 0 
Total Retention 195 200 205 210 
Costs 
NPV of Tier-1 Bonus 
Payment $46,159.68 $46,476.43 $47,426.69 $48,060.20
NPV of Tier-2 Bonus 
Payment $42,538.34 $43,571.84 $44,088.58 $44,863.71
NPV of Tier-3 Bonus 
Payment $37,550.97 $37,550.97 $37,550.97 $37,550.97
Total Cost $8,595,547.40 $8,958,353.30 $9,328,575.35 $9,705,866.53
Total Excess Cost to the Navy $74,784.88 $437,590.79 $807,812.83 $1,185,104.02
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These models address the trade-off between retention and cost under a 
performance-based bonus structure.  For example, 195 SWOs (i.e., 2 more tier-1 
performers than in the original optimization model) can be retained for $74,784.88 more 
than the original budget.  Retaining 200 SWOs through 13 YCS would cost the Navy an 
extra $437,590.79.  Figure 37 provides an illustration of the additional cost (increase 
compared to the theoretical current situation) plotted against the total number of retained 
Surface Warfare Officers.  Though this function appears to be linear, the constraints 
prevent perfect linearity. 
















Figure 37.   Comparison of Excess Cost by the Number of SWOs Retained 
Increasing SWO retention bares a significant cost with growth beyond the 
retention level of 193 SWOs.  Navy leadership must decide the marginal value of 
retaining an additional SWO (by performance tier) to determine which option would 
yield a positive net return on investment. 
4. Cafeteria-style Retention Bonus Options 
Further savings to the Navy might be realized through optimizing the payment 
plan to take advantage of individual SWOs’ personal discount rates that exceed the 
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federal standard 7-percent discount rate used in this study’s computations.  Higher 
personal discount rates can allow a larger initial lump-sum payment for the SWO Critical 
Skills Bonus, which will provide long-term savings to the Navy—since the NPV of the 
lump-sum payment is smaller than the NPV of the typical payment plan over three 
installments.  By creating a cafeteria-style retention bonus system, where SWOs can 
select the option that best meets their needs, the Navy can potentially save money in the 
aggregate due to the difference between the federal standard discount rate (i.e., 7 percent) 
and higher personal discount rates among Surface Warfare Officers (OMB, 1992). 
Using estimates from bivariate probit models, Warner and Pleeter (2001) found 
the average officer separating from active duty had a 21-percent personal discount rate.  
Furthermore, “personal discount rates decline with income, education, and age” (p .37).  
Holding separation constant, Warner and Pleeter (2001) estimated the mean nominal 
discount rate to be 18 percent for officers with 11 years of service and 13.2 percent for 
officers with 13 years of service.  Though each individual officer has a unique personal 
discount rate, using Warner and Pleeter’s (2001) results as a baseline, the personal 
discount rate used in this analysis is 15 percent.  Applying the solutions from the 13-year 
retention optimization model, Table 45 illustrates the three different payment options in 
the proposed cafeteria-style bonus program, including: the total payout (not adjusted for 
the time value of money), the net present value (NPV) of the total payout, and the savings 










Table 45.   Comparison of Payment Plans among Performance Tiers (Based on the Solution 













LCDR+2 $22,000.00 $22,000.00 $16,212.92 $42,570.41
LCDR+3 $12,000.00 $13,012.13 $16,212.92 $0.00
LCDR+4 $12,000.00 $13,012.13 $16,212.92 $0.00
Total Payout $46,000.00 $48,024.26 $48,638.76 $42,570.41
NPV of Payments $43,696.22 $45,526.17 $45,526.17 $42,570.41
Tier 1 
Savings to Navy (per SWO) $2,955.76
LCDR+2 $22,000.00 $22,000.00 $15,148.89 $39,776.58
LCDR+3 $12,000.00 $11,359.59 $15,148.89 $0.00
LCDR+4 $12,000.00 $11,359.58 $15,148.89 $0.00
Total Payout $46,000.00 $44,719.17 $45,446.67 $39,776.58
NPV of Payments $43,696.22 $42,538.34 $42,538.34 $39,776.58
Tier 2 
Savings to Navy (per SWO) $2,761.77
LCDR+2 $22,000.00 $22,000.00 $13,372.77 $35,113.00
LCDR+3 $12,000.00 $8,601.12 $13,372.77 $0.00
LCDR+4 $12,000.00 $8,601.11 $13,372.77 $0.00
Total Payout $46,000.00 $39,202.23 $40,118.31 $35,113.00
NPV of Payments $43,696.22 $37,550.97 $37,550.97 $35,113.00
Tier 3 
Savings to Navy (per SWO) $2,437.97
Note:  Savings to Navy = NPV of Optimal Payment - NPV of Payment under Payment Plan 3 
 
Payment Plan 1 is structured to continue to pay SWOs $22,000 during the initial 
installment, and the remainder of the bonus in two equal installments.  Consideration is 
given so that the present value of all annual installments does not exceed the NPV of the 
total payout.  On the other hand, Payment Plan 2 awards three equal payments.  For each 
performance tier, the NPVs of the payment schemes for Payment Plans 1 and 2 are 
equivalent.  However, when the 15-percent personal discount rate is applied to a single 
lump-sum payment, Payment Plan 3 yields a significantly lower NPV than the two other 
payment schemes.  Payment Plan 3 provides a per-capita savings to the Navy of 
$2,955.76 for tier-1 performers, $2,761.77 for tier-2 performers, and $2,437.97 for tier-3 
performers.  These cost savings are derived by comparing the NPV of Payment Plan 3 to 
the NPV of payments from Plan 1 (and Plan 2) based on the results from the 13-year 
optimization models.  Therefore, in addition to providing an optimum composition 
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among tiers while staying within budget, the proposed cafeteria plan saves the Navy 
additional money for each SWO that elects the third payment plan. 
To further illustrate the annual aggregate savings to the Navy, the following 
computation examines the annual net savings of implementing a cafeteria-style bonus 
program.  According to Warner and Pleeter (2001), approximately 36.2 percent of O-4s 
with 12 years of service accepted a lump-sum separation payment rather than an annuity 
settlement for voluntary separations during the military drawdown period in the mid-
1990s.  This indicates more than one-third of the sub-sample possessed a significantly 
higher personal discount rate (in the magnitude of 19.6 percent).  Using the distribution 
that 36.2 percent of the sub-sample will elect the larger up-front lump sum payment 
(corresponding to Payment Plan 3 in this study), Table 46 depicts an adjusted theoretical 
total cost to the Navy. 
 
Table 46.   Net Present Value (NPV) of Cost Calculations for the Cafeteria-style Bonus 











Total Cost of 
Plan 1 or 2 
Takers 




Tier 1 81 52 29 $2,497,261.63 $1,234,541.83 $3,731,803.47
Tier 2 112 71 41 $3,020,222.16 $1,630,839.58 $4,651,061.74
Tier 3 0 0 0 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Total 193 123 70 $5,517,483.79 $2,865,381.41 $8,382,865.21
 
With a total cost of approximately $8.38 million, the cafeteria bonus payment 
program yields a net savings of $137,897.30 from the theoretical current budget situation 
(i.e., $8,520,762.51).  Similar savings are realized using the solutions from the 
optimization model that maximizes the bonus differential between tiers.  
Comparable methodology is employed using the bonus payment scheme from the 
bonus differential optimization model.  The proposed payment options are compared with 
the current payment plan in Table 47. 
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Table 47.   Comparison of Payment Plans among Performance Tiers (Based on the Solution 













LCDR+2 $22,000.00 $22,000.00 $17,115.35 $44,939.93
LCDR+3 $12,000.00 $14,413.68 $17,115.35 $0.00
LCDR+4 $12,000.00 $14,413.69 $17,115.35 $0.00
Total Payout $46,000.00 $50,827.37 $51,346.05 $44,939.93
NPV of Payments $43,696.22 $48,060.20 $48,060.20 $44,939.93
Tier 1 
Savings to Navy (per SWO) $3,120.28
LCDR+2 $22,000.00 $22,000.00 $14,412.78 $37,843.76
LCDR+3 $12,000.00 $10,216.35 $14,412.78 $0.00
LCDR+4 $12,000.00 $10,216.35 $14,412.78 $0.00
Total Payout $46,000.00 $42,432.70 $43,238.34 $37,843.76
NPV of Payments $43,696.22 $40,471.35 $40,471.35 $37,843.76
Tier 2 
Savings to Navy (per SWO) $2,627.58
LCDR+2 $22,000.00 $22,000.00 $13,372.77 $35,113.00
LCDR+3 $12,000.00 $8,601.12 $13,372.77 $0.00
LCDR+4 $12,000.00 $8,601.11 $13,372.77 $0.00
Total Payout $46,000.00 $39,202.23 $40,118.31 $35,113.00
NPV of Payments $43,696.22 $37,550.97 $37,550.97 $35,113.00
Tier 3 
Savings to Navy (per SWO) $2,437.97
Note:  Savings to Navy = NPV of Optimal Payment - NPV of Payment under Payment Plan 3 
 
When compared to Payment Plans 1 and 2, Payment Plan 3 yields a per-capita 
savings to the Navy of $3,120.28 for tier-1 performers, $2,627.58 for tier-2 performers, 
and $2,437.97 for tier-3 performers.  Using the analogous distribution of 36.2 percent of 
the sub-sample electing Payment Plan 3, Table 48 depicts the theoretical total cost to the 







Table 48.   Net Present Value (NPV) of Cost Calculations for the Cafeteria-style Bonus 











Total Cost of 
Plan 1 or 2 
Takers 
Total Cost of 
Payment Plan 3 
Takers 
Total Cost 
Tier 1 81 52 29 $2,643,023.09 $1,303,257.87 $3,946,280.96
Tier 2 112 71 41 $2,873,465.72 $1,551,594.34 $4,425,060.07
Tier 3 0 0 0 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Total 193 123 70 $5,516,488.82 $2,854,852.21 $8,371,341.03
 
Akin to previous results from the 13-year retention optimization model, the 
cafeteria-style bonus plan (based on the values of the decision variables from the bonus 
differential optimization model) costs the Navy approximately $8.37 million, while 
yielding a savings of $149,421.48 when compared to the theoretical current budget 
situation (i.e., $8,520,762.51).  Regardless which optimization model the NPV of bonus 
payments is derived from, assuming that at least one SWO selects Payment Plan 3 each 
year, the Navy will realize annual net savings.  Therefore, it would be in the best interests 
of the Navy to implement a cafeteria-style bonus program to capture value in the 
differential between the federal discount rate and personal discount rates among Surface 
Warfare Officers. 
I. MODEL LIMITATIONS 
1. Performance Tier Categories 
Using a time-series dataset that covers 20 years, the methodology for creating 
performance tiers is dependent on the promotion time to Lieutenant Commander, which 
may fluctuate over the time period analyzed.  Promotion to O-4 is dependent on 
promotion zones based on individual lineal numbers, and these zones vary over time.  For 
example, in one fiscal year, SWOs with 9.5 YCS may be considered “in zone” for 
promotion purposes.  While in a later fiscal year, SWOs with 9.5 YCS may be classified 
as “below zone.”  This difference over time explains why approximately 35.16 percent of 
the SWO sample is categorized as tier-1 performers, who promoted between 9 and 10 
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YCS.  If this categorization was based on the annual 10-percent cap on “below zone” 
promotions, the portion of the sample classified as tier-1 performers should be no more 
than 10 percent (Yardley et al., 2005).  Furthermore, the proportion of tier-2 performers 
would be closer to 80 percent of the SWO sample to mirror “in zone” promotion 
probabilities, rather than 59.73 percent in this study.  However, the bottom 5 percent of 
the sample is more accurately categorized into performance tier 3. 
2. Econometric Models 
The econometric models have two major limitations.  First, fitness report 
(FITREP) data inaccessibility prevented performance analysis at earlier points in a 
SWO’s career—prior to promotion to Lieutenant Commander, or approximately 9 YCS.  
Ideally, FITREPs would provide performance data for earlier ports of exit in the SWO 
career path.  The inclusion of junior officer performance data would facilitate a more 
thorough analysis that examines the entire SWO career lifecycle to determine the optimal 
point at which to implement performance-based retention bonuses.  To directly analyze 
the SWO community’s trouble with retaining the annual minimum requirement of 275 
department heads, data on earlier performance indictors are required (Monroe & Cymrot, 
2004). 
Second, initial minimum service requirements (MSR) and the current active duty 
service obligation for each SWO were undefined in the DMDC dataset.  Therefore, it is 
assumed that every SWO in the sample was not under an additional active duty service 
obligation at the 13-year point.24  Additionally, all components of cash compensation for 
all years are used in the pay elasticity models.  Ideally, if the MSR is known, the pay 
elasticity models should include compensation only after the initial obligation to exclude 
pay that did not influence retention decisions (since the officer was required to serve the 
entire obligation anyway). 
                                                 
24 Additional active-duty service obligations can be incurred for attending a war college, pursuing a 
Navy-funded graduate degree, taking certain orders, laterally transferring to another officer community, 
filling a joint-duty billet, etc.  Since SWO career paths are fluid beyond the required department head tours, 
these additional requirements can be incurred at almost any point in the later portion of a SWO's career. 
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3. Optimization Models 
To create optimization models that predict optimal allocation of resources, several 
assumptions were made during calculations.  Under the theoretical current situation, the 
available pool of 252 SWOs was extracted from the FY 2007 Lieutenant Commander 
promotion board results.  Furthermore, the probability of categorization into a 
performance tier was derived from the descriptive statistics for the SWO sample 
contained in the DMDC dataset.  As previously discussed, the categorization would 
normally correspond to promotion zone categories as established by the Secretary of the 
Navy.  Additionally, this study applied personal discount rates (i.e., 15 percent) and the 
percentage of the sample that would elect the up-front lump-sum bonus payment (i.e., 
36.2 percent) based on Warner and Pleeter’s (2001) study.  Though based on a published 
journal article, these assumptions are only proxies for the actual intentions of the SWOs 
captured in the DMDC dataset. 
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The retention effects of adding a performance-based component to the Surface 
Warfare Officer Critical Skills Bonus were analyzed in this chapter.  Using a sample of 
1,331 Lieutenant Commander (O-4) SWOs, the researchers modeled the effect through 
econometric regression and optimization techniques. 
By dividing the SWO sample into three performance tiers based on promotion 
time to O-4, differences in 13-year retention, quality characteristics, and pay elasticity 
were derived through econometric analysis.  High performers were found to have higher 
13-year retention rates than lower-performing counterparts.  Additionally, as 
hypothesized, poor performers did not possess the quality characteristics desired by O-4 
promotion boards, such as: graduate education, Joint Professional Military Education 
(JPME) completion, and holding command of a unit.  Though these quality 
characteristics were statistically insignificant for high performers, average performers did 
possess many of these qualities.  Furthermore, the pay elasticity of low performers was 
much higher than for higher-performing SWOs.  Therefore, cash compensation motivates 
poor-performing SWOs more than average and higher performers.  Finally, low 
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performers, as categorized at approximately 9 to 12 years of commissioned service 
(YCS), continued to show poor performance at later points in their careers, as evidenced 
by their abysmal Commander (O-5) promotion rate.  These low performers add limited 
value to the SWO community, since they are ineligible for Commander Command and 
cannot retain past 20 YCS. 
A hierarchical bonus structure was modeled by applying the performance tier 
differences as basic assumptions for optimizing the SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  While 
staying within budget, the Navy could optimize the composition of the surface warfare 
community to yield a larger portion of high performers retained beyond 13 YCS, and 
achieve financial savings.  Furthermore, improving overall retention (with higher 
retention of stellar performers) can be purchased with an additional cost above the current 
retention bonus expenditure.  If the Navy desires to increase the overall 13-year SWO 
retention, a performance-based component to the SWO Critical Skills Bonus, coupled 
with an increased overall bonus budget, is a feasible solution. 
Finally, adoption of a cafeteria-style bonus program can yield further savings for 
the SWO community, as it takes advantage of higher personal discount rates.  By 
providing bonus payment plan options to eligible SWOs according to their respective 
performance tier, the Navy provides officers a freedom of choice while garnering 
additional savings to the Navy.  Though cost savings are not the goal of the proposed 
change, these savings are a financial benefit beyond the considerable effect of increasing 




VII. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this thesis was to develop a more efficient compensation system 
that would reward performance, improve Surface Warfare Officer retention in the mid-
grade and senior officer ranks, and improve the overall quality of the SWO community. 
A performance-based component of the SWO Critical Skills Bonus accomplishes all 
three objectives.  This study examined: 
• Surface Warfare Officer retention 
• Current policies and legislation affecting SWO compensation, 
performance evaluation, and promotion 
• Performance and compensation theory 
• Performance-based compensation in practice 
• The retention effects of adding a performance-based component to the 
SWO Critical Skills Bonus. 
In order “to get the right Sailor, with the right skills and experience, to the right 
place, at the right time, for the best value,” it is incumbent upon policymakers to improve 
business practices if they are not effectively achieving their intended results (Busch, 
2006, p. 1).  Thus, to change existing compensation vehicles and overcome severe mid-
grade and senior officer shortages in the SWO community, Navy leadership must be 
willing to adjust existing compensation policy, to lobby for appropriate legislative steps 
to induce change, and to remove institutional barriers that are preventing required 
manning levels (Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b).  The first section of this 
chapter addresses implementation of a performance-based component of the SWO 
Critical Skills Bonus.  The second section summarizes this study’s conclusions.  The final 
section presents future recommendations.   
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B.  IMPLEMENTING A PERFORMANCE-BASED COMPONENT OF THE 
SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER CRITICAL SKILLS BONUS 
1. Legislative, Policy, and Procedural Implications 
US Code Title 37—Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services details 
payment authorization for Surface Warfare Officers (United States Code, 2004b).  
Section 323 pertains to the Junior SWO Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) and the 
SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  These bonuses provide “retention incentives for members 
[…] who [are] serving on active duty and [are] qualified in a designated critical military 
skill” (United States Code, 2004c, p. 1).  Section 323 specifically limits cumulative bonus 
awards to not exceed $200,000 over a SWO’s career and restricts eligibility beyond 25 
years of active duty service (United States Code, 2004c).  Furthermore, Section 319 
authorizes Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) to eligible SWOs upon 
obligating for the requisite department head tours (United States Code, 2004d).  
Retention bonus payments in excess of limits set by Section 319 and Section 323 must go 
through appropriate legislative measures to modify current payment authorization.  Once 
approved through the annual National Defense Authorization Act, these funds can be 
distributed to eligible Surface Warfare Officers. 
Retention policies stipulated in NAVADMIN 012/06 (Junior SWO CRSB), 
NAVADMIN 326/02 (SWO Critical Skills Bonus), and NAVADMIN 259/04 (Senior 
CSRB) do not require significant revision to incorporate the addition of a performance-
based component to existing retention bonuses (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005b; Navy 
Personnel Command, 2008a; Navy Personnel Command, 2008b).  According to 
Commander Naval Surface Forces (2008b), a surplus exists in the junior SWO ranks 
through O-3 with 8 YCS; therefore, additional bonuses may not be warranted for junior 
officers.  However, retention issues (i.e., manning shortages) first appear in the senior O-
3 rank with 9 and 10 YCS.  After a short reprieve due to a reduction in O-4 Officer 
Programmed Authorization (OPA) in the first two years at the O-4 level, the officer 
shortfall reappears at 13 YCS and continues through O-5 with 22 YCS.  To capture a 
larger number of qualified SWOs at the mid-grade officer ranks while improving overall 
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quality of the SWO community through later years, this thesis targeted the $46,000 SWO 
Critical Skills Bonus as the primary vehicle in which to introduce performance-based 
compensation. 
Even though Title 37 Section 323 limits the total cumulative retention bonus 
awards to $200,000 per SWO over a full military career, most SWOs will not reach this 
maximum (United States Code, 2004c; Chief of Naval Operations, 2005b; Navy 
Personnel Command, 2008a; Navy Personnel Command, 2008b).  Currently, retention 
bonuses amount to $191,000 if Surface Warfare Officers receive the Junior SWO CSRB 
($25,000), SWOCP ($50,000), the SWO Critical Skills Bonus ($46,000), two years of 
Senior SWO CSRB at the O-5 level ($15,000 per year), and two years of Senior SWO 
CSRB at the O-6 level ($20,000 per year) (Chief of Naval Operations, 2005b; Navy 
Personnel Command, 2008a; Navy Personnel Command, 2008b).25  Therefore, for SWOs 
who receive each retention bonus, there is approximately $9,000 of flexibility written into 
Title 37 if the Navy is to remain under the $200,000 limit (United States Code, 2004c).  
Increased bonuses awarded earlier in a SWO’s career may affect future bonus 
authorization without further modifications to current restrictions.   
Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1304.21 sets DoD policy on critical 
skills retention bonuses (DoD, 2005b). 
It is DoD policy that the Military Services use enlistment, accession, and 
reenlistment and retention bonuses as incentives in meeting DoD 
personnel requirements.  The intent of bonuses is to influence personnel 
inventories in specific situations in which less costly methods have proven 
inadequate or impractical.  The Military Services must exercise this 
authority in the most cost-effective manner, considering bonus 
employment in relation to overall skill, training, and utilization 
requirements.  Military skills selected for the award of enlistment, 
accession, reenlistment, or retention bonuses must be essential to the 
accomplishment of defense missions. (DoD, 2005b, p. 2) 
In setting forth policy, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Personnel and Readiness (PDUSD(P&R)) provides direction in the management of 
                                                 
25 Senior SWOs may earn further Senior SWO CSRB payments dependent on the availability of (and 
appointment to) additional qualifying billets (CNO, 2004a). 
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retention bonuses with support from the Assistant Secretaries (Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs) of the specific military departments, who provide data pertaining to these skill 
areas (DoD, 2005b; DoD, 2004).  In conjunction with recommending policy and budget 
guidance to the Secretary of Defense, PDUSD(P&R): 
• Establishes criteria for designating military skills for the awards. 
• Sets criteria for individual Service member eligibility for awards. 
• Creates reporting and data requirements for periodic review and 
evaluation of bonus programs. 
• Proposes revision to the DoD policy established by DoDD 1304.21 and in 
accordance with applicable provisions of US Code Title 37. 
• Monitors bonus programs of the Military Services and recommends to the 
Secretary of Defense measures required to attain the most efficient use of 
resources devoted to the programs. 
• Reviews periodically (at least annually) the criteria for designation of 
military skills and makes revisions required to attain specific policy 
objectives. 
• Evaluates and takes appropriate action on requests for exception to the 
criteria for designation of military skills (DoD, 2005b, p. 3). 
Upon direction from PDUSD(P&R), the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) 
allocates funds approved by the Secretary of Defense to administer the bonus programs in 
accordance with DoDD 1304.29, Administration of Enlistment Bonuses, Accession 
Bonuses for New Officers in Critical Skills, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Critical 
Skills Retention Bonuses for Active Members (DoD, 2005b).  SECNAV has the 
responsibility to PDUSD(P&R) to recommend which military skill sets should be 
designated as critical skills.  Additionally, SECNAV must annually review critical skills 
designations, provide program review data as requested, adjust criteria for designating 
military skills, and ensure that the bonus programs are sufficiently communicated to 
potential awardees. (DoD, 2005b) 
DoDD 1304.29 also imposes an annual bonus limit of $30,000, subject to change 




SECNAV approval would be required; bonus increases that exceed the annual $30,000 
limit or the $200,000 cumulative restriction will require a waiver from PDUSD(P&R). 
(DoD, 2005b; DoD, 2004) 
2. Program Implementation 
The direction set forth in DoDD 1304.21 and DoDD 1304.29 sufficiently 
addresses policy and administrative requirements to implement a performance-based 
component of the SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  The largest administrative hurdle 
impeding successful implementation of a performance-based component to the SWO 
Critical Skills Bonus is the development of an appropriate and flexible process to 
categorize SWOs into performance tiers.  A suitable program for setting the correct SWO 
Critical Skills Bonus levels for each performance tier is necessary to achieve OPA 
manning requirements. 
This study used time to promote to Lieutenant Commander as a proxy for 
categorizing performance, which does not preclude applying other metrics in future 
implementation.  Officers could be ranked on various measures of performance; however, 
promotion boards capture the “whole person” concept, evaluating much more than 
inflated performance apparent in FITREPs.  Therefore, a similar peer review board that 
examines the whole service record may accurately evaluate and categorize performance. 
By establishing an ineffective or inappropriate process of categorization, 
improperly weighing individual characteristics, or allocating an insufficient level of 
retention bonus payments, the Navy will only aggravate retention issues at the mid-grade 
and senior officer ranks.  Since incorporating SWOCP in October 1999, the SWO Critical 
Skills Bonus in October 2002, the Senior SWO CSRB in 2004, and the Junior SWO 
CSRB in 2006, retention bonuses and continuation pay have not eliminated the shortage 
of mid-grade and senior level SWOs (Commander Naval Surface Forces, 2008b).  This 
has created a situation in which “retention experience in the military skill is below 
designated retention objectives,” whereby quality SWOs are still leaving at an alarming 
rate (DoD, 2004, p. 15). 
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3. Predicted Cultural Resistance to Change 
The US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) contends that the federal 
government must make significant changes to its compensation system in order “to 
recruit, manage, and retain the human capital” needed to meet today’s personnel 
challenges and those of the future (OPM, 2002, p. v).  A performance-based component 
of the SWO Critical Skills Bonus provides a suitable vehicle for introducing pay for 
performance in the military.  It provides a retention incentive while simultaneously 
encouraging increased quality in the Surface Warfare Officer community.  Adapting 
lessons learned from select federal demonstration projects implementing performance-
based compensation, some factors are equally important to the military sector of federal 
employment, such as:  
• Providing pay commensurate with the quality of work 
• Rewarding performance in a timely manner 
• Linking performance and results-oriented behavior 
• Promoting organizational goals (OPM, 2002). 
Although survey data is somewhat biased, military surveys have identified 
shortcomings with existing military compensation (Summers, 1969; Messonnier, 
Bergstrom, Cornwell, Teasley, & Cordell, 2000).  For example, the August 2005 Status of 
Forces Survey of Active-Duty Members only shows an overall 47-percent satisfaction 
level with military pay, while 85 percent of the sample reported that increased salary 
would improve their work-life balance (DMDC, 2006).  Dissatisfaction with existing 
compensation practices presents an opportunity to employ compensation reform. 
Implementation of performance-based compensation is contingent upon a change 
in current SWO retention bonus programs, which provide bonuses to nearly every SWO 
who meets minimum eligibility requirements.  Ingrained in the SWO culture, these 
bonuses have become entitlements which compensate for additional service obligations.  
To combat this entitlement philosophy, the culture must recognize that quality 
performance should be rewarded, and poor performance must be discouraged.  
Additionally, the performance management system must: 
 239
• Support the performance-based component of the retention bonus 
program. 
• Remove biases from the evaluation system. 
• Provide sufficient training for supervisors and employees. 
• Conduct constant program evaluation. 
• Ensure proper funding (MSPB, 2006). 
Implementing a compensation model that addresses retention and quality in the 
mid-grade officer ranks, a controversial deviation from the accepted standard in which 
bonuses quickly become entitlements, is not easily achieved through the hierarchical 
structure of the military organization.  In addition to the lengthy approval process that 
involves several levels of the Navy’s chain of command, buy-in by the SWO community 
is essential for the success (i.e., achieving intended results) and the longevity of 
performance-based compensation.  Emotions, attitudes, and behavior affect the 
relationship SWOs have with their peers, with their command, and the SWO community 
(McShane & Von Glinow, 2007).  Therefore, it is incumbent that “appropriate publicity 
campaigns [are conducted] to ensure that [… s]ervice members are fully aware of the 
purpose and availability of bonuses and the individual eligibility criteria for award” 
(DoD, 2005b, p. 4).  Only through a dutiful information and promotional campaign, 
which highlights the benefits to individual officers and the SWO community as a whole, 
can such a deeply ingrained compensation structure be changed.   
Furthermore, as an institution, the Navy is deeply steeped in tradition (Builder, 
1989). 
Tradition has always been an important part of military life, but the Navy, 
much more than any of the other services, has cherished and clung to 
tradition […] This reverence for tradition in the US Navy has continued 
right to the present, not just in pomp or display, but in the Navy’s 
approach to almost every action from eating to fighting—from tooth to 
fang.  (Builder, 1989, p. 18) 
Tenure-based compensation, among the Navy’s historic traditions, is an integral 
part of the Navy’s culture.  However, change is required to manage circumstances that 
have surfaced during the past few years, such as: the SWO manpower shortage in mid-
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grade and senior officer ranks, continued heightened operational tempo associated with 
the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, and the high toll that Individual Augmentation and 
Global War on Terrorism Support Assignments have on sailors and their families.  A 
performance-based alteration to the traditional Navy system of retention bonuses may be 
a feasible solution to combat the SWO inventory shortage.  The Navy, as an “institution 
[...] marked by independence and stature,” may be willing to change its traditional 
compensation system, provided such change achieves the positive results presented in 
this study’s optimization models (Builder, 1989, p. 31). 
Perhaps the most important step toward program implementation involves 
overcoming the resistance to changes falling outside of traditional boundaries.  
Organizational change is implemented through a three-stage change process introduced 
by Kurt Lewin, which is illustrated in Figure 38 (SHRM, 2007b). 
 
 
Figure 38.   Stages of the Change Process  
(Adapted from SHRM, 2007b, p. 3-38) 
Proceeding from the current SWO retention bonus system to one that incorporates 
a performance-based component requires change, a process involving “unfreezing, 
moving, and refreezing” (SHRM, 2007b, p. 3-38; McShane & Von Glinow, 2007).  
“Unfreezing” is the first step that introduces change.  The Surface Warfare Officer 
community must overcome impediments, “ending things that resist change” (SHRM, 
2007b, p. 3-38).  This step will require the Navy to break from the traditional philosophy 
that pay is an entitlement.  Step two, “moving,” is the adjustment process during which 
the SWO community becomes acclimated to the new performance-based component of 
the SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  During the “moving” phase, officers adapt to various 
leadership, management, and performance challenges that are introduced throughout the 
Unfreezing Moving Refreezing 
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process.  During this stage, the informational campaign can dispel myths and indoctrinate 
officers to the changes in the bonus structure.  Step three is the “refreezing” stage, in 
which change has been accepted as a regular component.  This step requires buy-in from 
all levels of leadership in the Navy, particularly within the SWO community. (SHRM, 
2007b) 
Expanding beyond Lewin’s change model, “Lewin’s Force Field Analysis Model” 
(depicted in Figure 39) provides another perspective on the forces influencing the 
adoption of change (McShane & Von Glinow, 2007, p. 272).   
 
 
Figure 39.   Lewin’s Force Field Analysis 
(Adapted from McShane & Von Glinow, 2007, p. 272) 
During this change process, “driving forces” are those dynamic activities that 
impel organization change, while “restraining forces” impede transformation (McShane 
& Von Glinow, 2007, p. 272).  Static equilibrium conditions occur when “restraining 
forces” are equivalent to “driving forces,” while change occurs when these two forces are 
not in balance.  When “driving forces” exceed “restraining forces,” change moves in the 
desired direction.  Conversely, the opposite occurs when “restraining forces” exceed 
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“driving forces.”  Commander Naval Surface Forces, SECNAV, and PDUSD(P&R) 
comprise influential military and civilian leadership positions capable of directing the 
process of implementing performance-based compensation.  Top-down support and 
guidance (beyond issuing DoD Directives) develops the performance management 
system and facilitates the cultural change required to successfully implement a 
performance-based component to the Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Bonus. 
(McShane & Von Glinow, 2007) 
4. Spillover Effects 
a. Positive Spillover Effects 
Implementing a performance-based component to the SWO Critical Skills 
Bonus has an immediate effect of rewarding higher-performing SWOs.  Stellar 
performers benefit directly by earning higher retention bonus payments than lower-
performing SWOs in the same rank.  This system combats the relative flatness of military 
compensation at the O-4 rank between 11 and 16 YCS.  Figure 40 depicts the annual 
basic pay as plotted by years of commissioned service based on the standard promotion 




Figure 40.   Annual Basic Pay by Years of Commissioned Service 
 (Adapted from Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2008a, 
p. 1) 
By adding a performance-based component to the SWO Critical Skills 
Bonus, the resultant pay structure is adjusted by relative performance, thereby 
differentiating overall compensation based on observable performance.  In the near-term, 
such a compensation program improves SWO retention in the mid-grade officer ranks 
and positively affects the overall quality of the SWO community.  Extending into the 
more senior ranks (i.e., Commander), increased retention of high-performing SWOs 
provides a higher-quality force profile, with more competitive cohorts from which to 
select future warship and unit commanding officers (i.e., Commander Command).   
Over a period of years, increased retention of mid-grade and senior 
officers reduces the requirement to maintain an extensive surplus of junior SWOs, 
particularly Ensigns through Lieutenants.  Furthermore, higher retention at later years 
will require fewer SWO accessions to achieve the requisite O-4 and O-5 inventory.  Thus, 
the Navy can realize additional savings in reduced accession costs by increasing 13-year 
retention through the revised retention bonus.  The addition of a performance-based 
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component to the SWO Critical Skills Bonus not only saves money in the short-term, but 
may also reduce the current junior officer surplus and future accession costs (Commander 
Naval Surface Forces, 2008b). 
Since categorization into performance tiers is based on time to promote to 
Lieutenant Commander (O-4), by modifying the SWO Critical Skills Bonus to include a 
performance-based component, the Navy will provide an incentive for junior Surface 
Warfare Officers to increase on-the-job performance earlier in their careers.  SWOs are 
provided with a financial incentive to improve their overall service record through 
graduate education, JPME completion, additional qualifications, subspecialty codes, and 
early command opportunities.  This spillover effect will increase the overall quality of the 
SWO community, as these better-educated and more-qualified officers will add higher 
value to the Navy.  The increased quality of junior SWOs will extend to improve the 
quality of mid-grade officers, who eventually promote to Commander at a higher rate 
than their lower-performing counterparts. 
b. Negative Spillover Effects 
Poor-performing SWOs are likely to strongly oppose the addition of a 
performance-based component to the SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  Since they are 
currently performing worse than their peers and are promoting more slowly, their 
retention bonus payment opportunity is significantly reduced under the compensation 
modifications.  Their motivation may further decrease after being classified as lower 
performers, further reducing on-the-job performance.  However, if they realize early that 
they are on a path to lower pay, these poor performers may improve their performance 
and attempt to improve the quality of their service records by investing in additional 
human capital to boost their professional competitiveness. 
Furthermore, promotion to Lieutenant Commander is highly dependent on 
the quality of fitness reports (FITREPs) in an officer’s service record.  Particularly, recent 
FITREPs are weighted more heavily during promotion board deliberations.  A poor O-3 
FITREP received closer to the O-4 promotion board could significantly reduce the 
resultant O-4 promotion probability.  If the bad FITREP was a result of a disagreement 
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between the officer and the commanding officer (or reporting senior) and not specifically 
due to poor performance, then this FITREP will not fairly represent that officer during 
the promotion board.  Unfortunately, there is limited recourse to handle this situation 
under current policy.  This spillover effect may be further exacerbated with the 
implementation of performance-based compensation. 
Finally, based on the tier characteristics econometric models, minority 
groups may be underrepresented in performance tier 1, particularly African Americans 
and SWOs who classify their race and ethnicity as “other.”  Moreover, officers 
categorized as “other” race and ethnicity are more likely to be classified as tier-3 
performers; indeed, these SWOs are overrepresented in tier 3.  Though unintended, this 
phenomenon may adversely impact diversity, especially if there is a systematic difference 
in retention bonus payouts among race and ethnicity groups. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
Extensive literature supports the difficulty the Navy has maintaining its Surface 
Warfare Officers in the mid-grade level and at later stages of their careers.  Due to the 
single port of entry in the SWO community at the time of commissioning, future warship 
commanding officers (serving in Commander Command billets) are selected from an 
officer pool that accessed as Ensigns (O-1) more than 15 years prior.  This finite officer 
corps is severely impacted by retention decisions along the typical SWO career path, 
including the following influencers: 
• The appeal of civilian job market opportunities compared to the Navy’s 
relatively flat pay structure 
• A bureaucratic promotion system with restrictive promotion opportunities 
in the mid-grade and senior officer ranks 
• Numerous and long deployment cycles 
• Changing job requirements (i.e., Individual Augmentation assignments 
and Global War on Terrorism Support Assignments) 
• The dangerous nature of naval warfare and the shipboard environment. 
These decision variables influence a complex internal labor market, in which 
retaining the highest-quality officers becomes increasingly difficult.  Higher-performing 
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SWOs also have the best opportunities in the civilian sector; while the military’s 
traditional pay system that provides equal pay, allowances, and bonuses (for all who meet 
minimum eligibility) offers little financial reward to acknowledge their exemplary 
efforts.  Furthermore, the current compensation structure provides limited incentive to 
increase the overall quality of the surface warfare community. 
Adding a performance-based component to the Surface Warfare Officer Critical 
Skills Bonus provides the most logical vehicle to influence quality and retention in the 
SWO community.  Targeting the retention shortage between 13 to 16 YCS generates 
positive spillover effects on either side of the implementation period (i.e., before 13 YCS 
and after 16 YCS) and will provide long-term benefits to the SWO community.  
However, to combat potential cultural resistance to the change, implementation will 
require an extensive investment in planning and training to ensure that the program is 
thoroughly communicated to the SWO community and that necessary processes are 
incorporated across all performance-management levels.   
This thesis validated the benefits of adding a performance-based component to the 
SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  This component creates a hierarchical payout in which 
higher performers earn a larger retention bonus than average performers, who earn more 
than lower performers.  The significance of adding performance-based compensation in 
the SWO community includes: 
• Increased 13-year retention among higher-performing SWOs  
• Improved quality of the SWO community 
• Higher promotion rate to Commander (O-5) based on increased 13-year 
retention of high-performing SWOs 
• Better person-job matches among high performers compared to lower-
performing peers. 
The Navy can achieve these benefits while remaining within the existing budget 
for the SWO Critical Skills Bonus program.  Furthermore, the composition of the SWO 
community and retention through 13 YCS can be further improved if the SWO 
community would be willing to relax future budget constraints and allot more resources 
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to the program.  Lastly, taking advantage of higher personal discount rates, a cafeteria-
style bonus payout program can generate additional savings for the Navy. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Adding a Performance-based Component to the SWO Critical Skills 
Bonus 
Retaining larger numbers of high performers increases the quality of the SWO 
community and reduces dysfunctional turnover.  Therefore, it is imperative that the SWO 
community’s retention bonus programs target these top performers.  Conversely, 
functional turnover should be encouraged—in which poor-performing SWOs are enticed 
to leave the service prematurely by reducing existing retention bonus payments.  The 
results from the bonus differential optimization model fulfill both needs and provide the 
optimal solution, in which retention of high performing SWOs is maximized.  
Additionally, a small annual savings is realized by the Navy, which compounds annually 
to yield substantial savings over the lifespan of the bonus program.  It is recommended 
the Navy add a three-tier performance-based component to the Surface Warfare Officer 
Critical Skills Bonus and utilize only the three-year obligation option.  Since the one-year 
obligation provides little guarantee of a long-term commitment, this short-term plan does 
little to improve SWO retention and should be terminated. 
To accurately categorize Lieutenant Commander (O-4) cohorts into three 
performance tiers, this study recommends that the SWO community integrate a SWO 
Tier Performance Review Board into the annual O-4 promotion board, creating a peer- 
reviewed performance management system for performance-based compensation.  Using 
the “whole person” concept, this performance review board will evaluate the complete 
service record to more accurately categorize performance.  Establishing tiers with this 
process extends beyond utilizing a metric based on a single indicator of performance, 
such as Fitness Reports, graduate education, or completion of Joint Professional Military 
Education.   
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This board would establish annual performance tier cutoffs, categorizing new O-4 
selectees into appropriate tiers.  In accordance with the results of this study, the current 
recommendation is to categorize the top 35 percent into performance tier 1, the following 
60 percent into tier 2, and the bottom 5 percent into performance tier 3.  Through the new 
performance-based component, bonus payments should be set accordingly to maximize 
the retention of tier-1 performers. 
2. Cafeteria-style Payment Program 
A cafeteria-style payment program should be added to the SWO Critical Skills 
Bonus.  Incorporation of higher personal discount rates among Surface Warfare Officers 
into a bonus option—which provides a larger up-front lump-sum payment—will yield 
further savings to the Navy for each officer electing this alternative.  A cafeteria-style 
bonus program can generate significant savings for the SWO community while providing 
individual officers (within their respective performance tier) the freedom to choose which 
option best suits their needs. 
3. Recommendations for Further Research 
This thesis provided a thorough analysis of Surface Warfare Officer retention and 
performance-based compensation.  However, further research could expand the study to 
include other important aspects of the SWO community, such as an analysis of earlier 
ports of exit (prior to 13 YCS) and the effect of performance-based compensation on 
SWO culture. 
a. Analysis at Earlier Ports of Exit in the Junior SWO Ranks 
This thesis focused analysis on SWO retention at the 13-year port of exit, 
with emphasis on the corresponding SWO Critical Skills Bonus.  Further analysis at 
earlier ports of exit is essential if policymakers are to determine the most optimal point 
along the SWO career path at which to implement performance-based compensation.  
Retaining at least 275 Lieutenant SWOs for department head tours is essential to the 
operational success of the surface Navy (Monroe & Cymrot, 2004).  The retention 
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bonuses (i.e., Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay and Junior SWO Critical Skills 
Retention Bonus) offered at this port of exit should be studied.  To effectively study the 
influence of these bonuses in the junior officer ranks, researchers must have access to 
FITREP data.  FITREPs provide a fairly accurate performance indicator for more junior 
SWOs.  Therefore, it is recommended that a follow-on study acquire SWO FITREP data 
and analyze the retention effect of adding a performance-based component to the 
SWOCP and Junior SWO CSRB. 
b. Cultural Climate Analysis of the Surface Warfare Community 
Prior to adding a performance-based component to the SWO Critical 
Skills Bonus, the Navy should conduct a cultural climate analysis to determine fleet 
sentiment toward performance-based compensation.  The recommended change to the 
bonus is incongruent with current SWO compensation philosophy—whereby retention 
bonuses have become entitlements, contingent upon incurring an additional active-duty 
obligation and void of any performance-based component.  Consequently, a SWO 
community survey may be necessary to gauge the potential cultural impact of 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 251
APPENDIX A.   FY 2008 MONTHLY BASIC PAY TABLE 
 
(Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 2008a, p. 1) 
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APPENDIX C.   PAY ELASTICITY REGRESSION MODELS FOR 
TIER-1 PERFORMERS 





from Probit Model 
Dependent Variable retention13yr retention13yr retention13yr 
age -0.0114 -0.0441 -0.0113 
 (0.0036)*** (0.0199)** (0.0051)** 
dependents 0.0393 0.2168 0.0555 
 (0.0047)*** (0.0284)*** (0.0071)*** 
prienlist 0.1151 0.3602 0.0825 
 (0.0199)*** (0.1329)*** (0.0270)*** 
female 0.2638   
 (0.0186)***   
amerindian 0.0502   
 (0.0159)***   
asian -0.8508   
 (0.0233)***   
black -0.0431 -0.1785 -0.0489 
 (0.0261)* (0.1224) (0.0357) 
hispanic -0.0066 -0.1431 -0.0389 
 (0.0434) (0.1610) (0.0462) 
other 0.0000   
 (0.0000)   
married 0.0835 0.2080 0.0568 
 (0.0245)*** (0.0920)** (0.0268)** 
masters 0.0661 0.2945 0.0716 
 (0.0132)*** (0.0712)*** (0.0163)*** 
postmasters 0.0000   
 (0.0000)   
JPMEph1 0.0999   
 (0.0132)***   
JPMEph2 0.0000   
 (0.0000)   
OCS 0.0337 0.1638 0.0412 
 (0.0163)** (0.0734)** (0.0181)** 
othercomm 0.1677   
 (0.0198)***   
command 0.1586   
 (0.0091)***   
lpay 0.0151 0.0606 0.0155 
 (0.0023)*** (0.0083)*** (0.0021)*** 
y2005 -0.0094 -0.0416 -0.0108 
 (0.0362) (0.2011) (0.0533) 
y2004 -0.0167 -0.0688 -0.0181 
 (0.0360) (0.2019) (0.0547) 
y2003 -0.0200 -0.0997 -0.0266 
 (0.0363) (0.2012) (0.0558) 
y2002 -0.0194 -0.1014 -0.0271 
 (0.0363) (0.2012) (0.0559) 
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y2001 -0.0184 -0.0976 -0.0260 
 (0.0363) (0.2011) (0.0557) 
y2000 -0.0179 -0.0977 -0.0260 
 (0.0363) (0.2012) (0.0557) 
y1999 -0.0192 -0.1195 -0.0321 
 (0.0366) (0.2006) (0.0565) 
y1998 -0.0207 -0.1406 -0.0381 
 (0.0369) (0.2001) (0.0572) 
y1997 -0.0210 -0.1461 -0.0397 
 (0.0370) (0.1999) (0.0574) 
y1996 0.0055 -0.0355 -0.0092 
 (0.0376) (0.1990) (0.0525) 
y1995 -0.0183 -0.1341 -0.0363 
 (0.0370) (0.1997) (0.0569) 
y1994 -0.0158 -0.1272 -0.0343 
 (0.0370) (0.1996) (0.0565) 
y1993 -0.0167 -0.1378 -0.0373 
 (0.0373) (0.1992) (0.0568) 
y1992 0.0142 0.0283 0.0072 
 (0.0382) (0.1984) (0.0496) 
y1991 0.0388 0.1289 0.0312 
 (0.0389) (0.1994) (0.0455) 
y1990 0.0588 0.2045 0.0478 
 (0.0403) (0.1997) (0.0423) 
y1989 0.0707 0.2392 0.0550 
 (0.0406)* (0.2007) (0.0410) 
y1988 0.0846 0.2939 0.0659 
 (0.0415)** (0.2013) (0.0388)* 
y1987 0.0927 0.3268 0.0721 
 (0.0416)** (0.2026) (0.0377)* 
Constant 0.7215 0.5692  
 (0.0907)*** (0.4850)  
Observations 3100 2320 2320 
R-squared 0.17   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses    
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX D.   PAY ELASTICITY REGRESSION MODELS FOR 
TIER-2 PERFORMERS 





from Probit Model 
Dependent Variable retention13yr retention13yr retention13yr 
age -0.0037 -0.0172 -0.0048 
 (0.0021)* (0.0079)** (0.0022)** 
dependents 0.0359 0.1438 0.0404 
 (0.0028)*** (0.0111)*** (0.0031)*** 
prienlist 0.0141 0.0681 0.0187 
 (0.0137) (0.0540) (0.0146) 
female 0.1039 0.3916 0.0924 
 (0.0208)*** (0.0895)*** (0.0172)*** 
amerindian -0.3957 -1.2666 -0.4645 
 (0.0786)*** (0.2062)*** (0.0751)*** 
asian 0.1676 0.8002 0.1548 
 (0.0128)*** (0.0944)*** (0.0109)*** 
black 0.0418 0.1346 0.0361 
 (0.0111)*** (0.0421)*** (0.0108)*** 
hispanic -0.0031 -0.0260 -0.0074 
 (0.0164) (0.0533) (0.0152) 
other -0.0740 -0.5037 -0.1672 
 (0.0301)** (0.1075)*** (0.0401)*** 
married 0.0712 0.2075 0.0616 
 (0.0127)*** (0.0396)*** (0.0124)*** 
masters 0.0530 0.2000 0.0543 
 (0.0070)*** (0.0290)*** (0.0076)*** 
postmasters 0.0000   
 (0.0000)   
JPMEph1 0.1872   
 (0.0071)***   
JPMEph2 0.1400   
 (0.0079)***   
OCS 0.0039 -0.0072 -0.0020 
 (0.0100) (0.0388) (0.0109) 
othercomm 0.1934 0.7336 0.1476 
 (0.0153)*** (0.0875)*** (0.0113)*** 
command 0.1932 1.4666 0.2337 
 (0.0052)*** (0.0889)*** (0.0055)*** 
lpay 0.0129 0.0400 0.0112 
 (0.0012)*** (0.0035)*** (0.0010)*** 
y2005 -0.0050 -0.0180 -0.0051 
 (0.0210) (0.0813) (0.0231) 
y2004 -0.0072 -0.0258 -0.0073 
 (0.0210) (0.0813) (0.0233) 
y2003 -0.0102 -0.0382 -0.0109 
 (0.0210) (0.0813) (0.0235) 
y2002 -0.0124 -0.0493 -0.0141 
 (0.0210) (0.0813) (0.0237) 
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y2001 -0.0123 -0.0504 -0.0144 
 (0.0211) (0.0813) (0.0237) 
y2000 -0.0124 -0.0503 -0.0144 
 (0.0210) (0.0814) (0.0237) 
y1999 -0.0128 -0.0550 -0.0158 
 (0.0210) (0.0813) (0.0238) 
y1998 -0.0143 -0.0638 -0.0183 
 (0.0211) (0.0812) (0.0239) 
y1997 -0.0137 -0.0622 -0.0179 
 (0.0211) (0.0812) (0.0238) 
y1996 0.0088 0.0068 0.0019 
 (0.0213) (0.0809) (0.0226) 
y1995 -0.0121 -0.0573 -0.0164 
 (0.0211) (0.0811) (0.0237) 
y1994 -0.0107 -0.0529 -0.0151 
 (0.0212) (0.0811) (0.0237) 
y1993 -0.0106 -0.0542 -0.0155 
 (0.0212) (0.0811) (0.0237) 
y1992 -0.0013 -0.0227 -0.0064 
 (0.0214) (0.0808) (0.0231) 
y1991 0.0167 0.0368 0.0102 
 (0.0216) (0.0808) (0.0221) 
y1990 0.0358 0.1031 0.0278 
 (0.0220) (0.0813) (0.0210) 
y1989 0.0449 0.1305 0.0348 
 (0.0222)** (0.0816) (0.0206)* 
y1988 0.0545 0.1626 0.0428 
 (0.0223)** (0.0821)** (0.0202)** 
y1987 0.0607 0.1813 0.0473 
 (0.0224)*** (0.0824)** (0.0199)** 
Constant 0.5250 0.0752  
 (0.0522)*** (0.1923)  
Observations 13720 12920 12920 
R-squared 0.11   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses    
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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APPENDIX E.   PAY ELASTICITY REGRESSION MODELS FOR 
TIER-3 PERFORMERS 





from Probit Model 
Dependent Variable retention13yr retention13yr retention13yr 
age -0.0800 -0.6667 -0.1589 
 (0.0076)*** (0.0624)*** (0.0133)*** 
dependents 0.0795 0.5490 0.1308 
 (0.0136)*** (0.0704)*** (0.0172)*** 
prienlist 0.3057 2.1961 0.7252 
 (0.0411)*** (0.3257)*** (0.0769)*** 
female -0.2017   
 (0.0224)***   
amerindian 0.0000   
 (0.0000)   
asian -0.4240   
 (0.0426)***   
black 0.2317 1.1229 0.3530 
 (0.0402)*** (0.1730)*** (0.0603)*** 
hispanic -0.4347   
 (0.0467)***   
other 0.2343 1.0010 0.3323 
 (0.0515)*** (0.3316)*** (0.1292)** 
married -0.0273 -0.4914 -0.1299 
 (0.0252) (0.1384)*** (0.0397)*** 
masters 0.5583   
 (0.0506)***   
postmasters 0.0000   
 (0.0000)   
JPMEph1 0.0000   
 (0.0000)   
JPMEph2 0.0000   
 (0.0000)   
OCS 0.2084 1.4587 0.4675 
 (0.0344)*** (0.2281)*** (0.0797)*** 
othercomm 0.6003   
 (0.0510)***   
command 0.0000   
 (0.0000)   
lpay 0.0158 0.0988 0.0236 
 (0.0018)*** (0.0134)*** (0.0030)*** 
y2005 -0.0118 -0.0901 -0.0206 
 (0.0637) (0.3339) (0.0730) 
y2004 -0.0139 -0.0471 -0.0110 
 (0.0633) (0.3338) (0.0761) 
y2003 -0.0282 -0.1438 -0.0320 
 (0.0637) (0.3342) (0.0693) 
y2002 -0.0301 -0.1960 -0.0426 
 (0.0632) (0.3355) (0.0658) 
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y2001 -0.0470 -0.1735 -0.0381 
 (0.0634) (0.3342) (0.0672) 
y2000 -0.0315 -0.1289 -0.0289 
 (0.0621) (0.3368) (0.0709) 
y1999 -0.0247 -0.1194 -0.0269 
 (0.0620) (0.3379) (0.0718) 
y1998 -0.0067 -0.0484 -0.0113 
 (0.0627) (0.3397) (0.0774) 
y1997 -0.0035 -0.0539 -0.0125 
 (0.0629) (0.3384) (0.0767) 
y1996 -0.0030 -0.0423 -0.0099 
 (0.0636) (0.3327) (0.0762) 
y1995 -0.0326 -0.1562 -0.0346 
 (0.0647) (0.3307) (0.0677) 
y1994 -0.0290 -0.1072 -0.0243 
 (0.0644) (0.3327) (0.0716) 
y1993 -0.0358 -0.1407 -0.0314 
 (0.0647) (0.3306) (0.0687) 
y1992 -0.0350 -0.1475 -0.0328 
 (0.0646) (0.3302) (0.0682) 
y1991 -0.0379 -0.1421 -0.0317 
 (0.0646) (0.3294) (0.0684) 
y1990 -0.0289 -0.0300 -0.0071 
 (0.0636) (0.3301) (0.0765) 
y1989 -0.0175 0.0285 0.0069 
 (0.0629) (0.3306) (0.0808) 
y1988 0.0005 0.1742 0.0448 
 (0.0637) (0.3275) (0.0903) 
y1987 0.0051 0.1795 0.0463 
 (0.0635) (0.3287) (0.0910) 
Constant 1.8263 12.7602  
 (0.1788)*** (1.3695)***  
Observations 1220 940 940 
R-squared 0.36   
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses    
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